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Abstract
The lens through which people observe and form judgements upon conflict and ter-
rorism depends heavily on the media they consume as well as their personal circum-
stances. This thesis is comprised of three empirical studies; the first two investigate
how media reporting of armed conflict affects both the perceptions of news consumers
and the completeness of media-based datasets, the third analyses the determinants of
public support for terrorism. Chapter 1 studies the factors that drive variation in the
intensity of media coverage that violent events receive and the impact this will have
upon consumers of news media. This is achieved by using the unique Iraq Body Count
(IBC) database. Conflict events accruing intense media coverage are those that have
higher numbers of fatalities and injuries, use more newsworthy weapons (e.g. explo-
sive violence) and occur on weekdays. Events occurring further from Baghdad receive
a reporting intensity penalty, particularly among the international media. Chapter 2
considers the impact of heterogenous reporting on media-based conflict event datasets.
Founders of such datasets select a subset of sources from the universe of news media
outlets to be monitored. This source selection affects both the overall body count as
well as the dataset’s event type composition. The chapter also applies multiple sys-
tems estimation (MSE) techniques to the Iraq case finding that IBC is likely missing a
substantial number of events and that these are not randomly distributed across event
types. The third chapter considers how an individual’s support for terrorism against
civilians is determined by their socio-economic and religious characteristics. The study
uses 11 rounds of Pew’s Global Attitudes Survey in five Muslim countries. Results
show that support for terrorism generally declines as household income or religious
commitment rises. Increased levels of education, however, may significantly increase
support for terrorism in some countries. Finally, a concluding chapter draws out the
implications from these three studies as well as the synergies between them.
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Introduction
Over the past 70 years, the nature of conflict worldwide has changed considerably, from
being mainly comprised of large inter-state or colonial wars, to being characterised by
civil war and insurgency (Dupuy et al., 2017). In this thesis I examine three areas which
have become salient as the nature of conflict has changed. Firstly, this transformation
in conflict, in addition to various technological improvements, means that conflict news
which previously flowed almost exclusively from state actors now usually comes from
personal reports by journalists who have been given increasing degrees of freedom
and access (Gunter, 2009). This media reporting provides the lens through which
consumers’ understanding of conflict is shaped. Secondly, as the prevalence of inter-
state war has given way to civil war, there has been an increased reliance on NGOs and
academics to carry out the documentation of conflict events which has previously been
undertaken by state actors. Such organisations have often relied on the news media as
the predominant (e.g. ACLED, UCDP-GED), or sole (e.g. SCAD, GDELT), source
to populate their datasets. Finally, as the nature of conflict has changed, so have the
types of weapons employed by actors. The use of suicide bombings has grown from
being almost nonexistant before 1990 to over 500 attacks per year by 2015 (CPOST,
2016). However, little is known about the types of people who would carry out, or
indeed support, such indiscriminate attacks which kill so many civlians (Iraq Body
Count, n.d.(a)). This thesis is, therefore, comprised of three empirical studies which
13
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evaluate, respectively, how violent attacks against civilians are reported on by the news
media, are documented by conflict datasets and may command public support.
The first chapter of this thesis considers how the news media can frame conflict through
the heterogeneous intensity of news reporting afforded to different types of conflict
events. The study is implemented using the media-based Iraq Body Count (IBC) data,
which is unique in providing reliable linkages between conflict events and the media
coverage they receive. Specifically, the study evaluates the impact of event characte-
ristics on reporting intensity as well as how sensitivity to these characteristics changes
across domestic, coalition and global media. Those events accruing more intense media
coverage are those which kill and injure more civilians, take place close to the capital,
occur on weekdays and involve the use of explosive weapons. International media repor-
ting is generally more sensitive to event characteristics than that of domestic outlets,
especially in terms of the event location.
In the second chapter, I assess the impact of this imperfect news reporting on the com-
pleteness and composition of media-based datasets. This study will have implications
for those embarking on projects aimed at documenting war deaths, as well as for those
who use such datasets for academic research. Given that monitoring media outlets
is costly, those who create such datasets generally select a subset of media outlets as
sources. The analysis uses the IBC data to generate pseudo-datasets based on the
reporting of selected groups of media outlets. It shows that source selection has signi-
ficant consequences on the overall event and fatality counts of datasets as well as their
event size, temporal and locational compositions. I then progress to assess the comple-
teness of IBC itself through the use of multiple systems estimation (MSE) techniques.
Stratified estimations imply that, because of imperfect media reporting, IBC is missing
around 9,500 conflict events; the majority of which are small gunfire attacks. Further
analysis, based on predictions derived from military and survey data, indicates that an
additional 6,000-8,000 events may have occurred outside of the media ‘ecosystem’.
14
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The third chapter studies how both socio-economic and religious factors may impact on
an individual’s likelihood of claiming that the suicide bombing of civilians is a justified
act. The relationship between income, education and support for terrorism has been
the subject of considerable debate. Conventional wisdom, regularly conveyed by world
leaders, that poverty and poor education are a root cause of violent extremism has
often contrasted with academic research which has painted a weak (Shafiq and Sinno,
2010) or even inverse (Krueger, 2007) relationship. Similarly, rhetoric claiming that
commitment to Islam drives people to support extremism remains empirically untested.
In this study, I significantly increase the quality and quantity of data used to assess
these topics. This involves the use of 11 rounds of Pew’s annual Global Attitudes Survey
totalling over 40,000 interviews in five predominantly Muslim countries. I show that
support for terrorism generally declines as household income or religious commitment
rises. Results on education are more varied with results in some countries indicating
a significantly higher level of support for suicide bombing among those who are better
educated.
15
Chapter 1
Framing of a War
Which Violent Events Grab Media Attention?
1.1 Introduction
Tens of thousands of people suffered violent deaths during the Iraq War (Iraq Body
Count, n.d.(a)). Some died in events generating very limited Iraqi coverage and remai-
ned far off the radar of the typical western news consumer. Other conflict incidents
triggered such a torrent of coverage that only the most isolated person could have failed
to take notice. Perceptions of a conflict held by people living both inside and outside
the war zone will be heavily influenced by the media coverage they consume. The
news media holds the ability to ‘frame’ a conflict by providing the lens through which
consumers view and form judgments on the violence which is occurring.
It has been shown that through the sphere of influence that the media has on public
opinion, reporting can impact governmental responses to international crises (Eisensee
and Stro¨mberg, 2007). While selective coverage of only key moments within a conflict
16
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can lead to short-term emergency responses by international actors rather than the
long-term preventative measures which are optimal (Jakobsen, 2000). Selective me-
dia reporting of conflict may also affect tourist flows into a conflict-affected country
irrespective of the true underlying level of violence (Fielding and Shortland, 2009).
Furthermore, reporting inconsistency could have a substantial impact on the accuracy
of media-based conflict data. It may result in the introduction of measurement error
into data commonly used to measure violence for the purposes of social science rese-
arch (Weidmann, 2015). More directly, there may be significant personal costs to the
friends and families of victims who have died in conflict events that do not meet certain
criteria of newsworthiness, and are therefore left unreported by some media outlets.
There is, therefore, a significant incentive to understand the factors affecting the inten-
sity of reporting of conflict. The key area of research in this chapter is analysing how
heterogeneity in event characteristics influences the intensity of media coverage that
conflict events receive, both domestically and internationally. This heterogeneity in
coverage is evaluated primarily in relation to how it will affect the knowledge of news
media consumers.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, the analysis
uses a dataset unique in directly linking specific conflict events responsible for civilian
fatalities and the monitored media organisations that report upon them. These direct
linkages enable claims that have been made elsewhere to be replicated but in a more
robust way using a new, improved, measure of reporting intensity. Secondly, the re-
search is original in looking at the differences in reporting between domestic (Iraqi)
media, coalition media and international news agencies. Results, are found to differ
significantly between these media groups. Thirdly, the chapter looks directly at the
relative newsworthiness of a variety of weapon types finding that explosive weapons,
and particularly those involving suicide, are more newsworthy.
17
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1.2 Reporting of Conflict in the News Media
Media framing can be defined as “principles of selection, emphasis and presentation
composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters”
(Gitlin, 2003, p. 6). There are two types of bias emanating from media framing which
affect the lens through which consumers view conflict events; description bias and
selection bias (Earl et al., 2004).
Description bias is concerned with how an event is reported. Specifically, the bias im-
pacts the emphasis, presentation and accuracy of news reports covering conflict events.
One example of description bias involves the differences in use of emotive language in
framing conflict events (Evans, 2010; Lehmann, 2005; Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern,
2007). Another example is heterogeneity between sources in specific details about
reported events such as locational information or fatality numbers (Weidmann, 2015).
Selection bias is the focus of this chapter. This refers to the decisions made by media
outlets that determine which events are reported. A news media organisation does
not report upon the entire universe of conflict events that take place, nor do they
cover all the conflict events that are known to have taken place (i.e. all those reported
somewhere), instead they ‘frame’ the conflict by choosing to cover a subset of these
events. Unless this subset is entirely representative of the true events which are taking
place, then news consumers of the particular media organisation will hold a skewed
impression of the conflict.
The question of why certain events are selected for reporting, whilst others are not, has
been at the centre of a string of research since the debate on the factors influencing the
flow of international news was opened by Galtung and Ruge (1965). They established
12 conditions by which events become news; based around variables such as intensity,
unpredictability, scarcity and demand. Building on this, Snyder and Kelly (1977)
18
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theorised the event selection process by using a two-sided model where the media
coverage that a conflict event receives is determined by the interaction between conflict
intensity and media sensitivity. In their model, intensity is determined by the size,
duration and violence of conflict, while media sensitivity represents a function of the
geo-political climate that each media provider is based in. This chapter builds upon
this approach by using a similar, expanded, two-sided analysis. On one side, instead
of the simple measure of conflict intensity, a broader range of event characteristics of
conflict incidents are studied. The hypothesis that media coverage of a conflict event
is significantly dependent on its intensity, in terms of magnitude and lethality, is well
supported by the literature (Oliver and Myers, 1999; Weidmann, 2016). The expanded
characteristics studied here also include the location and date at which an event took
place, as well as the type of weapon used. On the other side, media sensitivity is
studied by comparing the newsworthiness of these characteristics across media groups
(e.g. domestic and international media), this allows heterogeneous sensitivity across
multiple event characteristics and media providers.
As briefly outlined above in section 1.1, the chapter makes several key contributions
to the existing literature. The first is the innovative use of a uniquely rich dataset,
Iraq Body Count (IBC), which is detailed in section 1.4 below. A key advantage over
other studies is that the version of IBC used here gives direct linkages between specific
conflict events and the media coverage they received from numerous diverse sources. To
be clear, IBC is not unique in its recording of media sources used in conflict event data,
but instead the aim to record every reporting source from its broad list of monitored
organisations. It is this data collection process which enables the analysis here in such
a way that would not be possible using other media-based datasets such as ACLED,
UCDP-GED or SCAD. These direct linkages provided by IBC enable the creation of a
reporting intensity variable that records exactly how well reported a particular conflict
event is among a set of sources. This implicitly contains more information than binary
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measures of coverage used by other related research (e.g. Davenport and Ball, 2002).
The main previous examples of research into the reporting of conflict using a reporting
intensity measure is that of Jetter (2014) and Baum and Zhukov (2015). These papers
record the change in the number of media articles mentioning the name of a country on
the day following terror/conflict events occurring there. This ‘country-name intensity’
measure can be useful for analysing the relationship between event characteristics and
reporting intensity for relatively infrequent events. Where it will be limited, however, is
for research into a large conflict such as Iraq. For example, during the time period used
in this analysis (July 2006 – November 2013) there were an average of 7.2 incidents
and 20.5 fatalities per day in Iraq, with at least one event occurring on 98.5% of the
days within the time frame. This frequency of events would make disentangling the
impact of particular event characteristics upon reporting intensity very difficult using
the ‘country-name intensity’ measure. Therefore, the precise linkages provided by IBC
enable the creation of a far more accurate measure of reporting intensity than that
used in previous studies.
A second key contribution here is using the unique data to compare the sensitivity of
different media groups to particular event details. This sensitivity may change over
time, and as a result of entirely exogenous shocks. For example, a change in sensitivity
could manifest itself as a decrease in international media coverage caused by a decline
in their domestic audience’s interest, which is unrelated to the level of violence within
the conflict itself (Woolley, J., 2000). In this case, consumption of these media sources
alone could lead consumers of news media to falsely conclude that violence has declined.
A current gap in the literature exists around the reporting of domestic media due to a
lack of available data. This study will assess whether the reporting of domestic media
outlets in a conflict zone is generally less sensitive to event characteristics than the
reporting of the international media. One specific characteristic where we may expect
to see differential media sensitivity, across domestic and international media, is the
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event location. Previous research (O¨berg and Sollenberg, 2011; Raleigh, 2012) has
suggested the existence of a, within-country, centre-periphery bias. This is the idea
that events taking place near to, or within, the capital city of a country are likely to
be more widely reported than those taking place elsewhere. This is because the media
and its sources will often only have bases in large cities. This effect is predicted to be
largest for foreign media for whom leaving the safety of the capital may be dangerous
and costly. This chapter will test whether this location effect exists and whether it
is indeed found to be greater for the international media. It will also assess whether
any locational relationship is binary (i.e. inside/outside a city) or continuous (i.e.
dependent on the actual distance between the event and the nearest city).
The final key contribution to the existing conflict literature is studying the impact
that the type of weapon used by a perpetrator of violence has on the media coverage
that the violence receives. This topic has been previously explored in some elements of
the homicide literature by studying murders involving guns (Gruenewald, Pizarro, and
Chermak, 2009) or ‘unusual weapons’ (Buckler and Travis, 2005). In addition, Jetter
(2014) finds a premium in media coverage for terror attacks which include a suicide
element compared to those without suicide. However, application specifically to the
media coverage of armed conflict where a far greater range of weapons are employed
can ascertain the relative newsworthiness of many weapon types, as well as providing
answers to several interesting research questions. One question is whether, all else
equal, explosive weapons are found to be more newsworthy than other weapons, such
as small arms gunfire. This may be expected because explosive violence tends to cause
a higher level of collateral damage than events caused by, for example, gunfire. Some of
this collateral can be controlled for in the analysis that will be undertaken here, such as
the increased number of injuries accrued. Other collateral is unobserved here, such as
damage to buildings and property, as well as the increased psychological damage which
may come as a result of the use of explosive weapons (Article 36, 2013). Additionally,
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news consumers may find explosive violence more interesting and ‘exotic’ than other
types of violence and hence media providers may be more inclined to report incidents of
this type. A similar topic of interest, raised but left unanswered by Baum and Zhukov
(2015), is whether there are differences in the reporting of civilian casualties between
those killed by selective and indiscriminate weapons.
1.3 The Iraq War
The selection of the Iraq War as the case study for this chapter was inflenced by several
factors. From the coalition invasion phase in 2003 onwards, Iraq became one of the
largest media events of the 21st century, commanding front page headlines around the
world over a period of more than 10 years. The war was also characterised by actors
on all sides inflicting huge numbers of civilian casualties, which forms the focus of the
research here. The involvement of two global and media superpowers, the US and the
UK, allows for analysis of the coverage of large participating countries. Results should
also translate well to other recent conflicts with western involvement, such as the war
on terror in Afghanistan.
Where generalisability may be somewhat limited is when comparing international me-
dia coverage of Iraq to that of very small conflicts or those without western involvement.
Results obtained on characteristics of the Iraq conflict which are unique such as inter-
preting results relating to event location may also be less transferable to other countries
with different geographical compositions. That said, many of the event characteristics
to be examined here, such as those involving event size and weapon types, should be
relevant across the universe of media outlets and conflicts.
Quantitative evaluation of media coverage of the conflict in Iraq has been restricted
to a few studies. Much of the academic work that has been carried out on media
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coverage of the Iraq war looks at the descriptive framing of the media (Dimitrova and
Connolly-Ahern, 2007), analysing reports from a handful of newspapers rather than
a quantitative event based approach. Additionally, the previous focus has been upon
the invasion phase rather than the bulk of the conflict (Hayes and Guardino, 2010;
Lehmann, 2005). The present research is unique in looking specifically at variables
affecting the intensity of media reporting and also in covering the whole of Iraq over a
significant time period.
Outside of academic research, anecdotal evidence shows that international journalists
were restricted in their reporting capability during the Iraq conflict. This seems to be
particularly prevalent for journalists covering events happening outside of Baghdad;
Joe Floto, a senior producer at the BBC’s Baghdad office, claimed “the situation with
the roads in Iraq is so bad that our staff are largely limited to Baghdad unless there
is a special operation” (Freeman, 2004). In a Pew Research Center (2007) survey of
111 Iraq-based journalists “events occurring virtually anywhere outside of Baghdad”
were consistently stated to be underreported. The same survey also found that 62%
of the journalists claimed that demand for stories on day-to-day violence from editors
had decreased over the year before the survey was taken in late 2007, with most of this
fall attributed to civilian casualties. There was also some evidence of an oversaturation
effect, whereby consumers are overburdened with information about the conflict. As
one journalist put it “the greatest tragedy of the war has been how the media has in
some way bored its audience with the violence”.
1.4 Iraq Body Count Data
Data on both conflict violence and media coverage is taken from the Iraq Body Count
(IBC) project, a non-governmental organisation that documents violent deaths of civili-
ans in Iraq. IBC’s main sources of data are professional media reports originating from
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a range of countries including translated reports from Arabic sources. Their procedure
is to “collect and reconcile every available, distinct report about each incident” (Iraq
Body Count, n.d.(c)), achieved through the use of search engines and media collation
services (e.g. LexisNexis). Data from these media reports are sometimes complemen-
ted with extra information from alternative sources (e.g. from hospitals and morgues).
Each incident included in the data records at least one civilian death, defined as the
victim either being aged under 18 or, at the time of their death, not reported as initia-
ting deadly violence or being active members of a military or paramilitary organisation.
For each unique incident in the data, IBC extracts information on the number of ci-
vilian deaths and injuries (with upper and lower bounds where sources disagree), the
location (to the nearest town/village), the weapon used, and the date of each event.
For some events, further information, such as victim and aggressor identities or time
of day is also documented where available.
The publicly available part of the IBC database lists a subsection (generally one or two)
of the media sources reporting each incident. However, the full ‘IBC Team’ database
which is used here records, for data verification purposes, which of over 200 press and
media outlets monitored by IBC were found to have reported each incident (Sloboda
et al., 2013). This, therefore, presents a unique research opportunity to analyse the
intensity of media reporting of conflict involving civilian casualties.
Although IBC has monitored civilian deaths since the coalition invasion in 2003, the
data used here runs from the 1st of July 2006 through to the 10th of November 2013.
This is due to a change in formatting which meant that not all media sources co-
vering an event were correctly specified before July 2006. Events analysed are only
those for which the minimum number of civilian casualties observed by IBC is greater
than zero, such that all events in the data incorporate at least one confirmed civilian
death. Since the exposition of the US Department of Defense’s SIGACTS database
(Wikileaks, 2010) the IBC team have been amalgamating the two datasets. Due to
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the process being currently incomplete and inconsistent, it was necessary to remove
any events in the data only recorded by SIGACTS. Events included here were also
restricted to shorter duration events which occurred over a maximum period of two
days. This allows for tighter more reliable linkages between specific event details such
as the weapon, time and place (Hicks et al., 2009). Finally, a small number of events
that were documented as aggregated reports of several separate incidents (rather than
as individual events with full information) were also removed from the analysis. These
include, for example, monthly body count figures from hospitals and morgues. A sepa-
rate Technical Appendix (A.2) discusses the implications of removing these from the
database and tests whether the reintroduction of those excluded due to being long du-
ration or aggregations significantly affects results found in the study. These robustness
checks find that these restrictions have little impact on the significance and magnitude
of key results found.
After the above transformations, the data used for this research is comprised of 19,413
unique events responsible for between 54,762 and 59,584 civilian fatalities and between
88,409 and 95,877 civilian injuries. The range in these counts is due to the fact that
some event entries document a minimum and maximum figure where press reports
differ in their reporting of these event details. Here, the minimum count will be used
throughout, however, all results are also robust to using the maximum counts.
1.4.1 Weapon Type
IBC contains detailed information about the specific weapon(s) employed by aggressors
in each recorded incident, this includes multiple weapons in a small proportion of the
events in the data. In order to analyse weapon types the data is coded according to
the primary listed weapon and incidents are placed into one of nine weapon categories.
Similar weapon types have been left separated rather than combined where they could
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics by Weapon
N
Average No. of % in
News Reports Fatalities Injuries Baghdad
Air Attack 186 7.50 5.07 6.27 31.2%
Non-Suicide Bombing 6381 5.47 2.76 7.29 32.8%
Drive-by Shooting 1321 3.59 1.44 0.61 22.1%
Execution 494 2.12 3.67 0.14 7.7%
Gunfire 9014 2.84 2.32 1.02 16.1%
Missile Fire 930 4.09 3.14 9.10 44.5%
Suicide Bomb (Foot) 299 17.28 11.77 24.03 18.4%
Suicide Bomb (Vehicle) 486 13.26 9.24 29.28 23.3%
Vehicle Accident 25 4.40 3.64 14.40 24.0%
Other 277 2.75 1.92 1.47 10.5%
be expected to lead to quantitatively different results. An example is that suicide bom-
bings may accrue a greater level of media coverage than otherwise identical bombings
without a suicide element. Some incidents involving killing by unusual methods such
as stabbing, suffocation or burning, which did not fit into any of the broader weapon
categories above, but had too few incidents to be listed as an independent category,
were designated as ‘Other’. Dichotomous variables were created for each of the 10
categories with Gunfire, as the most frequently observed weapon, being designated as
the reference category throughout the following analysis.
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for the weapons types in the data. The table
shows gunfire and bombings (non-suicide) as the most common event types. It also
suggests a clear link between event intensity and media coverage with those weapon
types such as bombings and aerial attacks causing a higher number of fatalities and
injuries also receiving a higher average number of media reports from IBC sources.
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1.4.2 Event Location
As the IBC data is not accurately georeferenced (i.e. with coordinates), it was necessary
to do so manually for the incidents in the data in order to spatially analyse reporting
intensity. This was achieved by using the smallest unit of locational information avai-
lable across all events, the closest town. There were 691 unique location points within
the IBC data and these were matched with location information from a UNOCHA and
MapAction (2014) dataset providing coordinates for over 23,000 settlements in Iraq.
Geo-referencing to the nearest town will lead to some inaccuracy in coordinate data
by assuming all events take place in the centre of the settlement (Weidmann, 2015).
However, it is assumed here however that this will be directionally unbiased overall
and thus should not affect results when studying distance to events from major cities.
Figure 1.1 plots the manually georeferenced IBC media-based dataset along with the
US military-based SIGACTS (Wikileaks, 2010) dataset which is georeferenced at event
source. The maps show events during the time period in which the two datasets over-
lap (July 2006 - December 2009). The size of the marker in the IBC map indicates
the number of events recorded as occuring at that location. In the SIGACTS data a
marker indicates one event taking place at that specific coordinate point. Whilst we
would expect to see differences between the maps due to being different types of data
(Weidmann, 2016) it does appear that the spatial distribution of events follow broadly
similar patterns.
Distance measures were created from events to the capital and other cities to analyse
whether events further from the capital do, in fact, accrue less intense media coverage.
Google Maps’ ‘directions’ feature was selected due to its ability to calculate driving time
and distance using detailed information on the road networks. Driving time is expected
to be superior to geodesic (as-the-crow-flies) distance because reporting intensity effects
are likely to be due to journalistic decisions about whether events are worth travelling
27
1.4. Iraq Body Count Data 1. Framing of a War
Figure 1.1: IBC and SIGACTS Events by Location
(a) IBC Media-Based Events
(b) SIGACTS Events
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to. Due to the mountainous nature of Iraq, as well as the inefficient nature of the road
network, driving time is expected to give a better indication of this choice. Coordinates
for all location points for individual events within the data were inputted, and expected
journey time (measured in hours) was calculated to the centre of the 5 largest cities in
Iraq (Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Erbil and Kirkuk) according to the fastest driving route.
This was repeated for the driving distance as well as the geodesic distance in order to
perform robustness checks. There were 95 events logged as occurring in the suburbs of
Baghdad, but without precise locations, these were allocated the average journey time
(38 minutes) to other events occurring in the Baghdadi suburbs.
1.4.3 Media Coverage Intensity
The key measure of newsworthiness here will be a count measure of the intensity of
media coverage that individual conflict events receive. This will be achieved by creating
groups of news providers according to location and type and counting the number of
sources within each group that reports each conflict event. This intensity measure
allows the analysis to take advantage of the unique nature of the IBC data in terms of
the number of media providers monitored. It implicitly carries more information than
simply looking at binary measures of coverage for individual news providers. Studying
the intensity of coverage also helps to avoid issues that arise due to some conflict
events involving civilian casualties in Iraq never being reported on by IBC’s media
sources. The intensity measure means that analysis here will study why some events
(all of which have been reported by at least one IBC media source) receive no or very
limited coverage from a particular subsection of the sources whilst other events receive
widespread coverage amongst those sources. In addition, a comparison of these results
across media groups will assess the sensitivity of different types of news provider to
particular characteristics of conflict events.
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Groups to be used as dependent variables are as follows:
• International News Agencies: A count (0 - 3) of the number of international news
agencies (Reuters, AP and AFP) reporting each event.
• Coalition Media: A count (0 - 10) of the number of coalition media outlets
reporting each event. Based on the reporting of the 10 US or UK media outlets
which reported the highest proportion of the conflict events in IBC.
• Iraqi Media: A count (0 - 10) of the number of Iraqi media outlets reporting each
event. Based on the reporting of the 10 nationally reporting Iraqi media outlets
which reported the highest proportion of the conflict events in IBC.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics by Group
Source Group Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
News Agencies 19,413 0.860 0.978 0 3
Coalition Media 19,413 0.744 1.400 0 10
Iraqi Media 19,413 1.253 1.175 0 9
Summary statistics for each variable are presented in Table 1.2 with a list of the spe-
cific sources incorporated into each group in Table 1.3. It can be observed that the
means and standard deviations differ across groups with, for example, coalition media
having the lowest mean and the highest standard deviation. Figure 1.2 tracks the mean
intensity of reporting across all IBC events of the source groups over time. Both a rise
in the reporting of Iraqi media and a decline in reporting by coalition media and news
agencies can be observed over the period. In order to allow for direct comparison of
regression coefficients between the groups these variables will be standardised with a
standard deviation of 1 in ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications of the models
used.
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Table 1.3: Media Sources by Group
Media Source Country Proportiona
International News Agencies
Reuters UK 0.382
Associated Press USA 0.237
Agence France-Presse France 0.226
Coalition Media
McClatchy Newspapers USA 0.203
CNN USA 0.130
New York Times USA 0.112
Los Angeles Times USA 0.096
British Broadcasting Corporation UK 0.069
Washington Post USA 0.057
The Guardian UK 0.019
The Times UK 0.018
The Independent UK 0.014
The Telegraph UK 0.012
Iraqi Media
National Iraqi News Agency Iraq 0.377
Voice of Iraq Iraq 0.319
Al-Sharqiya TV Iraq 0.196
Al-Sumaria Iraq 0.079
All Iraq News Iraq 0.079
AKNews Iraq, Kurdistan 0.070
Al-Iraq Iraq 0.030
Mosul Observer Iraq 0.029
Al-Shorfa Iraq 0.028
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Media Iraq, Kurdistan 0.027
aProportion of included IBC events reported by media source
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Figure 1.2: Average Number of Reports by Source Group over Time
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1.5 Analysis and Results
1.5.1 Models
The analysis here utilises both OLS and negative binomial (NB) models. The OLS
models are used predominantly for comparison between the media source groups created
in section 1.4.3 after standardisation. The distribution (Appendix Figures A.1-A.3) and
nature (count data) of the observations within the source group variables indicate that
a Poisson distribution is the most appropriate model. However, for all three source
groups the variance is found to be greater than the mean, indicating the presence
of overdispersion. Therefore, a negative binomial regression was chosen due to its
ability to model a second parameter indicating unobserved heterogeneity, and therefore
account for the overdispersion within the count data (Long, 1997, p. 230).
The zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model was also considered; this model
assumes that the data was generated by two independent processes (Long, 1997, p. 243).
The first of which is a binary model, independent of the count model, which assumes
that the count measure for some events within the dataset will be zero with probability
one. This imples that in the case of this study there are events which could never
have been reported by the media source group. The second is a count model restricted
to those not designated as ‘always zeroes’. As all of the events in the dataset were
reported by at least one IBC media source the ‘always zero’ assumption does not seem
to fit the data here. However, zero-inflated negative binomial coefficients are reported
in Appendix Table A.3 as a robustness check.
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1.5.2 General Results
This section presents some overall results before the following sections focus on weapon
and locational effects in more detail. Table 1.4 analyses several of the key independent
variables and reports negative binomial and standardised OLS regression coefficients for
the three source group dependent variables created in section 1.4.3. Standardised OLS
coefficients are presented as levels whilst the NB coefficients are presented as incidence
rate ratios. This can be interpreted, for example in the number of fatalities variable,
as follows: one additional death occured by an event will lead to, ceteris paribus, an
increase in media reporting within the news agencies group of 0.02 standard deviations,
according to the OLS model. The NB model implies an increase in coverage of 1.1%
from the previous count. The significant coefficient on the dispersion parameter (alpha)
in all three NB models confirms overdispersion and that these are better modelled
within the negative binomial model rather than the alternative poisson model. All
specifications include controls for year and weapon type. Year controls are important
due to the changing nature of the average level of coverage between the groups across
the time period (Figure 1.2). Controlling for weapon type here ensures that effects
observed on event size are not actually being driven by the weapon used.
OLS coefficients in bold for coalition media or news agency groups indicate significant
differences with the Iraqi media groups according to a Chi-squared test performed using
stata’s ‘suest’ command. They, therefore, indicate heterogeneity between source group
sensitivity for that particular characteristic. Overall, within the results presented in this
section, the reporting decisions of the international media (both coalition media and
news agency reporting) are found to be significantly more sensitive to the characteristics
of an event when compared to domestic media outlets. This is also backed up by R2
levels which show that the model explains a larger proportion of reporting intensity
variation in international media.
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As anticipated by the literature (Oliver and Myers, 1999; Weidmann, 2016), there is
a strong event size effect across all specifications with a positive relationship between
the number of fatalities and injuries and the intensity of media coverage received.
Comparing, using the standardised OLS model, between source groups shows that
this event size effect is largest for coalition media coverage, indicating that coverage
decisions by coalition media are the most dependent upon event magnitude. The NB
coefficient shows that for each additional death incurred by an event the intensity of
coverage received in the coalition media group will rise by around 4%. While the result
is statistically significant, it shows a disproportionate relationship between the number
of deaths and media reports; an increase in the number of people killed, ceteris paribus,
fails to generate an increase in media coverage of equal magnitude.
In terms of the other event characteristics included in the model, the weekend variable
is a dummy variable indicating whether events took place during the Iraqi weekend
(Friday and Saturday). A negative coefficient is observed across all specifications in-
dicating a significant drop in reporting intensity for conflict events occurring at the
weekend where less staff may be available to compile reports. The results of the dri-
ving time variable, as well as the weapon type controls, will be discussed below in
sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.4, respectively.
Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 test the robustness of the results in Table 1.4. Appendix
Table A.1 repeats the analysis in Table 1.4 with the imposition of robust standard
errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). Significant results on fatalities, driving time, and
weekend are found to be very robust to this specification. However, there is a weakening
in significance of coefficients on the number of injuries variable. Appendix Table A.2
tests two alternative specifications of the time controls: the addition of quarter-year
dummies, and the use of a time trend variable with a squared term to allow for any
nonlinearities. These are useful as both a robustness check to Table 1.4 as well as an
opportunity to study how the intensity of media reporting changes over time. Firstly,
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in terms of robustness, results are found to be very similar to those in Table A.1,
with a weakening in results on the number of injuries the only significant change. The
quartile dummies test whether coverage within the media groups differs within year.
Results show that time of year does not affect reporting within the Iraqi Media. For the
coalition and news agency media sources, events occurring in Q2, Q3, and Q4 are less
intensely reported than those in the first quarter of the year. The coefficients on the
year trend and non-linearity term present a very similar picture to the data presented in
Figure 1.2, showing that these trends persist when controlling for other variation. For
the coalition media, the coefficients show reporting intensity rising until 2008 at which
point reporting intensity decreases each year at an increasing marginal rate. For the
Iraqi media, reporting intensity rises every year - albeit at a diminishing marginal rate
- until 2012, before decreasing slightly in 2013. For the international news agencies,
reporting intensity is relatively stable until 2009 at which point it begins to decrease,
although at a lower rate than for the coalition media.
It should be noted that the standard errors, and therefore the statistical significance
of coefficients, are calculated with the assumption that there is no serial correlation
within the error terms. Given that the data is structured as a set of observations of
documented events (with multiple events occurring on a single day in the vast majority
of cases) rather than structured as event counts within set time periods this is difficult
to test for. Robust standard errors, therefore, may still be too small if serial correlation
is indeed affecting the IBC data.
Zero-inflated negative binomial results for the coalition media group - as the group most
likely to suffer from excess zeroes (Appendix Figure A.1) - are presented in Appendix
Table A.3 alongside the full set of results including the control variables for Table 1.4.
The ZINB coefficients are found to be very similar to the non-inflated negative binomial
coefficients presented in Table 1.4.
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1.5.3 Locational Effects
Locational data can be used to analyse whether a centre-periphery bias exists within
reporting of the conflict in Iraq where events closer to, or within, the capital are more
intensely reported. Firstly, in Figure 1.3, reporting of conflict incidents by all IBC
media sources are compared according to their event size and whether they took place
inside or outside of Baghdad. The positive relationship between event size and intensity
of media coverage, shown in Table 1.4, holds for both locations presented here. Howe-
ver, at all event sizes the median number (indicated by the thick horizontal lines) of
media reports for events occurring in Baghdad is higher than those taking place outside
the capital. An interesting extension to this shows that when the graph is extended
to larger events (Appendix Figure A.5) the difference in reporting disappears. This
suggests that for relatively small events a Baghdad bias exists and journalists may be
unwilling to travel to report them. However, once an event passes a certain intensity
threshold, this bias disappears and journalists will cover the event regardless of loca-
tion. The results presented above, in Table 1.4, confirm the existence of a significant
centre-periphery bias for all three media groups. For example, in the coalition media
group, a one hour increase in the driving time from the location of an event to the
centre of Baghdad leads to a decrease in coverage within the coalition media group of
0.0612 standard deviations in the OLS model, or of 12.9% from the previous count in
the NB model. Given that some events in the data occur more than seven hours drive
away from Baghdad, such events will be reported with substantially lower intensity
than those inside the capital.
Given that the centre-periphery bias exists we may expect that international news
reporting will be more sensitive to the bias than domestic reporting. This is because
most international media were based almost exclusively in Baghdad and found leaving
the capital to report events difficult (Pew Research Center, 2007). Therefore, the
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Figure 1.3: Reporting of Events Inside and Outside of Baghdad by Event
Size
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journey time to an event is more likely to be of consequence in their coverage decisions.
In contrast, domestic sources often have offices across multiple regions, meaning that
they are less likely to disregard events as a result of travelling time.
This hypothesis is tested in Figure 1.4. The number of events reported by at least one
of Reuters and Associated Press (the two international news agencies that reported
the highest number of events) is compared by province with the number reported by
at least one of the National Iraqi News Agency and Voice of Iraq (the two Iraqi news
providers that reported the highest number of events). Provinces with darker colours
are those where reporting by international media is more complete relative to Iraqi
media. The graph indicates substantial variation between reporting. The internatio-
nal news agencies reported a higher number of events in provinces close to Baghdad
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(denoted on the map by the octagon symbol), however, in some provinces further from
the capital they reported less than 15% of the number of events reported by the Iraqi
sources. These findings are supported by the regression results in Table 1.4. While the
results show a universally negative relationship between coverage and distance from the
capital, the effect is significantly larger in magnitude in the coalition media and news
agencies groups than in the Iraqi media group (where intensity of reporting decreases
by only 1% per hour). This shows that the media reporting of the international media
is far more sensitive to event location.
Figure 1.4: Ratio of Event Coverage between International and Iraqi Media
Table 1.5 dislays the results of expanded study into the impact of event location on
the newsworthiness of conflict events. One research question, raised in section 1.2, is
whether the centre-periphery bias found above is dependent on distance/travel time or
is a binary relationship only. For this study only the coalition media group is used,
40
1.5. Analysis and Results 1. Framing of a War
this is because Table 1.4 indicates that this group are the most likely to be influenced
by location bias. The first specification is identical to that presented in column 2 of
Table 1.4 and shows a decrease in reporting intensity of around 13% when the driving
time to a conflict event from Baghdad increases by one hour. The second specification
adds to column (1) a dummy variable indicating whether the event occurred within the
city of Baghdad. The coefficient on this dummy variable is positive, significant and of
considerable magnitude; events occuring in the capital obtain a substantial reporting
premium. The driving time variable remains negative and is also significant, however,
the size of the coefficient has now dropped to a reporting intensity decrease of 4% for a
one hour increase in driving time. This suggests that, for the capital city, locational bias
is partially binary, significantly depending on whether an event happens in Baghdad
or elsewhere in the county. However, it is also partially continous, as when an event
takes place outside of Baghdad reporting intensity decreases with the driving time. For
a robustness check (Appendix Table A.5), events in Baghdad were removed from the
sample and similarly significant results on driving distance to Baghdad were observed.
Another question which arises from these findings is whether the results above are
specific to the capital city, Baghdad, or also hold for other major cities. We may
expect that events occuring within, or close to, large cities will also recieve a reporting
intensity premium for several reasons. Firstly, while most journalists in Iraq were
based in Baghdad, some larger news organisations also had small regional bases or
contacts operating in other large cities. Secondly, a higher population density increases
the number of potential observers of conflict events and an increased proliferation
of telephones and internet access increase the ability of locals, news stringers and
journalists to report observed events. Finally, news stories reporting on the deaths of
civilians in cities may resonate more with an international news audience whose own
living standards may be closer to civilians living in urban areas compared to those
living rurally.
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Table 1.5: NB Regressions: Coalition Media by Locational Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Driving Time from Baghdada 0.871∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗
(0.00554) (0.00782)
Within Baghdad City 1.797∗∗∗
(0.0573)
Driving Time from Nearest Citya 0.825∗∗∗ 1.003
(0.0125) (0.0256)
Within Any City 1.445∗∗∗
(0.0571)
Constant 0.489∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0139) (0.0149) (0.0152)
Alpha 0.635∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0205) (0.0223) (0.0221)
Event Size Controlsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weapon Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19413 19413 19413 19413
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.155 0.141 0.143
Standard errors in parentheses; Coefficients are given as incidence rate ratios
a Measured in hours; b No. of fatalities and injuries; cYear and weekend controls;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To test whether this hypothesis is the case, columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.5 repeat the
previous analysis with an alternative measure. Here, driving time is measured from the
event location to the nearest of the five largest cities in the country: Baghdad, Mosul,
Basrah, Kirkuk or Erbil. Column (3) indicates that driving time to a conflict event from
the nearest large city is of similar importance to driving time from Baghdad. However,
in this case, when a dummy variable indicating that the event took place inside one of
the large cities is added to the model, the distance measure becomes insignificant. This
result is also obtained when removing those events occurring within the large cities
from the sample (Appendix Table A.5).
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Appendix Table A.4 reproduces the results in Table 1.5 with standard errors that are
robust to heteroskedasticity (Huber, 1967; White, 1980), there is no change to the
statistical significance of any coefficients.
Overall, within the reporting of coalition media sources in Iraq, there exists a clear
selection bias in favour of those conflict events taking place within Baghdad and other
large cities. Driving time to events from Baghdad is also found to have a significant
negative effect on reporting intensity. However, driving time to events from other cities
is not found to be a significant predictor of intensity of coverage. For robustness checks,
all locational results were rerun, finding very similar results, using an ‘as-the-crow-
flies’ (geodesic) measure of distance instead of the driving time measure (Appendix
Table A.6).
1.5.4 Weapon Type
Whether the type of weapon employed within a conflict event will impact upon the
event’s newsworthiness has previously remained unstudied although indications from
the homicide (e.g. Gruenewald, Pizarro, and Chermak, 2009) and terrorism (Jetter,
2014) literatures indicate that it will have a considerable effect. Figure 1.5 shows the
relationship between event size and reporting within the IBC dataset comparing bet-
ween gunfire and explosive weapons. Comparing these weapon types by event size is
important, Table 1.1 shows bombings have a higher average death toll and Table 1.4
shows that event size is a determinant of reporting intensity. There is a large discre-
pancy between the median level of reporting of gunfire attacks and that of bombing
events which is increasing by event size. In contrast to Figure 1.3, this gap continues
to increase when event size is extended past those shown in the figure (Appendix Fi-
gure A.4). This indicates a systematic difference in the newsworthiness of these weapon
types even where the number of people they kill per event is held constant.
43
1.5. Analysis and Results 1. Framing of a War
Figure 1.5: Reporting of Gunfire and Bombing Incidents by Event Size
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Figure 1.6 displays the coefficients from a regression analysis testing the impact of
various weapon types on reporting intensity, with gunfire (the most commonly occur-
ring weapon) as the reference category. The analysis includes a full range of controls
(event size, region, time trends and weekend). The figure can be interpreted as follows:
those coefficients to the left of the vertical line at zero indicate weapons which are less
newsworthy than gunfire, those to the right of the line hold a reporting intensity pre-
mium over gunfire. Full negative binomial and OLS results are presented in Appendix
Table A.7.
One attack type which appears to attract relatively little coverage is execution. These
events receive a significantly lower intensity of coverage than gunfire across specifica-
tions despite being a particularly brutal and discriminate method of killing civilians.
One reason for this could be that executions carry very little collateral damage. Also,
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Figure 1.6: Standardised OLS Coefficients by Weapon Type
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Note: Confidence intervals at the 95% level. Regression includes region, time and event size controls. Reference category is gunfire
despite some high profile public executions, many are carried out in secret and away
from the public eye. This is in contrast to civilian deaths caused by other weapons,
such as those by bombings or missile fire, which are far less likely to occur undetected.
These factors may prevent news about these events ever reaching many journalists. In
addition to this, if bodies are only discovered several days after an execution has taken
place, some editors may no longer consider the killings as newsworthy.
The results show a significant reporting premium for explosive weapons and aerial
attacks. This supports the idea that explosive violence may be considered as more
‘exotic’, and thus intrinsically more newswothy, than other forms of violence. These
weapon types accrusing the highest intensity of media coverage are also those which
can be considered the most indiscriminate. However, they are also more likely to kill
women and children (Hicks et al., 2009), groups whose deaths are likely to be more
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newsworthy (Peelo et al., 2004). Therefore, it cannot be ascertained without further
study whether the premium in coverage for indiscriminate weapons is as a result of the
weapon type itself, or of the impact of the age or gender distribution of its victims.
The reporting intensity effect is greatest across all groups for suicide bombings and
particularly those suicide attacks which are committed on foot. Such attacks receive
2.6 - 4.6 times more coverage (according to the negative binomial regressions) than,
otherwise equivalent, gunfire attacks. This result runs in the same direction as that
found by Jetter (2014) in his study of the media reporting of terror attacks. There
could be several reasons for the observed reporting premium which suicide bombings
receive. One such reason is that suicide bombing may be considered by the news media
as an extreme version of the ‘exotic’ nature of ordinary bombing attacks, given that
individuals are willing to kill themselves in their pursuit of harming others. Another
possibility is that suicide attacks may be targeted at more newsworthy, high-profile,
victims (Berman and Laitin, 2008) and it is partially the prescence of these which
inflates intensity of coverage.
Figure 1.6 shows significant variation in reporting intensity across weapon types. Ho-
wever, in this case, there is comparitively little variation in the relative sensitivity of the
three media source groups. The figure shows that the groups are close to unanimous
in their ordering of the newsworthiness of the ten weapon types. The exception to
this (i.e. a difference in ordering outside of the 95% confidence interval) is that for the
international news agencies, air attacks obtain a smaller premium over gunfire attacks
than non-suicide bombings. The international and coalition media groups also show
a significantly larger reporting intensity premium for suicide bombings than the Iraqi
media.
Appendix Figure A.6 tests whether results in Figure 1.6 are robust to heteroskedasticity.
The introduction of robust standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) widens the
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confidence intervals (especially for rarer events such as suicide bombings). However,
the significance and ordering of the weapon types is unchanged in comparison with
Figure 1.6 indicating that these results are robust.
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1.6 Conclusions
This chapter has made use of a unique dataset linking specific conflict events to the
media sources which reported them. This data has been employed, firstly, to analyse
how heterogeneity in event characteristics will affect the intensity with which events are
reported by the news media and, secondly, how heterogeneous groups of news outlets
differ in their sensitivity to these event characteristics.
The study has added to the existing literature on the media coverage of conflict in
several ways. Firstly, the availability of an innovative dataset has presented an oppor-
tunity to test the importance of various event characteristics to the reporting of the
news media. In some of these, such as an observed event size bias, this has involved
quantifying an effect also predicted by other studies. Reporting intensity is found to
significantly increase with event size, although, not proportionally. Other event charac-
teristics, such as the day of the week and weapon type of an attack, have been analysed
for the first time. Events occuring on weekends are covered with less intensity by the
media than those which take place on weekdays. In terms of weapon types, a signifi-
cant premium in media coverage has been found across source groups in the reporting
of events involving explosive weapons. Those explosive weapons attacks on civilians
including suicide gain an additional reporting premium. In contrast, otherwise equal
conflict events involving other weapon types, such as execution, receive significantly
less coverage.
Additionally, this chapter has enabled a comparison between the news reporting of
domestic media, coalition media and international news agencies. In general, interna-
tional media are less random in their reporting and, therefore, more sensitive to event
characteristics, such as the magnitude of an event, to determine reporting. This means
that the beliefs of international media consumers about the Iraq conflict are likely to
have been skewed according to the biases found here. The difference between internati-
48
1.6. Conclusions 1. Framing of a War
onal and Iraqi media was found to be at its greatest when analysing locational bias and
specifically the travelling time to an event from Baghdad. Media reporting intensity
decreased with driving time from Baghdad in all media groups. However, the effect of
an additional hours driving time on international reporting was 7 to 13 times that on
domestic coverage. Extended analysis, specifically on the coalition media group, looked
at whether the centre-periphery bias is also relevant for other cities in Iraq. Results
show that the distance measure is only significant for Baghdad although events taking
place within other large cities are reported more intensely.
For consumers of news media, this study has shown that relying on a few relatively
homogeneous media sources for conflict news will lead to significant inaccuracies in the
beliefs held about the nature of violence against civilians. For example, consumers of
media from coalition countries will have observed a decline in the intensity of coverage
per incident over time (Figure 1.2), which may lead them to wrongly assume a decline
in violence against civilians of the same magnitude. They will also have observed a
disproportionately large number of events with particularly newsworthy characteristics
e.g. those involving explosive weapons and taking place within large cities. One recom-
mendation, for those who are interested in obtaining more accurate information about
civilian fatalities in conflict, is to regularly check the websites of data collators such
as IBC that amalgamate information from many sources. This should give consumers
a more unbiased and informed overview of the violence that is occurring. In addition
to this, the news media should also be responsible for regularly updating their readers
or viewers with an overview of known casualties taken from event based data, such as
IBC, as well as other violence monitoring data, such as estimations from surveys.
There are of course several limitations to the analysis carried out here. Firstly, some of
the results may suffer from a lack of generalisability due to this analysis being carried
out on one conflict in particular. The Iraq case study was relatively unique in terms of
the level of international attention it received, media reporting may be very different
49
1.6. Conclusions 1. Framing of a War
in smaller conflicts without western involvement. The conflict was also characterised
by difficulties for journalists in travelling around the country, which may not be the
case in other conflicts. That said, results from certain variables, such as event size
and weapon types, should translate across conflicts and therefore can be interpreted
more generally. Also, the results here were obtained using data that records events
only where civilians were killed; it is possible that selection bias affecting events killing
combatants could be different in nature.
A second limitation is that the IBC data, specifically the subsection of the data used
here containing only fatalities reported by the media in the form of events, is not a
complete list of conflict events which took place in Iraq. The chapter implemented an
intensity measure of reporting (rather than a binary measure of coverage) to mitigate
the impact of this. It is important to note, therefore, that results should primarily
be interpreted as the impact of event characteristics upon reporting intensity amongst
media reported events. The coefficients on these characteristics do, however, point to
some explanations about why certain events are not reported by any media sources.
Analysis here is also restricted to those event characteristics routinely recorded in the
IBC database. There is likely to be heterogeneity within reporting intensity caused
by event characteristics (e.g. victim and aggressor identities) that are not consistently
recorded in the IBC data. There are also likely to be other event characteristics, such
as damage to buildings and capital goods or political relevance of events, which affect
reporting intensity but are not monitored by IBC.
This chapter has enabled a new perspective within a growing literature considering
how the media ‘frame’ conflict through their reporting decisions. The study has also
highlighted several areas where further research is necessary. One such area is for
similar analyses to be carried out in alternative geo-political contexts, for example
conflict zones without western involvement. This is necessary to understand whether
the findings here are specific to the Iraq case, or translate to conflict in general. Another
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area for future research is a need to assess how other event characteristics not covered
by IBC affect reporting, particularly the effect of victim or aggressor characteristics.
Two final research areas which arise from the findings here are studied in Chapter 2 of
this thesis. The first is how the results may impact the accuracy of the media-based
conflict datasets used by many researchers engaged in empirical studies of conflict.
The second considers the likely characteristics of those ‘missing’ events which were not
picked up by any media sources.
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Chapter 2
Assessing the Completeness of
Media-Based Datasets
2.1 Introduction
Conflict event datasets documenting war deaths have often relied on the news media as
the predominant, or sole, source used to populate their datasets. The data contained
within such media-based datasets has been regularly used by politicians, journalists and
other public figures to make claims regarding the intensity and lethality of conflict. This
type of data also underpins much of the academic research into the empirical study of
conflict and related subjects.
It is likely a mistake, however, to assume that these datasets are complete or indeed that
their event type composition (e.g. geographical or locational make-up) is an accurate
reflection of the true underlying compositions. This is due to two contributing factors.
Firstly, Chapter 1 showed that the intensity with which the media reports upon conflict
is non-uniform and determined by event characteristics. The direct consequence of this
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heterogeneity will be on consumers of the news media whose viewpoints will be skewed
according to event newsworthiness. However, in addition to the effect upon news
consumers, these findings also hold significant weight when evaluating the accuracy of
media-based conflict datasets. Secondly, given that monitoring media sources is costly,
those creating such datasets will only select a subset from the full set of media sources
to be monitored. This reporting heterogeneity combined with a non-random source
selection process will lead to a dataset comprised of a biased subsample of the universe
of conflict events.
This chapter is comprised of two main sections which attempt to study these pheno-
mena. The first section provides an overview of the literature surrounding the complete-
ness of media-based datasets. It then proceeds to use the unique Iraq Body Count data
to draw inference about the relative completeness of datasets comprised of subsets of
IBC sources. The second section uses Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE) techniques
to attempt to estimate the extent to which IBC itself may be incomplete.
2.2 Completeness Analysis
2.2.1 Media-Based Datasets
The use of the news media as a source for populating event datasets has increasingly
become the normality in conflict documentation. Many of the most widely-used conflict
event datasets use media reports as sources for their data. In some cases, such as
the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) and the Global Database of Events,
Language and Tone (GDELT), reporting by the news media is the sole data source. In
others, such as the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP-GED) and the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), news reports serve as the primary data
source but may sometimes be complemented by other information (e.g. NGO reports
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or research articles).
Media-based conflict datasets have been used for countless academic studies into a wide
range of conflict-related fields. Examples include studies looking at the relationship
between conflict and climate change (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; O’Loughlin, Linke,
and Witmer, 2014), migration (Forsberg, 2010), child welfare (Minoiu and Shemyakina,
2014) and inequality (Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh, 2009; Fjelde and Østby, 2014) among
many others. The validity of many of these studies relies upon the composition of events
within these datasets being an accurate reflection of the unobserved true composition
of events. For example, analysis which compares child health outcomes across regions
affected by heterogeneous levels of conflict will be skewed if media reporting is more
sensitive to violence in particular regions. Should violence be consistently recorded by
media-based datasets in such a manner this can be considered a type of neo-classical
measurement error. Systematic measurement error such as this will lead to endogeneity
and therefore biased coefficients where conflict is used as an independent variable in
analyses.
Academic research into the completeness of such datasets has, however, been relati-
vely sparse. While many studies acknowledge that potential inaccuracies may exist
within media-based datasets (e.g. Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004; Eck, 2012) detailed
empirical analyses have been limited. Most trends which have emerged from the em-
pirical literature suggest that the patterns in heterogeneity in coverage intensity found
in Chapter 1 above may also translate to media-based datasets.
One trend to consistently emerge is an event size bias effect, where larger events will
receive higher levels of media coverage. This bias is found to affect dataset completeness
to various extents (Duursma, 2017; M. Price and Ball, 2014; Donnay and Filimonov,
2014). Another event characteristic shown in Chapter 1 as affecting reporting intensity
is geographic location. In terms of the imact this may have on dataset completeness,
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O’Loughlin et al. (2010) find that the geographical distribution of conflict is highly
consistent between the media-based ACLED data and the military data released by
Wikileaks at the regional level. Weidmann (2013) shows, however, that consistency
decreases at higher levels of geographical precision. Studies have also shown a decline
in media dataset accuracy (Weidmann, 2015) or completeness (Davenport and Ball,
2002) in rural areas. The explosive weapons reporting premium found in Chapter 1
has, so far, remained unstudied in terms of the effect upon dataset completeness.
This previous research, generally based around comparing media-based and alternati-
vely sourced conflict data, has a couple of main limitations. One is that other types of
data, used for comparison, are often equally incomplete records of the conflict. For ex-
ample, events in military collected data may only be recorded where troops are present
and thus miss incidents of sectarian violence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 2011). A
second limitation is that research can be somewhat restricted by the laborious nature
of coding necessary to match datasets and thus analysis can often only be undertaken
using smaller samples (e.g. Siegler et al., 2008).
A consistent theme within this previous work is the consideration of media-based da-
tasets as single entities. This bypasses the fact that they are, in fact, composed of
a combination of several selected media sources. Taking this into consideration ena-
bles an alternative type of research which studies how source selection influences the
completeness of a dataset. This considers how dataset creators can strive for efficiency
through the selection of sources to maximise dataset completeness. Completeness here
is defined as incorporating as many of the universe of media reported events and fata-
lities as possible. While, ideally, datasets would monitor all media sources, this is not
often possible due to the marginal costs associated with monitoring each additional
source. These costs may include labour, electronic subscriptions and computing power.
There may also be trade-offs between data completeness and another important aim:
having a distribution of events (in terms of event size, weapon type, location and time)
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which mirrors the underlying distribution.
The limited research that has studied this source selection process has painted a mixed
picture. Doran, Pendley, and Antunes (1973) showed that event data trends based on
data derived from international newspapers were often different to those in regional
newspapers. However, other studies have found that source selection has only a very
marginal impact on conflict documentation (Hazlewood and West, 1974; Taylor and
M. C. Hudson, 1972) and that increasing the number of sources beyond two is “not
likely to result in substantial changes to the overall picture” (Jackman and Boyd, 1979,
p457).
The present study provides an opportunity to expand upon this ageing research through
using the rich, media-based, Iraq Body Count (IBC) dataset outlined in section 1.4
above. Crucially, in IBC, media coverage can be broken-down by news outlet for each
event. The IBC dataset is also composed of many media sources of various types and
country origins. This enables the study of which events would have been included
in a ‘pseudo dataset’, generated based on the reporting of a chosen subset of sour-
ces. Through this methodology it is possible to assess the benefits of adding further
sources to a dataset, and to establish which pseudo datasets offer the most accurate
documentation of the conflict relative to IBC.
In this chapter, analysis is conducted based upon a binary measure of event inclusion
within a ‘pseudo dataset’ group of sources, relative to IBC. It is important to note
that this measure is different to the count measure of intensity used in Chapter 1. The
results in section 1.5.1 showed that newsworthiness is significantly dependent upon
event characteristics. However, this will only be a problem for the completeness of a
media-based conflict dataset where it results in some events not being reported on by
any monitored media source. This is because only one media outlet reporting the event,
among all monitored media sources, is necessary to ensure that an event is documented.
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It is important to note, again, here that Iraq Body Count itself is not a complete list
of conflict events and is likely to be “missing many civilian deaths from violence” (Iraq
Body Count, n.d.(a)). In addition, there are other deaths, such as those found in
morgue body counts, included in IBC but which are not recorded in the format of an
event. This means that results here should be interpreted as assessing completeness of
pseudo datasets relative to the media reported IBC data rather than to the unobserved
reality (although results in section 2.3 below will point to how these results may transfer
across to this). This restriction makes sense as the aim of this exercise is to understand
the impact of source selection on, specifically, media datasets. The comparison with
IBC shows the difference between each pseudo dataset and the ‘best case scenario’ of
media data in terms of the IBC dataset.
This first section (2.2.2) is comprised of figures and simple regressions which show how
these pseudo datasets will differ in their documentation of the conflict relative to the
IBC dataset, comprised of the full set of media sources.
2.2.2 Dataset Creation Exercise
For the purpose of this exercise I generate four pseudo datasets which are detailed in
Table 2.1 and are subsets of the full IBC database. As monitoring media sources is
costly, I restrict the number of sources per group to a maximum of five sources.
Dataset (1) is comprised of the reporting of AP and AFP. These two sources were
specifically chosen as a pseudo dataset grouping due to being commonly incorporated
into conflict event datasets. For example, they are the sole two sources used for the
Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) which has been used regularly in conflict
research (Salehyan et al., 2012). They are also two of the main media sources which act
as a basis for the UCDP-GED Database (Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). Despite their
wide use, a dataset comprised of these two sources for Iraq would only include around
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a third of the events within IBC while incorporating 59% of the total deaths.
The second and third pseudo datasets are comprised of the reporting of national media
outlets (e.g. newspapers and websites). The sources for dataset (2) are the five US/UK
media outlets that reported the highest proportion of conflict events. The third is the
equivalent Iraqi group. These two datasets incorporate similar numbers of fatalities,
however, dataset (2) has a considerably lower event count. The final dataset, (4), is
based upon the reporting of the five largest reporting news agencies in the IBC data,
combining both international and Iraqi focused agencies. This dataset incorporates
around 40% more events and 30% more fatalities than the other media outlets. I
would, therefore, anticipate that it will also have event type compositions which are
more similar to the full IBC data.
2.2.3 Event Size
One area of key importance when implementing a data collection project aiming to do-
cument a conflict is the accuracy of the event size distribution of the dataset. Table 1.4
showed the existence of an event size bias whereby the intensity of media reporting that
Table 2.1: Pseudo Datasets by Source Composition
Name Sources
Completeness
Events Fatalities
(1) SCAD Sources AP & AFP 34.25% 58.91%
(2) US/UK Media
McClatchy Newspapers, CNN, New
26.08% 53.73%
York Times, LA Times, BBC
(3) Iraqi Media
Al-Sharqiya TV, Al-Sumaria, All Iraq
38.65% 55.12%
News, AKNews, Al-Iraq
(4) News Agencies
Reuters, AP, AFP, Voice of Iraq,
76.95% 85.20%
National Iraqi News Agency
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an event receives depends upon the number of fatalities which it inflicts. This is clearly
presented in Figure 2.1. As event size increases, the proportion of events reported by
1 - 3 IBC monitored media sources falls from nearly 80%, for events with one death,
to under 20% in events where ten people were killed. This implies that restricting
the number of sources within a dataset will likely accentuate this event size bias as
disproportionate numbers of smaller events will be missed for every omitted source.
Figure 2.1: Event Size Bias on Media Coverage
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The assertion that smaller datasets will accentuate the event size bias is tested in
Figure 2.2. The solid line represents the proportion of events reported by Reuters (the
media source reporting the highest number of events) at each event size relative to
the complete list of media reported events at that event size. The next six largest
sources according to the number of IBC events reported are then added in turn to
create an increasingly large dataset. A horizontal line would imply that a source
group incorporates events in a uniform manner and thus does not have any event
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size bias. The steep gradient of the Reuters line means that despite covering around
75% of conflict events with 10 fatalities, only around 32% of events with a single death
are included. The figure shows that adding sources tends to contribute more to the
inclusion of smaller events than larger ones (where there is likely to be more crossover in
reporting). Adding a further six sources contributes a percentage point increase of 21%
for events of size 10 whilst increasing coverage by 49% for events of size 1. This figure
shows the importance of utilising multiple media sources when recording casualties in
media-based event data and that this will be particularly effective in reducing the event
size bias affecting the recording of smaller events.
Figure 2.2: Relative Completeness by Dataset Size
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In terms of the pseudo datasets outlined above in Table 2.1, Figure 2.3 presents their
relative event size distributions. For all four, there is a clear oversampling of large
events, albeit to differing extents. Despite reporting a lower proportion of events at
each event size, dataset (3) follows a similar event size distribution to that of dataset
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(4). The relative completeness of these two datasets is less dependent upon event size
in comparison to datasets (1) and (2) where the event size bias effect appears to be
particularly strong. This figure highlights a trade-off for dataset implementers between
overall fatality coverage, which is higher in dataset (1), and event and composition
accuracy, which is better in dataset (3).
Figure 2.3: Relative Completeness by Pseudo Dataset
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2.2.4 Dataset Performance over Time
Another important factor in maintaining an accurate record of a conflict is that the
temporal fluctuations in events or fatalities are as a result of real changes in conflict
intensity rather than simply a result of changes in newsworthiness.
Figure 2.4 presents the number of documented conflict events by quarter-year of the
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Figure 2.4: Relative Event Completeness over Time
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four pseudo datasets and that of IBC as a whole. As expected, dataset (4) gives by far
the most accurate documentation of the timeline of the conflict relative to IBC. The
other three datasets are almost identical in their recording of conflict events over the
first half of the timeline, however, after Q1 of 2010 there is considerable divergence. A
dataset in the form of (2) entirely fails to document the resurgence in violence towards
the latter half of 2013. On the other hand, pseudo dataset (3) appears to oversample
this period with the event count being around 200 events per month higher than that
which it records during the IBC peak of violence during 2006 and 2007. This divergence
is likely to be due to the declining interest in the conflict in Western countries as well as
the increased capacity for reporting by the Iraqi media. Appendix Figure B.1 presents
the results for fatalities over time. These results are very similar to those for events,
albeit the differences are slightly less pronounced.
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2.2.5 Weapon Type Distributions
Another important dataset characteristic is to have an accurate composition of the
various types of violence employed (i.e. the weapons used). Figure 2.5 shows how the
IBC weapon composition compares with the compositions contained within the pseudo
datasets. (1) and (2) portray a conflict which is almost 60% comprised of incidents of
explosive violence (air, missile and bombing attacks). The full IBC data suggests these
types of attacks are responsible for around 42% of violence.
A similar picture is obtained in Appendix Figure B.2 showing the weapon distribution
of deaths rather than events. Pseudo datasets (1), (2) and (3) show explosive weapons
being responsible for around 68% of deaths while IBC shows that these should cover
less than 54%. This type of bias is likely to significantly affect research undertaken
using weapons data as variables.
Figure 2.5: Weapon Composition by Pseudo Dataset
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2.2.6 Geographical Distribution
Figure 1.3 showed how western media reporting varies with Iraqi reporting across regi-
ons. In Figure 2.6 I simply show the proportion of events which occurred in Baghdad
according to the 4 pseudo datasets as well as IBC.
Figure 2.6: Proportion of Events in Baghdad by Pseudo Dataset
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The group of sources chosen is shown to have a considerable impact on the proportion
of events which are documented as occuring in Baghdad with all pseudo datasets over-
sampling Baghdad relative to IBC. For example, the sources used in SCAD overstate
relative conflict intensity in Baghdad by more than 13% points. This type of dataset
bias is likely to be a problem for studies using regional conflict intensity, such as Hod-
ler and Raschky (2014) who use the UCDP GED data, and Ide et al. (2014) who use
SCAD, ACLED and UCDP-GED.
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2.2.7 Regression Analysis
These dataset imbalances are tested more formally in Table 2.2. Here I use a dependent
variable for each pseudo dataset which is equal to 1 where an IBC event was reported
by at least one of the set of media sources under analysis, and 0 otherwise. A simple
linear probability (OLS) model - chosen due to the ease with which it can be inter-
preted - is then implemented for each pseudo dataset incorporating a range of event
characteristics. Coefficients, where non-zero and significant, show that the probability
of a random IBC event being included in the pseudo dataset is biased according to the
event characteristic in question. For example, the probability that an event is reported
by AP and/or AFP, and is thus included in dataset (1), increases by 0.724% points for
every additional fatality it causes. The coefficients are presented with robust (Huber,
1967; White, 1980) standard errors in parentheses. As noted in section 1.5.2 there is
a possibility that these standard errors may still be too small should serial correlation
be affecting the underlying data.
The regressions confirm the findings from the above figures with all source combinati-
ons showing significant dependencies upon event characteristics when completeness is
compared to the full dataset. The R2s show, as expected, that there is a greater level
of overall dependency upon event characteristics present for pseudo datasets (1) and
(2), where 12.2% and 17.6% of the variation in inclusion can be attributed to the event
characteristics tested here. In contrast, these event characteristics account for only
2.3% of the variation in inclusion in dataset (4) where missingness can be considered
as more of a random process.
The impact on inclusion probability of each event characteristic generally moves in
the same direction across pseudo datasets although there is substantial variation in
magnitudes. A positive coefficient on fatalities and injuries indicates an event size bias
in all pseudo datasets, albeit there is substantial variation between datasets with the
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Table 2.2: Bias in Completeness of Media Source Combinations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCAD US/UK Iraqi News
Sources Media Media Agencies
No. of Fatalities 0.00724∗∗∗ 0.00854∗∗∗ 0.00540∗∗∗ 0.000929
(0.00181) (0.00195) (0.00154) (0.000770)
No. of Injuries 0.00119 0.00107 0.00125 0.000947∗∗
(0.000782) (0.000820) (0.000674) (0.000363)
Baghdad Driving Time -0.0386∗∗∗ -0.0336∗∗∗ -0.00672∗∗∗ -0.00946∗∗∗
(0.00190) (0.00179) (0.00194) (0.00168)
Year Trend -0.00958∗∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗
(0.00141) (0.00119) (0.00148) (0.00133)
Weekend -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.0247∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗ 0.00157
(0.00738) (0.00654) (0.00780) (0.00702)
Air/Missile 0.0283 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗ -0.00799
(0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0136)
Non-Suicide Bombing 0.139∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗
(0.00891) (0.00832) (0.00891) (0.00739)
Suicide Bombing 0.406∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0276) (0.0242) (0.0127)
Other Weapon -0.0750∗∗∗ -0.0499∗∗∗ -0.0587∗∗∗ -0.0404∗
(0.0141) (0.0131) (0.0155) (0.0165)
Constant 0.387∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0103) (0.00815)
Observations 19413 19413 19413 19413
R2 0.122 0.176 0.087 0.023
Note: Omitted weapon category is gunfire; Driving time measured in hours; Robust standard
errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
coefficient on (4) insignificant when controlling for weapon type. In terms of the weapon
type variables, suicide bombing attacks are between 15% and 40% more likely to be
incorporated into the datasets than otherwise equivalent gunfire deaths, depending
on pseudo dataset. The ‘Driving Time from Baghdad’ variable also shows the same
pattern across datasets although the probability of inclusion declines by 4% per hour’s
drive in the SCAD sources while the effect is below 1% in the Iraqi media and News
Agencies datasets.
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One noticeable difference in the bias affecting each pseudo dataset is in the year trend
variable. Inclusion probability is significantly decreasing by year, controlling for other
event characteristics, over the 2006-2013 period in (1), (2) and (4), while significantly
increasing in the Iraqi media dataset (3). This, again, is likely to be due to the decline
in interest in the conflict internationally, especially after coalition troops started to
be withdrawn. Combined with Figure 2.4, this provides strong evidence that source
selection will play a significant part in determining the temporal variation in conflict
datasets. For example, in dataset (2) an event occurring in 2013 had a probability of
inclusion which was 26% lower than an otherwise identical event in 2006. On the other
hand, in dataset (3) the probability would be 28% higher 7 years later.
Table B.1 presents robustness checks comprising alternative temporal specifications;
these are the addition of a quadratic term to the time trend and the addition of dummy
variables indicating the quarter of the year. The table shows that the results in Ta-
ble 2.2 are very robust to these alternative specifications with no coefficients showing
considerable changes in magnitude or significance. The quadratic term is significant
in all specifications, although the direction depends upon the pseudo dataset. For da-
tasets (1) and (4) the quadratic term is working in an opposing direction to the year
trend. This indicates, for example for the SCAD sources, that probability of inclusion
decreases over time but with diminishing marginal reductions. In datasets (2) and (3)
the quadratic term indicates an exponential relationship such that for dataset (2) pro-
bability of inclusion decreases at an increasing rate (and increases at an increasing rate
for dataset (3)). The coefficients for the quarter dummy variables also exhibit variation
in inclusion probability between the different datasets with no consistent pattern. For
the Iraqi Media group (3) there is no significant relationship between the quarter of
the year and probability of coverage. For the US/UK media dataset (2) events in Q1
are significantly more likely to be included than those at other times. For dataset (1)
events in Q3 have higher likelihood of inclusion, while for dataset (4) events in Q4 are
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less likely to be incorporated.
The results here, and those in figures 2.3-2.6, present pseudo datasets covering the same
conflict which are significantly different in their size and composition. These differences
are dependent upon the media outlets which are selected at the outset as data sources.
The difference to the IBC data as-a-whole is smallest where the sources within a group
are geographically diverse news agencies. Although the results presented in this section
are specific to the Iraq case, it appears highly likely that the findings will also affect
many event datasets covering other conflicts. This will impact researchers, consumers
and policy makers relying on such datasets to drive their research, or to inform their
beliefs about a conflict. For example, they may incorrectly assume a rise or decline in
violence over time which is, in reality, a product of a change in media sensitivity.
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2.3 Multiple Systems Estimation
The remainder of this chapter exploits the unique nature of IBC by implementing
a multiple systems estimation (or capture-recapture) approach to the data. This is
undertaken with the main aim of predicting the scale and types of conflict events
which are likely missing from the media-reported IBC event data. In addition to
this, the analysis should serve as a critique of the multiple systems estimation (MSE)
methodology, especially where reporting of news media outlets is used as a data source.
Capture-recapture was first introduced within ecological research as a method for es-
timating animal populations in cases where counting full populations would be too
complex or costly (Petersen, 1896; Lincoln et al., 1930). Through the capture, tagging
and then recapture of animals it is possible to generate predictions of the overall popu-
lation size based upon the number of animals captured each on occasion as well as the
overlap. Multiple Systems Estimation (sometimes known as multiple-recapture estima-
tion) expands upon this by implementing more complex statistical methods to allow
for more than two capture occasions and various structures of overlap. These techni-
ques have been used to estimate population sizes in a wide range of contexts such as
the number of web pages on specific topics (Fienberg, Johnson, and Junker, 1999),
the prevalence of HIV among drug users (Mastro et al., 1994) and lesbians among the
population of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Aaron et al., 2003).
In recent years the technique has increasingly been used in the study of human rights
abuses and, specifically, the estimation of incomplete conflict data. The technique
was first used in this field by Ball (2000) to estimate the number of Guatemalans
killed during the CEH mandate. It has since been used for similar projects in Bosnia
(Zwierzchowski and Tabeau, 2010), Peru (Ball, Asher, et al., 2003), Kosovo (Ball,
Betts, et al., 2002), Timor-Leste (Silva and Ball, 2008), Colombia (Lum, M. Price,
et al., 2010) and Syria (M. Price, A. Gohdes, and Ball, 2015) among others.
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These studies estimate the size and lethality of conflict by using lists of conflict events
or deaths as capture occasions. These lists are generally provided by human rights
organisations, governments, or other sources. Entries on each list are then matched
with those on other lists by researchers using information such as date, location and
weapon type, such that each unique event has a set of capture histories based on their
inclusion on each list. MSE can then be used to estimate the number of events/fatalities
which occurred but did not appear on any lists.
In this chapter, news media reporting will be used as the data source for the estima-
tion. Media reporting has previously been used in several studies to generate the lists
necessary for capture-recapture analysis. Eckberg (2001) uses newspaper reporting to
estimate historical homicides in South Carolina. Newspaper data has also been used
to generate predictions on road traffic mortality (Kraemer and Benton, 2015). Ho-
wever, media-based MSE in documenting conflict has been rare. The main previous
example of this, which the current study aims to build on, is Hendrix and Salehyan
(2015). They use a two-source capture-recapture approach to estimate the number of
events which may be missing from the reporting of AP and AFP on social conflict in
Africa in 2012. The present study considerably expands on their analysis by including
a larger and more diverse range of media sources. This makes it possible to test how
the two-source estimation which they implement compares with an estimation using
multiple sources. Additionally, the availability of military and survey data in the Iraq
case provides a robustness check to the MSE analysis which was not available for their
study. The results in this section should complement those in section 2.2, indicating
how the biases found in pseudo datasets relative to IBC may translate across to the
universe of conflict events.
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2.3.1 Data
The IBC data provides a unique opportunity to implement MSE and test its application
to media data. The IBC team perform matching between different media sources at
first capture of an event as part of their verification process. This means that all events
in IBC are included along with their various capture histories across the many media
source ‘lists’ which are monitored by the IBC team. The period of study here is from
the 1st of July 2006 to the 31st December 2009. This interval was chosen as it covers
the overlap between the IBC data (for the period in which all reporting media sources
were correctly recorded) and the US military dataset SIGACTS, which will be used to
check the robustness of findings. During this period the IBC dataset recorded 11,534
unique media reported conflict events which were responsible for 37,393 deaths.
As in Chapter 1, the IBC data used here is comprised exclusively of media reported
deaths which were reported as events. This means that they are recorded with a full
range of event characteristics such as the incident location, lethality, date and weapon
type. This means that the data used here is only a subset of the full IBC, the main
exclusion being the omission of deaths included in IBC as part of composite (aggre-
gate) counts such as morgue tallies or police body counts. There are 644 composite
counts in the IBC database during the 2006-2009 time period of the study comprising
of 9,783 deaths. Although these deaths are not included within the MSE analysis here,
one would expect that the missing events estimated by MSE would imply an additi-
onal death count of at least the 9,783 deaths which were found in composite counts.
The reason for their removal is that full recording of events is the goal of any conflict
documentation organisation such as IBC. Although the body counts provided by these
composites can be integrated into their overall tallies, they are not covered in the same
richness as the events within the data and therefore cannot easily be used for disag-
gregated analysis of the conflict. There are also practical reasons for their exclusion
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from the present analysis. Estimations generated here will be based upon the matching
of events which are stratified according to event characteristics (e.g. event size), the
lack of this information make this kind of estimation impossible when including the
composite deaths. Additionally, the event matching by the IBC team, which under-
pins the SIGACTS comparison in section 2.3.5, is carried out without the inclusion of
compositions.
2.3.2 Capture-Recapture Methodology
Basic two-source capture-recapture estimates can be produced using the following
(Lincoln-Petersen) formula:
N =
M × S
R
Where M is the number of events which are ‘marked’ by being reported by the first
media outlet, S is those ‘marked’ by the second media outlet and R is the number of
events which were ‘recaptured’ i.e. those which were reported by both sources. N is,
therefore, the estimated total population size including those predicted events which
were not reported by either of the media outlets.
Although the estimation itself is simple, the two-source model requires a strict set of as-
sumptions (Lum, M. E. Price, and Banks, 2013) for estimates hold. These assumptions,
as well as their applications to the present context, are outlined briefly below:
(1) Closed population: That both media sources are reporting from identical popu-
lations of total conflict events. This means that they should be monitored over
the same periods and should report from the same geographical areas.
(2) Homogenous probability of capture: All conflict events in the population have
72
2.3. Multiple Systems Estimation 2. Media-Based Datasets
an equal probability of being captured within the reporting of individual media
outlets.
(3) Independent systems: An event being reported by one media outlet does not
affect the probability of that event being reported by another outlet.
(4) Perfect matching: If an event is reported by multiple news agencies it should be
recorded as so in the dataset.
It is reasonable to assume that assumption (1) should hold here; for this analysis I only
include nationally reporting media outlets which report over the whole period of study.
In terms of assumption (4), the IBC team employ a stringent data input methodology
which should meet the criteria of this assumption. Specifically, they aim to record
and collate every unique report from the numerous media sources which they monitor.
Additionally, they only publish events which have been independently reviewed and
error-checked by three team members (Iraq Body Count, n.d.(b)). There is likely to be
some human error within the dataset coding although there is no evidence that this is
common or systematic.
In contrast, the nature of media sources makes it highly unlikely that assumptions (2)
and (3) will hold. Firstly, Chapter 1 of this thesis showed how media reporting of
conflict events cannot be considered homogenous across all events. Instead, reporting
will be heavily dependent upon event characteristics such as lethality and location.
This implies heterogeneous probability of capture according to the population subset
which events reside within, hence violating assumption (2).
Similarly, the news media are unlikely to act in a consistently independent manner
from one another as required by assumption (3). They will not be operating within a
vacuum, searching for events in an entirely random manner (Kru¨ger and Lum, 2015),
instead they will exhibit dependencies in several ways. Some may rely on the same
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sources (e.g. local stringers, witnesses or police). They may also directly rely on one
another (e.g. a newspaper may only decide to report on a story when they become
aware of it through the report of a news agency). Finally, groups of sources (e.g.
domestic media) are likely to have similar criteria of newsworthiness; events residing
within particular population subsets will be more likely to be captured by groups of
media outlets. Positive list dependence, as implied here, will lead to an undercount in
the population estimate for the number of conflict events.
The advantage of implementing a three-source or greater MSE approach over a sim-
ple two-source capture-recapture model is that it implicitly carries richer information
(Manrique-Vallier, M. E. Price, and A. Gohdes, 2013). Data from two sources holds
one of three possible states; captured by source “A”, captured by source “B” or cap-
tured by both. Every additional source doubles the number of capture patterns over
which to draw inference. This allows sophisticated techniques which do not require the
full range of these strict assumptions to hold. For example, MSE can model a range of
interactions between different source lists which means that the source independence
assumption (3) is no longer required to hold. Additionally, the modelling of these
source interactions will help to satisfy assumption (2), as the probability of capture
can differ according to groups of source dependence.
For both two-source and multiple-source estimation there is, however, one important
caveat. MSE can only estimate missing events where the probability of capture is
above zero. In the present context, this means that estimations obtained here will be
bounded in being only those events which could have feasibly been reported by news
media outlets.
The analysis here is carried out using two methods for MSE estimation where the
number of captures is greater than two. Both techniques are implemented using the
data processing software ‘R’. The first method, model-based MSE, obtains estimates
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using log-linear modelling. It derives a list of estimates based upon a full range of
models controlling for various subsets of all interactions between lists. These can then
be ranked according to various fit criteria such as the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) or Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with the best fitting model then chosen
as the central estimate. This method is implemented here using the Rcapture package
(Baillargeon and Rivest, 2007) with the best estimate selected as that which minimises
the BIC. This method has been used in many studies of war-related deaths (e.g. Ball,
Asher, et al., 2003; A. R. Gohdes, 2015).
The second method used for this analysis is the use of ‘Latent Class Models’ (LCM),
a new approach for MSE estimation by Manrique-Vallier (2016), implemented using
the LCMCR package in R. This method works by optimally allocating all observations
into an unbounded number of strata (classes) such that assumption (3) - independence-
holds within each of them. One advantage of this approach over the model-based
method is that the model selection step is not required. Although the method is still
undergoing testing, Ball (2016) claims that the use of LCM is “probably the best option
available for MSE right now.” It is thus useful here as both a robustness check of results
obtained using the traditional model-based methodology as well as an opportunity to
test this novel method.
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2.3.3 Simple MSE Results
The results presented here, first, carry out an overall MSE analysis on the IBC data
before proceeding in section 2.3.4 to study any compositional effects by stratifying
according to event size, date and weapon type.
Two-Source and Three-Source Calculations
In order to illustrate the problems caused by not meeting the restrictions imposed by
two-source capture-recapture, Figure 2.7 shows the result of estimations implemented
through this method on the IBC data. This was generated by randomly drawing 10,000
pairs of news outlets from the top 20 reporting IBC media sources and estimating the
total population size using the Lincoln-Petersen formula as outlined in section 2.3.2.
These results give a median estimate of 4,824 events, while no two source pairs generate
Figure 2.7: Event Population Estimates from Two-Source Capture-
Recapture
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a population estimate of greater than 10,000. Given that the number of events in IBC
during the period of study was 11,534, all pair combinations are clearly underestimating
the true population size. The most likely reason for this significant undercount is the
violation of the independence assumption above which will bias estimates downwards.
The results confirm that the two-source capture-recapture undertaken by Hendrix and
Salehyan (2015) likely produces a significant undercount of the true rate of missingness
in the SCAD datasets coverage of events in Africa. Using their two sources (AP and
AFP) in the Iraq case, I calculate a capture-recapture prediction of a total of 5330
events which is less than half the observed IBC figure.
I now perform a similar analysis in Figure 2.8 however this time with the drawing of
10,000 sets of three random sources and the implementation of log-linear modelling.
Moving to a three-source system moves the median estimate up to 10,096. This is
still below the IBC total of 11,534 although it does now lie within the 95% confidence
interval.
Figure 2.8: Event Population Estimates from Three-Source MSE
Total Events Estimate
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
77
2.3. Multiple Systems Estimation 2. Media-Based Datasets
Five-Source Calculations
As outlined above, increasing the number of capture lists (sources) increases the number
of possible capture patterns exponentially. This, in turn, exponentially increases the
number of possible ways to model source dependency. For the remainder of this chapter
I use five-source MSE. This is the maximum level of modelling complexity available
within the computing constraints of this study. Here, the BIC minimising main estimate
is selected from those produced by 6,893 possible source dependency patterns.
Five specific source lists are selected for the five-source MSE. These are Reuters, As-
sociated Press, Agence France-Presse, National Iraqi News Agency and Voice of Iraq.
These chosen media outlets were the top five sources in terms of reporting completeness
of all events recorded by IBC monitored media sources over the period. They also, as
news agencies, come closest to acting as independent news gathering bodies when com-
pared to newspapers which may rely on agencies or wires for their stories. Finally, the
source dataset comparison in section 2.2 showed that these five sources come closest to
the composition and time trends of the full IBC dataset. These five sources cover 9,283
Table 2.3: Model Based MSE Estimation Results
Rank Modelled Dependencies Estimate Std. Err. Bias df AIC BIC
1 [12,13,14,15,23,24,25,34,35,45] 20858.1 933.8 46.9 14 263.4 384.7
2 [134,12,15,23,24,25,35,45] 20389.3 920.6 48.5 13 260.9 389.4
3 [125,13,14,23,24,34,35,45] 21136.6 973.5 51.0 13 262.8 391.2
4 [145,12,13,23,24,25,34,35] 21307.3 1070.5 60.9 13 264.3 392.8
5 [234,12,13,14,15,25,35,45] 20746.4 933.2 46.9 13 264.6 393.0
6 [245,12,13,14,15,23,34,35] 20798.5 932.7 46.9 13 264.9 393.3
7 [124,13,15,23,25,34,35,45] 20770.7 935.3 48.5 13 264.9 393.4
8 [135,12,14,23,24,25,34,45] 20689.2 958.3 51.1 13 265.0 393.4
9 [123,14,15,24,25,34,35,45] 20779.5 937.3 48.6 13 265.0 393.5
10 [235,12,13,14,15,24,34,45] 20882.3 941.3 48.2 13 265.3 393.7
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of the 11,534 events in IBC during the time period of study. Running estimations using
both the model-based and LCM methods yields the results presented in Table 2.3 and
Figure 2.9 respectively.
Table 2.3 shows abundance (population) estimates for the top ten dependency patterns
ranked according to the minimum BIC criterion. According to these results the optimal
model (1) is that which models paired dependencies between all source combinations.
This indicates that the reporting of none of these sources is truly independent from any
other. This model estimates a total event count of 20,858, implying that IBC may be
missing around 9,000 conflict events from their database. Figure 2.9 shows the results
of the LCM estimation. The solid blue line represents the number of events captured by
the five sources used for the estimation and the red dashed line denotes the total IBC
count. The latent class model method predicts a slightly lower overall event population
of 17,901 albeit with an overlapping 95% confidence interval of 15,694 to 24,122.
Assuming there is no change in the average event lethality, the model-based and LCM
Figure 2.9: Latent Class Model Estimation Results
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methods estimate a total civilian death count of 67,621 and 58,035 respectively. This
estimate, however, is na¨ıve in that it assumes that missing events are just like captured
events and therefore will be drawn equally from event sizes in the same composition
as the captured dataset. In reality, it is highly unlikely that the composition of event
characteristics of the implied missing events will be the same as those detected by IBC.
2.3.4 Stratification Results
The analysis in the previous section indicated that IBC is likely to be missing many
events but provides no insight as to what kind of events these may be. The follo-
wing sections use stratification techniques to partition the population according to
event characteristics. Homogeneity of capture probability was one of the key assump-
tions outlined in section 2.3.2. Some capture heterogeneity will be accounted for by
the source-dependency modelling which is possible when the number of source lists is
greater than two. However, the availability of observable covariate information in the
present context means that the heterogeneity can be more formally controlled for. This
involves carrying out an independent MSE analysis for each stratum of the population.
This means that the assumption that all events have homogeneous capture probability
is now only is required to hold within each stratum. Additionally, because they are
producing an independent estimate for every partition, stratification techniques pro-
vide information upon the implied change in composition of events rather than only
the estimated overall total.
Event Size Stratification
Event size information is available for every event within IBC. Chapter 1 showed that
the number of fatalities was one of the key contributors to differing reporting intensities.
Valid MSE relies on a large enough sample to contain heterogeneity in capture histories.
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Table 2.4: Model Based MSE Estimation Stratified by Event Size
Event Size
IBC MSE Estimate
Events Deaths Events Deaths
1 6,129 6,129 12,807 12,807
[10,980, 14,634] [10,980, 14,634]
2-3 3,264 7,579 5,772 13,403
[4,835, 6,709] [11,227, 15,578]
4-9 1,536 8,255 1,878 10,093
[1,745, 2,011] [9,378, 10,808]
10-19 347 4,558 332 4,361
[320, 344] [4,203, 4,519]
20+ 258 10,872 259 10,914
[251, 267] [10,577, 11,251]
Total 11,534 37,393 21,048 51,578
[18,131, 23,965] [46,365, 56,790]
Note: 95% Confidence Intervals in parentheses.
Because of this, analysing each event size individually would not be plausible due to
an increasingly small number of events at higher event sizes (Appendix Figure B.3). I,
thus, divide the population into five event size strata; 1, 2-3, 4-9, 10-19 and 20+. MSE
is then carried out for each of these strata by using the five chosen sources detailed
above (i.e. Reuters, AP, AFP, NINA and VOI).
The results of this estimation using the log-linear modelling MSE estimation are dis-
played in Table 2.4. They show that IBC itself likely suffers from the same event size
bias found in the pseudo datasets in Figure 2.3. The vast majority of estimated missing
events and deaths are in the smaller event size bands (i.e. 1 and 2-3). The IBC media
sources are estimated to miss around half of the deaths in these event sizes. In contrast,
among the higher event sizes the MSE estimate is very close to, or even slightly lower,
than the IBC observed number of events. It is possible to be lower here because these
estimates are generated based upon the five top reporting sources rather than IBC as
a whole. These results imply that IBC contains virtually the universe of events where
10 or more civilians were killed, but is estimated to miss a significant number of small
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events. The overall totals estimate that IBC contains only 54.7% of the total number
of conflict events that occurred but covers (as events) 72.4% of the total estimated
deaths. With the addition of the 9,783 additional composite deaths included in IBC
body counts but without full event information, IBC is estimated to include 91.4% of
total deaths. Results from the LCM methodology are presented in Appendix Table B.2.
They show identical patterns in the composition of estimated missing events although
the undercount of events of size one is estimated to be smaller.
These results also shed further light upon the pseudo dataset comparison, above, in
Section 2.2.3. As the event data within IBC itself is estimated to have a substantial
event size bias, it appears that the bias present in the pseudo datasets (Figure 2.3) is,
in fact, a lower bound of the true event size bias relative to the universe of conflict
events.
Temporal Stratification
Another variable over which MSE can be stratified is the event date. The event data
within Iraq Body Count has been regularly used by researchers (Lewis et al., 2012;
Boyle, 2009; Deflem and Sutphin, 2006) and the media (e.g. BBC News, 2011; Dewast,
2016) to analyse trends in the intensity of conflict over time. In section 2.2.4, I showed
that the selection of particular groups of sources may affect the temporal distribution of
conflict. In this previous analysis these outcomes were assessed in terms of completeness
against the full IBC database. It is important to note, however, that given that IBC
itself is missing a considerable number of conflict events it is unlikely that the rate of
omission is uniform over time.
To test this, I run individual (model-based) MSE analyses for every month of the
period of study with the results displayed in Figure 2.10, along with their associated
95% confidence intervals. The total estimated event count is around 14,000 which is
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below that predicted in the previous section. This may be because of the lack of event
size stratification which was not possible here because of the small sample sizes per
stratum. Nevertheless, these results estimate that IBC misses many events from mid-
2006 to mid-2007. Interestingly, this period is where the number of deaths recorded
within IBC composites (e.g. morgue statistics) was also highest. This implies that
the deaths caused by many of these estimated missing events are in IBCs overall body
counts but not recorded in the form of events. After July 2007 the gap narrows, aside
from a spike in July 2008. After September 2008 the estimated number of events by
month is not significantly different from the IBC event total.
Figure 2.10: IBC and MSE Event Count Over Time
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One possible reason for this decrease in the estimated missing events rate over time
is the existence of a media oversaturation ‘crowding out’ effect which may exist when
the number of events is high. Media organisations operate under constraints such as
newspaper space, personnel time and financial resources. During periods of particularly
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intense conflict these constraints may lead to a crowding out of events whereby a
conscious decision may be made that some observed events simply cannot be reported
on (Delli Carpini and Williams, 1987; Davenport and Ball, 2002).
Weapon Type Stratification
Researchers have regularly used the IBC data to analyse patterns in weapon usage (e.g.
Hicks et al., 2009; Boyle, 2009). If the added deaths implied by MSE are drawn from
the various weapon types according to the same composition as the IBC data, then
the results of these studies will remain unaffected. Should, however, these estimated
missing events be drawn according to a distribution which differs from that of the
rest of IBC, it can be expected that there will be implications for the conclusions of
these studies. Stratifying by weapon type should also complement Figure 2.5 in showing
whether IBC as a whole exhibits the same overall weapons biases as the pseudo datasets.
In order to facilitate this analysis, events were sorted according to their primary listed
weapon into one of six categories: gunfire, non-suicide bombing, suicide bombing,
driveby shooting, air/missile attack, and other. The event size stratified log-linear MSE
estimation (2.4) was then repeated but with the addition of weapon type stratification.
Appendix Table B.3 presents the full results of these estimations broken down according
to the event size bands used above. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 summarise these results by
aggregating across all event size bands to show overall compositions.
Figure 2.11 presents a comparison between the weapon compositions by event of the
raw IBC event data and that of the estimated event breakdown after the addition of
missing events predicted by MSE. When these are incorporated we observe an increase
of around 7 % points in the proportion of events categorised as gunfire. This increase
has come at the expense of those categories involving explosive weapons. A similar
pattern emerges in Figure 2.12 when we observe the composition of deaths, rather
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Figure 2.11: IBC and MSE Estimated Event Weapon Type Composition
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than events, with the proportion of deaths attributed to gunfire moving from 44% of
the IBC deaths to 48.4% of the MSE estimated total deaths. The smaller increase in
deaths compared to events is because the proportion of gunfire events is higher, and
the increase implied by MSE larger, for smaller event sizes (Appendix Table B.3).
These findings, again, corroborate with the composite deaths available within IBC.
Although full information is not available, many of the aggregate reports which these
additional deaths are based upon contain lines such as “27 bodies found around region,
most deaths caused by gunshot.” It appears likely that if event details were available
for these deaths, IBCs weapon breakdown would be much closer to the MSE estimate.
These results show that the bias towards explosive weapons (Figure 2.5) in the pseudo
datasets in section 2.2.5 above is, again, likely to be an underestimation of the true
bias. This is because Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show that IBC itself is disproportionately
biased in favour of explosive violence incidents relative to other events types.
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Figure 2.12: IBC and MSE Estimated Fatality Weapon Type Composition
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2.3.5 Comparison With Other Data Types
Military Data Comparison
One advantage of using the Iraq case study for this analysis is that IBC was not the only
data gathering project which attempted casualty recording during the period. The US
military’s leaked SIGACTS dataset (Wikileaks, 2010) documented 391,832 reports by
US military service persons in Iraq between 2004 and 2009. Within these reports were
the deaths of 66,081 civilians. While many of these events containing civilian fatalities
were already documented by IBC, the leak brought to light additional conflict events
which need to be incorporated into the dataset.
The complementary data within this military dataset acts as a robustness check to the
above MSE analysis. We would expect that the total number of unique recorded events
(which resulted in at least one civilian fatality) between both IBC and SIGACTS will
be the lowest possible bound of a feasible multiple systems estimation. It is important
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to note that while IBC is likely a non-random subset of conflict events, this will also
apply for SIGACTS. The military data here will hold its own weaknesses (Berman,
Shapiro, and Felter, 2011); it captures only violence against civilians where U.S. forces
are geographically close enough to compile a report and recording also may differ con-
siderably between U.S. military units. For this reason, we should expect that the MSE
estimate will be somewhat higher than this lower bound implied by IBC+SIGACTS.
At present, the IBC team are systematically working through the SIGACTS data on
an event-by-event basis aiming to incorporate all new events into IBC. This process
is currently incomplete and being carried out in a non-random manner meaning that
the amalgamated dataset cannot yet be used. However, the IBC team have estimated
the number of new events which they expect to uncover by taking a random sample
across several event size bands (Iraq Body Count, 2010). The IBC team’s estimation
uses the IBC dataset from 2004 to 2009. As the subset of this data used here only
covers the July 2006 – December 2009 period I extrapolate the matching rate found
across the whole period by the IBC team to the events found within the present data
range. I then use this matching rate as well as its 95% confidence interval to predict
the IBC+SIGACTS event count over each event size band.
The predicted documented events from this IBC+SIGACTS matching as well as the
MSE estimations from Table 2.4 and their respective 95% confidence intervals are
presented in Figure 2.13 below and detailed in full in Appendix Table B.4. Note that
the figure is drawn according to a logarithmic scale. The number of events in each
band in the IBC+SIGACTS tally and the MSE estimates are found to be relatively
consistent with one another across larger event sizes. However, for events of size one,
IBC+SIGACTS predicts a total of 16,233 events, model-based MSE estimated 12,807
events, whilst the LCM methodology estimated only 8,724. There is clearly still a
significant underestimation by the MSE techniques at this event size despite Table 2.4
showing that these small events were subject to the largest MSE increase.
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Figure 2.13: Comparison of IBC+SIGACTS and MSE Estimates by Event
Size
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The results provide an opportunity to test the two MSE estimation methods alongside
a benchmark. The two methods performed equally well among event sizes greater than
3. Below this, however, the model-based MSE yielded results which were significantly
closer to the IBC+SIGACTS projection.
One possible reason for the underestimation of smaller events is that there are two ty-
pes of events missing from IBC. The first type are those events which can be predicted
by MSE. These are those which were on the radar of the news media but were not
reported by the media sources monitored by IBC. Any event could be missing because
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of random variation in reporting. The extent to which event reporting is complete will
differ according to the whether their characteristics fulfil the criteria of newsworthiness
discussed in Chapter 1. A combination of stratification and source-dependency model-
ling means that events can be successfully estimated. The stratification results above
show that these missing events are most likely to be small in terms of event size.
The second type of missing event is that which resides within the ‘ecosystem’ of conflict
events which have no chance of ever being discovered by the news media. MSE can
only produce estimates for those events for which the probability of capture is greater
than zero. Chapter 1 of this thesis found that conflict events will receive an increasingly
limited amount of media coverage as certain event characteristics change (e.g. as events
become smaller, more rural and use non-explosive weapons). It seems very plausible
(although untestable) that extreme levels of these event characteristics which drive
lower reporting probabilities may be enough to give a reporting probability of zero.
The gap between IBC+SIGACTS and the MSE estimates for the small event sizes in
Figure 2.13 is, therefore, comprised of events with no chance of being reported by the
media despite being detectable by the military.
Eventually, once the SIGACTS integration is complete, IBC will contain events which
reside in this ecosystem and further multiple systems estimation should be carried out
with SIGACTS included as one of the capture lists.
Survey Data Comparison
There may, however, be some further events which remain inestimable (i.e. those which
reside in an ecosystem outside of the radar of both military and media sources). For
these, comparing the estimated event composition with that obtained from a represen-
tative household survey may give some indications about the type of incidents these
may be.
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Several household surveys have attempted to estimate the number of war related deaths
in Iraq (Roberts et al., 2004; Burnham et al., 2006). These studies have generally
focused on the start of the Iraq War and their conclusions, and the methodologies
underpinning them, have often been disputed or discredited (e.g. D. Kane, 2007;
Spagat, 2010). One more recent survey by Hagopian et al. (2013), the University
Collaborative Iraq Mortality Study (UCIMS), estimated a total of 405,000 excess deaths
(both violent and non-violent) between 2003 and 2011. As with the earlier surveys this
study has also received criticism. For example, Spagat and Weezel (2017) show that
the 95% confidence interval underpinning this estimate intersects with zero. However,
a benefit of the UCIMS study is that a cause of death is recorded for all violent deaths
found by the survey. This data can be used to produce an estimate for the weapon
composition of violent deaths across any time period. It can thus be used as a robustness
check for the weapon composition predicted by the MSE analysis above.
As the UCIMS Survey and IBC have differing weapon categories, I simplify war deaths
into three broad categories; gunshot deaths, explosive violence deaths and other war
deaths. For the IBC plots above this means combining the gunfire and drive-by shooting
events as well as the suicide bombing, non-suicide bombing and air attack/missile
events. The UCIMS survey was carried out in two sections, one asking for deaths
within the household and another asking for deaths among household member’s siblings.
For the purpose of this composition analysis I combine these to obtain the weapon
composition of the 225 war deaths picked up by the survey. It should be noted that
due to the relatively small sample as well as the wide confidence intervals pointed out
by Spagat and Weezel (2017), the exact proportions should be treated with caution
although can reasonably be considered indicative.
Figure 2.14 compares the weapon composition of raw IBC deaths, the MSE estimated
deaths and that found over the same (2006-2009) time frame by the UCIMS survey.
The UCIMS composition validates the direction of travel of the MSE analysis which
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Figure 2.14: Comparison of IBC, MSE and UCIMS Survey Weapon Com-
positions
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estimates an increase in the proportion of gunshot deaths at the expense of explosive
violence deaths. However, while the inclusion of missing events estimated by MSE
moves the gunfire percentage from 44.7% to 51.6%, the percentage found by the UCIMS
survey is greater still at 57.7%.
This compositional difference appears to provide further evidence for the two event type
model discussed above, whereby events of the second type are those which occurred
in a different ‘ecosystem’ where media detection was not possible. It is these missing
events which explain the compositional difference in weapons between the IBC MSE
deaths and the UCIMS deaths. This difference suggests that these events are comprised
predominantly of gunshot deaths. This conforms well with Figure 2.13 which showed
that events in this ecosystem are mostly those with a small number of fatalities. IBC
(e.g. Table 1.1) shows that gunshot events have the lowest average event size of all
weapon types within IBC, with over half of events with less than four fatalities being
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caused by gunfire. Based upon the findings in Figure 2.10 it also seems likely, although
untestable, that the number of events where the reporting probability is zero will be
higher during times of intense conflict. This is due to an extreme version of oversatu-
ration whereby journalists and stringers may be so preoccupied (e.g. with reporting
large events in Baghdad) that small events occurring hundreds of miles away may never
even appear on their radar.
The number of events within this ecosystem does not appear likely to be enormous,
nor the number of fatalities caused by the events. Figure 2.13 suggests around 3,500
deaths reside within this ecosystem (or 7,500 when using the seemingly less successful
LCM method). There could, however, be further deaths which fall outside the radar
of both media and military monitoring. For the compositional analysis in Figure 2.14
an additional 6,000 gunfire deaths would bring the gunshot deaths percentages up to
the 57.7% found by UCIMS, although some increase in other event types may bring
the actual number of fatalities in the ecosystem slightly higher than this. From these
analyses it seems reasonable to conclude that there may be somewhere in the region
of 6,000 to 8,000 conflict deaths which are missing from the media-based IBC event
data which could not have been picked up by media sources. However, without a truly
representative, successful, survey with a large enough sample, it may be impossible to
draw further inference than this educated guesswork.
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter has contributed to the previous research into the validity of media-based
conflict datasets through an original approach using the unique IBC data. This ap-
proach is based around the study of the source selection process and the impact this
has upon dataset completeness. I implemented this through the generation of pseudo
datasets incorporating events generated from the reporting of subsets of media sources.
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Results show that dataset inclusion is significantly dependent upon a range of event
characteristics. One such event characteristic is the lethality of an event. Event size
bias will affect dataset composition by underrepresenting smaller events. This bias will
be largest where datasets are comprised of a low number of international media sour-
ces. Other important characteristics were the event date, the location and the weapon
type of an event. These factors combine to generate datasets which are compositio-
nally unbalanced relative to IBC. MSE analysis complemented this research by showing
that the biases present within this comparison will likely be a lower bound of the bias
between these datasets and the unobserved full set of events.
The chapter has also added to the growing literature on the use of MSE to estimate
human rights abuses and conflict deaths in several ways. Firstly, in the use of media
sources as the basis for the capture histories. This has only been previously attempted
as a simple two-source capture-recapture (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2015). Here, I show
the significant underestimation that two source models will result in and instead use a
full multiple systems estimation approach to generate population predictions. Secondly,
I apply the technique in a relatively unusual arena due to the existence of other types of
data – military documentation and survey estimation – which act as a useful robustness
checks to the findings here. Finally, in addition to the traditional log-linear modelling
method, I also compare results using the new LCM technique.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations based upon the model-based MSE analysis in this
chapter suggests that between July 2006 and December 2009 the media reported IBC
event data is estimated as missing around 9,514 conflict events as a result of imperfect
media reporting. These events were responsible for a total of 14,185 deaths. In addition
to these a further 6,000 to 8,000 deaths are also likely missing which could not have
feasibly been reported by media sources. IBC, in addition to its documented events,
also records an additional 9,783 deaths as parts of composites (mainly within morgue
counts) rather than events during the period. This implies that the missingness of IBC
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in terms of pure body count implied by this analysis is likely somewhere between 10,671
and 12,671.
Overall, the findings from both the pseudo dataset completeness analysis and the MSE
analysis point to a few recommendations for those whom attempt to document armed
conflict using media sources. Firstly, they should monitor as many outlets as possi-
ble given the resource constraints they are operating within. Increasing the number
of sources grows completeness disproportionately amongst smaller, less newsworthy
events (Figure 2.2) and thus works against the event size bias. Datasets monitoring
conflict should also incorporate a wide range of sources including both domestic and
international media. Without doing so, datasets are likely to be skewed by, for ex-
ample, a decline in international interest in the conflict which could lead to incorrect
assumptions that the level of conflict is also declining.
Even when undertaking these steps there will remain some events which occur and
are not reported by the selected media sources and are thus omitted from the dataset.
Researchers should endeavour to undertake MSE analysis, where possible, to estimate
the completeness of their datasets. This technique will provide an indication of mis-
singness; however, it will only be useful in predicting those events which the media
could feasibly have reported. There are likely to be other events which will remain
entirely off the radar of media sources. It should therefore be taken as a lower bound
of the extent of missing events.
It is therefore recommended that, to increase data reliability, those producing conflict
event datasets ensure that they utilise other sources of conflict information in addition
to media sources. This could be in the form of revisiting data when new sources be-
come available, such as IBC currently integrating the deaths from the leaked SIGACTS
military data. It may also be possible to complement existing event data with further
information even where data quality is less rich. For example, IBC complement their
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event data with additional body count data from morgue and hospitals. Finally, repre-
sentative survey data, can be used to provide information about the likely composition
of missing events even where full event documentation is impossible.
The findings in this chapter, as well as those in Chapter 1, also hold significance for
those academics who use media-based datasets within their research. The present
analysis has demonstrated the presence of systematic measurement error in the level of
violence affecting Iraq between 2006 and 2013 when conflict is documented through the
use of media sources. This non-classical measurement error is such that the observed
level of violence - as recorded by media-based datasets - differs from the true unobserved
level of violence in a non-random way through the influence of the covariates tested
here. The findings also raise the likelihood of similar measurement error affecting
media-based datasets documenting other conflicts.
This measurement error is likely to result in biased estimates in the many empirical
academic studies which use media-recorded conflict intensity as an independent varia-
ble in their analyses. One example of a study whose results will likely be affected by
the measurement error found in this chapter is analysis of the impact of conflict on
education in Iraq by Diwakar (2015). The paper studies how regional conflict intensity
will affect a child’s years of education (or likelihood of school enrolment), where con-
flict intensity is measured by taking the number of events by region according to the
Iraq Body Count dataset. Results in chapters 1 and 2 have showed that violence is
measured with a greater degree of error (i.e. conflict intensity is more underreported)
in regions which are further from Baghdad. Diwakar shows that individuals living out-
side the centre of Iraq - and hence further from Baghdad - have lower average levels of
education. There is, therefore, a negative correlation between the unobserved size of
the measurement error and the dependent variable of Diwakar’s study, education. This
will likely have resulted in the coefficient indicating the relationship between conflict
and education being biased.
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In terms of future research, there are several avenues which should be explored. Firstly,
as both a robustness check and an extension to the present analysis, the estimations
here should be repeated with SIGACTS as a separate source list within the MSE. This
will only be possible once the IBC team completes the considerable task of integration
of these new events. Post-integration we would expect this new combined dataset to be
significantly closer to the universe of conflict events. Secondly, further research should
be carried out on the source selection process undertaken by those establishing media-
based conflict event datasets. This chapter has presented indicative results showing
the importance of this process for data accuracy. Formal models should be developed
to assist dataset creators with these crucially important decisions. Finally, further
research should be carried out on the nature of those events which fall outside the
‘ecosystem’ of media coverage. Studies should assess whether this phenomena is unique
to the Iraq case or also present in other conflicts.
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Chapter 3
Who Supports Terrorism?
The Socio-economic and Religious Characteristics of
those who Claim that the Suicide Bombing of Civilians is
Justified
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the characteristics of those individuals who claim that the suicide
bombing of civilians is justified. It aims to answer three key research questions: Are
those who support terrorism living in poverty? Are they poorly educated? Are they
particularly committed to Islam?
Assessing these three questions is important. Firstly, previous academic research in
this area has been limited and results have painted a very mixed picture (e.g. Shafiq
and Sinno, 2010), often contrasting with conventional wisdom. Secondly, understanding
what drives people to support terrorist activity should have some relevance to domestic
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and international policymakers aiming to reduce terrorism. Terrorism does not operate
in a vacuum and those groups carrying out violent attacks usually require a substantial
level of localised and non-localised public support in order to successfully carry out
their objectives (Pape, 2006).
This study significantly increases the data quality used to answer the key research
questions above. Previous studies attempting to answer similar questions have generally
relied upon data from a single year (Krueger, 2007; Shafiq and Sinno, 2010) and/or
a single country (Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, 2010). In contrast, the present study
collates survey responses from five countries over a period of 11 years (2005-2015),
totalling over 40,000 interviews. This has the advantage of smoothing out random
variation which can affect studies with smaller sample sizes while also better controlling
for covariates (e.g. regional effects). The present data also provides an opportunity
to update ageing existing research. The nature of terrorism has changed considerably
over the past 15 years however most previous studies were carried out using data from
the early 2000s.
While it is expected that conclusions reached here are applicable to a range of types of
terrorist and insurgent activity, the focus in this research is specifically on the suicide
bombing of civilians. Firstly, these types of attacks are unambiguously terrorism,
defined as “the commission of criminal acts, usually violent, that target civilians or
violate conventions of war when targeting military personnel; and that are committed
at least partly for social, political, or religious ends” (Agnew, 2010). Chapter 1 of this
thesis showed that suicide bombings also kill the most civilians and receive the most
media coverage amongst tactics used by armed groups. These attacks can be thought
of as a worst-case scenario which should be universally condemnable. They are also
among the most difficult attacks to prevent using military means (Berman and Laitin,
2005). This is due to the ease with which bombers can blend into crowded areas as well
as their instantaneous impact. This makes the prevention of these attacks, including
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establishing their root causes particularly important. Finally, over the period of study
their use worldwide has increased substantially (CPOST, 2016). It should also be
noted that, although armed groups carry out suicide bombing attacks with a variety
of political, economic or religious aims, the research carried out here is particularly
focused upon suicide bombing which is carried out with the aim of ‘defending Islam’.
Since 2011 85% of terrorism incidents worldwide occurred in majority Islamic countries
(Cordesman, 2017). Islam inspired or Jihadi terrorist attacks have also been responsible
for the majority of terrorism fatalities in Western Europe since 2004 (START, 2017).
3.2 Motivation
There is clear motivation in attempting to understand why people decide to support
extreme ideologies and the brutal attacks which they carry out. The findings in this
chapter are likely to have direct policy relevance for those governments and aid or-
ganisations who are working to reduce terrorism. It should inform the decisions they
make, such as to how to target money and other resources effectively. For this to hold
there should be some causal link between the extent to which citizens support terrorist
activity and the quantity or lethality of terrorist events that take place, both domes-
tically and internationally. While establishing this causal link is outside the scope of
this chapter, I briefly set out how this link may work and related empirical findings.
Theoretically, there are two main causal mechanisms through which public justification
for suicide bombing could lead to suicide attacks taking place. Firstly, there may be a
direct correlation between those who justify attacks and those who at the time of the
survey were members of armed groups. They may be currently involved in planning
or carrying out attacks or may go on to do so in the future. Secondly, those who
justify attacks may be more receptive to aiding armed groups. This could be in the
form of passive assistance e.g. withholding information from counter-insurgency forces
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or willingly harbouring insurgents within their village. Alternatively, they may assist
armed groups directly, this may take the form of financial or land donations. Here it is
important to note that the propensity of citizens to justify attacks is not only relevant
to attacks taking place in that country but also to the flow of financial resources and
fighters to armed groups carrying out attacks in other countries.
Empirically, a causal relationship between public opinion and terrorism has been gene-
rally supported by the literature although there is a need for further research in this
area. Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) finds that a supportive public enables terrorist groups to
carry out more indiscriminate attacks and kill more civilians. Krueger and Malecˇkova´
(2009) find a greater incidence of international terrorism occurs where public opinion
in one country disapproves of the leadership of another.
3.3 Theoretical and Empirical Background
3.3.1 Income, Education and Terrorism
There are several theoretical channels by which income and education may affect an
individual’s likelihood to support or carry out terrorism. In terms of income, an ordi-
nary rational choice model used in the crime literature (Becker, 1968) would predict
that individuals will choose between working in the legal sector or illegal sector de-
pending on what best maximises their utility while accounting for the risks which may
be involved. Here, the likelihood of being involved in illegal activity will increase as
legal wages decrease (Krueger and Malecˇkova´, 2003). In terms of terrorist activity, the
utility derived from participation may be future financial gain or some non-pecuniary
benefit such as a prestige effect felt from furthering one’s political or religious ideology.
In the specific case of suicide bombers, they are certainly not motivated by their own
financial gain, although they may be promised payments to their family in the future
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(Bahney et al., 2013). Under this type of model, we would expect that richer people
would not engage in, or support, terrorism due to the increased opportunity cost of
doing so. On the other hand, the relationship may in fact move in the opposite di-
rection. For example, it could be argued that if there is little or no financial gain from
terrorist activities then the poorest in society - those who have no financial cushion
and whose families are living at subsistence level - have more to lose from any financial
loss than those who are already wealthy. They may also expect less financial gain from
any future regime change where the top jobs and power will likely go to those who are
wealthier or better educated.
In terms of education, it could plausibly be assumed that higher levels of education
may give people the tools (i.e. better reasoning skills) to be able to reject the ideologies
behind terrorism (Berrebi, 2007). Clearly though, this depends upon not only the level
of education that people receive but also the type of education. For example, five years
of education at a madrassa (an Islamic religious school) may give an individual a very
different ideological outlook to one provided by a western style university. It is also
possible that as one’s level of education increases one could become more aware of
national and international political grievances while increasingly mixing among social
networks with others who may hold similar views. There may also be social pressure,
for example in students who are living away from their families, to join these networks
and experience the solidarity which comes as being part of the group (Manzo and
Wintrobe, 2009). Finally, it is possible that educated individuals may feel specific
grievances if the wages they receive in the legal economy do not provide a return on
their investment into education.
Political leaders and policymakers have regularly expressed views on the relationship
between income, education and extreme ideologies. These include many who back up
their foreign policy objectives by directly linking these factors with terrorism. Among
these are former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry who said, “We have a huge common
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interest in dealing with this issue of poverty, which in many cases is the root cause
of terrorism” (Kerry, 2014) and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair who claimed
“Education in the 21st Century is a security issue. There is no better cause nor one
more urgent” (United Nations, 2013). Assertions such as these generally conform to
the conventional wisdom that reducing poverty and improving education should lead
to less people choosing to support or engage in violent extremism.
However, this conventional wisdom has not always been backed up by empirical findings.
The present empirical literature analysing the relationship between income, education
and terrorism can be broadly categorised into three areas. The first area of research
involves macroeconomic studies mapping the level of terrorism at the country level with
various indicators including measures of GDP per capita and educational variables. In
terms of income many studies have found either a positive relationship between GDP
per capita and the level of terrorism (Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze, 2011; Freytag et
al., 2011) or an insignificant relationship (Abadie, 2006; Dreher and Fischer, 2011) after
controlling for various geopolitical factors. Enders and Hoover (2012) find a nonlinear
relationship whereby terrorism decreases with country income but only when income
passes a threshold of GDP per capita. Less macroeconomic studies have included
variables related to education, those that have find contrasting (Brockhoff, Krieger,
and Meierrieks, 2015) or insignificant (Drakos and Gofas, 2006) results. Freytag et al.
(2011) find that while terrorism is decreasing with human capital in the whole country
sample, in Islamic countries this relationship is reversed. The main areas of concern
with these macroeconomic studies have been the quality of the data (e.g. measuring
the level of terrorism consistently over time and countries) and establishing any clear
channels of causality (De Mesquita, 2008). These studies may provide an indication of
the general macroeconomic conditions under which terrorism may thrive, however they
cannot provide any answers on intra-country variation.
The second area of research contrasts the personal characteristics of those who carry
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out, or attempt to carry out, terror attacks with that of the general population. Ber-
rebi (2007) finds that higher education and standards of living appear to be positively
associated with both membership of terror organisations and becoming a suicide bom-
ber in Pakistan. Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003) show that members of Hezbollah are
as likely to come from educated and rich families as they are to have come from poor,
uneducated ones. Related research shows that changing macroeconomic circumstances
will determine the quality of terrorists. Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2012) show that
during times of economic hardship terrorists are better educated and more experienced.
The main problems with this type of research are the small sample sizes and lack of
rich, consistent, data on those who have carried out, or have attempted to carry out,
attacks.
The final segment of research into the relationship between income, education and ter-
rorism is the area in which this study is placed. This is analysing the determinants of
support for terrorism among a country’s population by using household surveys. One
advantage of survey-based analysis is that it utilises larger samples which have more
accurate and consistent information than studies based on characteristics of terrorists
themselves. Another advantage is that because it makes use of socioeconomic details
of individuals within a population, rather than a country’s macroeconomic position
overall, it can pick up within country variation. For example, terrorists may thrive in
general in richer countries but are they - or those whom are passively or actively sup-
porting them - rich or poor relative to the general population? One possible drawback
to this type of analysis, as discussed in the ‘motivation’ section above, is that it relies
on the assumption that at least some of those who claim that terrorism is justified will
go on to carry out attacks or assist those who do.
There have been several studies which use surveys to analyse the likelihood of support
or justification for terrorism according to various characteristics. The two studies which
are most closely related to this chapter are Krueger (2007, p. 23-26) and Shafiq and
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Sinno (2010). These use the same data source, Pew Global Attitudes Survey (PGAS),
and analyse some of the same countries as I do here. Neither of these studies find
strong evidence in support of the conventional wisdom that income and education levels
should be negatively correlated with support for terrorism. Krueger, using the 2004
survey, finds that “people with a higher level of education are in general more likely
to say that suicide attacks against Americans and Westerners in Iraq are justified”
and that the same pattern exists with attacks intended to defend Islam. He finds
that there is a weak relationship between income and justification for attacks but that
there is “no indication that at higher levels of income people are less likely to say
that suicide bombing attacks are justified”. Shafiq and Sinno, using the PGAS from
2005, find a weak and inconsistent relationship between education, income and support
for suicide bombings. In terms of attacks against civilians they find that educational
attainment discourages support in Indonesia and Pakistan but encourages support in
Jordan. They find that greater income discourages support for suicide bombings in
Jordan and Pakistan but encourages support in Morocco. Otherwise, the results they
find are insignificant.
There are a few main limitations of the results of these studies which I attempt to ad-
dress in this chapter. The first is that they are based on a single years’ worth of data.
This means that they have a relatively small sample size in each country and their
results are more vulnerable to short term shocks in the dynamics of support for terro-
rism compared to a larger dataset which includes multiple years. Another limitation
is that they use data from Spring 2004 and 2005 respectively, the nature of terrorism
has clearly changed substantially between then and the final year in this study, 2015.
Finally, both studies fail to fully exploit the amount of information available within
the surveys. Krueger uses a simple mean comparison to show the relationship without
making use of any covariates. Shafiq and Sinno, use an econometric framework but
do not control for religious variables or make use of the full range of income variation,
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instead they separate income into quartiles. This study should complement both pa-
pers by providing an opportunity to test whether their findings remain robust when
they are analysed using an expanded dataset and with alternative specifications.
Given the weak empirical evidence outlined above on education, income and terrorism
I select the following hypotheses to be tested in this study:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is no significant relationship between educational attain-
ment and support for terrorism.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is no significant relationship between household income
and support for terrorism.
3.3.2 Religious Commitment and Terrorism
In a similar vein to the relationship between income, education and terrorism there
is also considerable ambiguity about how an individual’s commitment to Islam affects
their likelihood of supporting terrorism. There are a few theoretical channels by which
commitment to Islam could lead to support for terrorism. One is that radicalisation
occurs directly through teaching of a narrow, fundamentalist interpretation of the Ko-
ran and Sunna, teaching potential suicide terrorists that they will die as martyrs for
Allah (Thayer and V. M. Hudson, 2010). A related channel is that this radicalisation
could particularly thrive when it takes place within social networks which religious
commitment may create (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008).
While politicians, such as U.S. President Donald Trump and his former Security Advisor
Michael Flynn have often linked commitment to Islam with support for violent extre-
mism (Khan, 2016), there is very weak empirical evidence of any link. Mousseau (2011)
uses Pew data from 2002 and finds no relationship between religious commitment and
support for terrorism. Other research has found some evidence of a relationship between
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mosque attendance by Palestinian Muslims and support (Ginges, Hansen, and Norenza-
yan, 2009) although this effect is put down mainly to a ‘coalitional-commitment’ effect
of people meeting together rather than being directly related to religion. Fair, Mal-
hotra, and Shapiro (2010) find that those Pakistani Muslims with a better knowledge
of Islam are significantly less likely to support terrorist groups in some specifications.
Again, because of the weak and contrasting empirical evidence I will test the hypothesis
that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is no significant relationship between commitment to re-
ligion and support for terrorism.
3.4 Data
The data used in this study is taken from several editions of Pew’s Global Attitudes
Project which is freely available on their website (Pew Research Center, 2005-2015).
This takes the form of a representative household public opinion survey administered
to thousands of people across a variety of countries annually. From 2002 to 2015 the
following key question was asked as part of the survey to Muslims in some countries:
“Suicide bombings can be [Often/Sometimes/Rarely/Never] justified against civilian
targets in order to defend Islam from its enemies?”
The answer given by respondents to this question underpins the present analysis. The
question was asked to Muslims in at least one year in Bangladesh, Britain, Egypt,
France, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Senegal, Spain, Tanzania, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda and Uzbekistan. Countries were then selected based upon the following
criteria:
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• A predominantly Muslim population.
• Good data availability through the majority of the period of study (2005-2015).
• Compatible data on education, income and region.
• Has suffered some suicide attacks against civilians during the period of study.
Taking these criteria into account the following five countries were selected for the
analysis: Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey.
Pew follows a robust methodology (Pew Research Center, 2018) in administering their
surveys to attempt to elicit honest answers from participants as well as ensuring that
they sample a representative selection of the population. To ensure that participants
feel comfortable, surveys are contracted out to trusted local vendors. The vendors use
local people to administer the survey face-to-face in the participants own language. To
ensure that the survey is representative, Pew randomly select a number of ‘cluster’ areas
which are normally either city blocks or villages. These are chosen by first randomising
at the provincial level, and then randomising at increasingly smaller territorial units,
until the desired number of these clusters are identified across the country. Sometimes
high-level provinces are selected with probability one, this is to ensure that at least
some part of e.g. a capital city is sampled. At this point teams of local interviewers
are deployed to these selected clusters. If a list of addresses is available residences
are selected at random from this list. If this is not the case, interviewers perform a
‘random walk’ whereby they visit every third or fourth residence along a randomly set
route. Participants from the adult population of these households are then selected
at random, sometimes by choosing to interview the person who has had the most
recent birthday. At least three attempts are made to interview the randomly chosen
household/individual, at this point another household and individual are randomly
selected until the desired sample size is met.
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It is important to note that some small areas were excluded from random sampling in
certain years where they were inaccessible or undertaking the survey may have put the
interviewer in danger. In Lebanon these were comprised of a small part of Beirut under
militia control and a few inaccessible villages on the Israeli border. In Turkey parts
of the Dog˘u region were not sampled in some years due to instability. In Pakistan,
small areas of several provinces were not sampled due to security concerns. In Jordan
and Indonesia (excluding the autonomous Papua region) the survey covers the whole
population in all areas. Omitting these areas of instability from the selection of clusters
detailed above is unlikely to substantially affect results in the present analysis given that
their populations cover such a tiny proportion of the country populations. However,
further research – outside of the bounds of the current study – may investigate whether
individuals in these areas are atypical in their support of terrorism against civilians. For
example, it could be expected that areas under control of militants hold populations
that are generally more supportive towards them and their methods. Alternatively,
observing the violence caused by such groups first-hand may have turned the public
against such acts of terrorism. Future studies may consider these questions by analysing
household surveys of such areas after the conclusion of violence.
For the purpose of this research I merge the individual annual Pew datasets to create
a cross-sectional panel for these five countries. This involved some transformation of
key variables on education, income and region as outlined in the next section. In
around 5% of interviews individuals refused to answer the suicide bombing question
or claimed that they didn’t know whether bombings are justified. In these cases,
the individuals were removed from the analysis. Appendix Table C.1 compares the
characteristics of these dropped observations to those of the full sample along with
results of associated t-tests comparing the means of the groups. It finds that those
who didn’t answer the suicide bombing question had lower average levels of education
and income in comparison to those who did. They were also significantly more likely
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to be female. Although these differences should be noted, I do not believe that they
are significant enough to affect the overall results obtained given that they cover such
a small proportion of interviewees. Furthermore, the characteristics of those who did
not answer the terrorism question (i.e. more likely to be female, less well educated, and
poorer) are found to be very similar to the characteristics of those who did not answer
other, less contentious, questions in the survey. Column 3 of Table C.1 shows that there
are no significant differences between those who did not answer questions on terrorism
and those who failed to answer questions on their life dissatisfaction (aside from on
the no. of children variable). This indicates that such characteristics are likely to be
those of individuals who generally are less politically or socially engaged or who are
cautious of surveys rather than being the specific characteristics of individuals avoiding
questions on terrorism. In a very small number of observations respondents refused to
answer questions on certain covariates (i.e. their education level), these observations
were excluded from models including these variables.
Figure 3.1 shows the number of observations by year in each of these countries after the
removal of observations with missing data. In Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey
data is available for all 11 years. In Lebanon there are also 2 years (2006 and 2012)
where the survey was not carried out. One perceived limitation to the analysis may
be the relatively small sample size which the individual surveys by country rely upon.
The surveys in Indonesia, Jordan and Pakistan have averages of 800-1000 responses
per year, while surveys in Turkey and Lebanon rely on lower average samples (733 and
553 respectively). It is important to note, however, that the regression analysis in this
chapter is not undertaken on these relatively small sample sizes. It will instead combine
observations across years to create far larger samples by country. The total number of
observations across all countries is 44,393.
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Figure 3.1: Observations by Country and Year
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3.5 Country Backgrounds
The selected countries provide the study with considerable variation and scope. Firstly,
the countries cover several major world regions with Islamic populations; the Middle
East, Eurasia, South Asia and Southeast Asia. In terms of population they incorporate
some 550m people, ranging from Indonesia with a population of 262m to Lebanon with
6m. The countries also vary considerably in their economic development; Turkey has a
GNI per capita of $11,230 while Pakistan’s is just $1,500 (World Bank, n.d.). Finally,
and most significantly here, they have suffered from Islamic terrorism to a variety of
different extents.
3.5.1 Indonesia
Indonesia has the largest Islamic population in the world with more than 200m Mus-
lims (BPS Census, 2010). It suffered several major attacks from radical Islamic groups
on civilians during the period of study. These include suicide attacks on Westerners,
Christian groups and moderate sections of Islam. The most lethal suicide attack occur-
red in the resorts of Jimbaran and Kuta, Bali in October 2005. The attack killed 23
people and injured over 100 and was carried out by the Al-Qaeda linked Jemaah Isla-
miyah (BBC News, 2005). More recently, Indonesia has been one of the world’s larger
exporters of Islamic State fighters with more than 500 Indonesians thought to have
travelled to join them in Syria and Iraq (BNPT, 2017).
3.5.2 Jordan
Jordan has generally been considered as one of the most stable and moderate coun-
tries in the Middle East (USAID, 2015). However, in recent years the country “has
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increasingly struggled to preserve its security and inure itself against the threat posed
by homegrown extremists” (Milton-Edwards, 2017). This insecurity includes both a
growing number of attacks taking place in Jordan as well as a steady stream of fighters
leaving the country to fight for various jihadi groups in Syria. Suicide attacks in Jor-
dan have been rare, however, during the period of study, the November 2005 Amman
bombings carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq killed 60 civilians in attacks on three hotel
lobbies (Ghazal, 2015).
3.5.3 Lebanon
Lebanon suffered a considerable number of attacks relative to its small population
between 2005 and 2015, many of which involved a suicide element. These attacks
ranged from politically motivated sectarian violence to direct attacks upon civilians.
The period started with the assassination, by suicide bombing, of the former Lebanese
President Rafic Hariri. The 2015 Beirut bombings carried out by Daesh were the
most lethal suicide attack in the period, responsible for the deaths of 43 people with
240 recorded as wounded (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2015). The
period also corresponds with the transition of Hezbollah from predominantly a militant
group to a political party which held ministerial office as part of a coalition deal.
3.5.4 Pakistan
Pakistan has been referred to by commentators as the “epicentre of Islamic terrorism”
(Zakaria, 2010). Over the period of study 5,374 individuals were recorded by the Global
Terrorism Database as killed by suicide bombing attacks (START, 2017) with the 2007
Karsaz bombing believed to have been carried out by Al-Qaeda responsible for up to
180 deaths alone. The violence in Pakistan has been multifaceted with most political
parties employing military wings – some of which have allied themselves to international
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militant groups such as Al-Qaeda. This has led to a culture of poor governance due to
the imbalance of power between civil institutions and various military groups (Nawaz,
2016).
3.5.5 Turkey
Despite its considerable standing in geo-political spheres, Turkey has suffered consi-
derably from violence and terrorism over the past 30 years. Historically this violence
has been mainly attributed to the Kurdish-Turkish conflict but in recent years there
has increasingly been attacks by jihadi groups, such as Daesh. Suicide attacks have
been used by both Kurdish separatists and jihadi groups during the period of study
(START, 2017). The most destructive attack was the double suicide bombing of An-
kara railway station in 2015 which was attributed to Daesh or its allies and killed 102
people (Guran, 2015).
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3.6 Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics
In this section I outline the transformation of key variables included in the analysis
as well as presenting descriptive statistics on the temporal, socio-economic, religious
and spatial distribution of public justification for terrorism. These should be seen
only as initial indicative results before a range of controls are introduced in a formal
econometric analysis. In this section I use a dichotomous variable equal to one if survey
respondents claim that suicide bombings are ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ justified and zero
if respondents claim suicide bombings are ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ justified. This is so that
results here can be simply interpreted as the percentage of people who claim that the
suicide bombing of civilians is at least sometimes justified.
Within the remainder of this thesis chapter, I use language such as ‘justification for
suicide bombing’ or ‘those who justify bombing’ or ‘supporting suicide bombing’. To
be clear, these statements are derived from the answers given to the above question;
specifically, the extent to which surveyed individuals claim that suicide bombing is
justified against civilians in the defence of Islam.
3.6.1 Temporal Changes
Firstly, in Figure 3.2, I plot the percentage of people claiming that suicide bombing is
justified over time by country. Firstly, there is considerable variation in support across
countries. Averaging over the whole period, the most supportive country was Lebanon
where 33.3% of the sample believed bombing to be justified. The least supportive was
Pakistan, where justification was considerably lower at 9.9%. There are few consistent
temporal patterns across countries. There does appear to be an overall weakening
of support in all countries from 2005 until 2007/2008, possibly related to a declining
frustration about the ‘War on Terror’ which some Muslims interpreted as a de facto war
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on Islam (Cavatorta, 2012). There is also evidence of a rise in support between 2013 and
2015 in Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey. This could be correlated with the emergence
of Daesh as a major player within Syria and Iraq and the start of their expansion to
other Muslim countries. Overall country specific trends show that support in Jordan
declined considerably over the 11-year period, from above 40% to around 15%. In
contrast in Turkey, between 2007 and 2015, the percentage of people claiming suicide
bombing as justified rose from 5% to almost 40%. In Indonesia, Lebanon and Pakistan
support remained relatively stable.
Figure 3.2: Justification for Suicide Bombing over Time
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3.6.2 Education Level
There is considerable heterogeneity in educational information in the combined dataset
with up to 11 different types of education in some countries and years. To simplify
the analysis, as well as to ensure comparability with other studies (e.g. Krueger, 2007;
Shafiq and Sinno, 2010), individuals are allocated to one of four broad categories. This
is achieved using a national education framework (or equivalent) for each country and
matching qualifications across years. The four categories are ‘Below Primary Educa-
tion’, ‘Completed Primary Education’, ‘Completed Secondary Education’ and ‘Some
Higher Education (e.g. University or College)’.
Figure 3.3: Justification for Suicide Bombing by Education Level
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Education Categories: 1 - Below Primary, 2 - Primary Education, 3 - Secondary Education, 4 - Higher Education
Results on education are presented in Figure 3.3. The results here appear to give
support to H1 that there is no clear, consistent relationship between education and
justification for suicide attacks. There is, however, some weak evidence of an increasing
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relationship between education and support for terrorism in Indonesia and Turkey as
well as a decreasing one in Lebanon.
3.6.3 Income Level
Survey questions on monthly income are generally of the form:
“Here is a list of incomes. Which of these does your household fall into counting all
wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in?”
Where, in most cases, income is reported in bands, the midpoint of each band is
recorded as the household income level. These bands are generally around $25-$100 in
width (depending on country and year) and should provide a relatively good measure
of household income. In the surveys administered in 2014, respondents were asked their
actual monthly household income and I thus use this figure.
For the present analysis this raw income figure is transformed as follows. Firstly, I
adjust the figure by using an equivalence scale. This is necessary to accurately compare
income across households with a variety of different structural compositions. The
consumption needs of a household grow with size but not proportionally - economies of
scale mean that a family of six are unlikely to be six times poorer than an individual
living alone with the same household income (OECD, n.d.). Similarly, a household
comprised of two adults and four children will likely be better off than an equally
financially compensated household of six adults. The scale chosen here is the ‘OECD-
modified scale.’ This scale introduced by Hagenaars, De Vos, Asghar Zaidi, et al. (1994)
attempts to model these economies of scale by using the following formula:
EI =
RI
0.5 + (0.5× a) + (0.3× c)
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Where EI is the household’s equivalent income, RI is the raw income, a is the number
of adults and c is the number of children living in the household. Such that for a
household of size one, equivalent income is the same as raw household income. As
a household increases in size, equivalent income is deflated but not in a way which
weights the demands and needs of additional adults and children equally.
To provide temporal and cross-country compatibility the resulting equivalent income
figure is split into income quartiles by country and year. Some models in the data,
those that are within country only, use a continuous measure of income. Here, to
facilitate comparison, equivalent household income by country and year is deflated to
2005 USDs.
Figure 3.4: Justification for Suicide Bombing by Income Quartile
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Income Quartiles One - Four from Poorest to Richest
Figure 3.4 shows the level of justification by income quartile across countries. Here,
we can certainly reject the notion that there is a positive relationship between in-
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come and support for suicide attacks. In Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon there exists
a clearly declining relationship between income quartile and support. Indonesia also
exhibits an overall declining relationship albeit one which is considerably weaker and
non-monotonic. In Pakistan there is little discernible relationship. We can therefore
cautiously reject H2, that there is no relationship between income and support for
terrorism, although clearly there is a need to see whether these patterns persist when
controls are introduced in an econometric specification.
3.6.4 Religious Variables
This study uses two measures of religious commitment. Firstly, a measure of the self-
declared ‘importance’ that individuals place upon religion. Survey respondents are
asked:
“How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat important, not too
important, or not at all important?”
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between the importance individuals place upon re-
ligion and their likelihood of justification of suicide attacks. One confounding factor
here is that the suicide bombing survey question used in this study states that the
justification should be ‘in the defence of Islam’. This could mean that those who are
not committed to Islam - and thus in the ‘not at all important’ or ‘not too important’
groups - but still believe that the suicide bombing of civilians could be justified may
say that it is not justified ‘in the defence of Islam’. Therefore, it is likely that the true
percentage of people who would justify attacks in general in these groups is likely to
be higher than that reflected in Figure 3.5. These two categories also only incorporate
around 3% of the total sample. In the vast majority of surveys where individuals said
that religion is somewhat or very important in their lives, there is a declining relations-
hip in all countries except Lebanon. Overall, these graphs show a considerable amount
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of variation, however, there is no conclusive evidence either way as to whether we can
reject H3 that there is no impact of religion on support.
Figure 3.5: Justification for Suicide Bombing by Importance of Religion
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Categories: 1 - Not at all important, 2 - Not too important, 3 - Somewhat important, 4 - Very important
The second measure of religious commitment is a more objective indicator based upon
the question:
“How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on
Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at
least once, or every day five times?”
Figure 3.6 shows that, with the exception of Lebanon, as the frequency that people
claim that they pray increases, the percentage claiming suicide bombing is justified
decreases. Overall, this figure suggests that the hypothesis that there is no relationship
can be rejected, although the direction of the relationship depends upon the country.
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Figure 3.6: Justification for Suicide Bombing by Frequency of Prayer
0%
10
%
20
%
30
%
40
%
0%
10
%
20
%
30
%
40
%
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Indonesia Jordan Lebanon
Pakistan Turkey
%
 c
la
im
in
g 
su
ic
id
e 
bo
m
bi
ng
 is
 s
om
et
im
es
/o
ft
en
 ju
st
if
ie
d
Categories: 1 - Hardly ever, 2 - On Fridays and/or religious holidays, 3 - More than once a week,
4 - Every day, 5 - Every day five times
In order to simplify this measure for use in the regression models covered later, I convert
it to a simple dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual prays at least once
a day. These religious measures are not included in every econometric specification as
their inclusion lowers the sample size. The religious importance question was not asked
in 2014 and the frequency of prayer question was not asked in 2005, 2006 and 2012.
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3.6.5 Control Variables
Several control variables are used in the econometric analysis. Most of these are indi-
vidual characteristics. These include the individuals’ age, their gender, their marital
status, the number of children they have, and where they live. Another control variable
used in some specifications is a measure of ‘dissatisfaction’. This is a dummy variable
equal to one if an individual answered ‘dissatisfied’ to the survey question: “Overall,
are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country at the
moment?”. A similar measure was introduced by Shafiq and Sinno (2010) and is inten-
ded to control for any omitted variable bias that could occur if, for example, people’s
willingness to support the suicide bombing of civilians is only determined as a direct
result of their dissatisfaction with the way things are going in their country. In this
situation results on income/education would be driven through individuals’ dissatis-
faction rather than having a direct impact upon one’s likelihood of supporting attacks
upon civilians.
The results displayed in Table 3.1 show that factors increasing the average level of sup-
port include being male, unmarried, older and having fewer children. However, these
overall trends mask considerable variation between countries. For example, contrary
to the conventional wisdom, in Pakistan and Lebanon I observe a greater percentage
claiming that suicide bombing is justified amongst women than men. Another inte-
resting finding is the discrepancy in support by age groups. In Lebanon support for
these attacks is more likely as age increases. In contrast, in Turkey average support
is highest among young people. Trends over time in age and gender are presented in
Appendix Figures C.1 and C.2. Another interesting result in Table 3.1 is that dissatis-
faction with the way their country is going slightly decreases an individual’s support
for suicide attacks on civilians.
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Table 3.1: Justification by Other Personal Characteristics
Indonesia Jordan Lebanon Pakistan Turkey Overall
Gender
Female 10.26% 20.49% 34.57% 10.14% 13.29% 15.94%
Male 11.54% 20.63% 31.10% 9.77% 17.32% 16.27%
Marital Status
Unmarried 11.85% 18.47% 31.61% 9.38% 16.98% 17.13%
Married 10.61% 21.65% 34.54% 10.09% 13.97% 15.68%
Has Children
No Children 10.04% 28.61% 33.17% 11.34% 16.09% 18.01%
Children 11.16% 19.56% 33.42% 9.72% 14.16% 15.58%
Age Group
18-29 10.91% 18.44% 31.66% 10.10% 18.98% 16.04%
Age 30-49 11.67% 21.08% 32.95% 9.47% 12.94% 15.67%
50-64 8.13% 24.07% 35.99% 10.92% 13.48% 18.11%
65+ 11.90% 21.15% 44.68% 10.46% 10.02% 13.29%
Satisfaction
Satisfied 12.28% 21.51% 37.75% 13.94% 18.65% 17.90%
Dissatisfied 10.12% 19.80% 32.69% 8.51% 11.97% 15.12%
Country Average 10.91% 20.62% 33.35% 9.92% 14.96% 16.11%
N 10,577 9,989 4,981 10,782 8,064 44,393
In terms of geographic variation, although some individual surveys carry data to the
town level, I split observations at the regional level. This is in order to maintain
geographical consistency across all years for each country. It also has the additional
benefit of giving a considerable sample in every region. This means that here I can,
as an original contribution, show geographically which areas of the studied countries
have a higher level of support for terrorism. These regions are shown, as well as their
associated levels of justification for suicide attacks, in Figure 3.7. Regional boundaries
were obtained from the GADM Data project (GADM, 2018). It is important to take
note of the scale in each graph i.e. in Lebanon support ranges from 30% to 40% while
in Indonesia the range is from 9% to 16%. Aside from in Jordan, there is considerable
variation in the average level of justification by region.
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Figure 3.7: Justification for Suicide Bombing by Country Region
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Figure 3.7: Justification for Suicide Bombing by Country Region (cont.)
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3.7 Results and Analysis
The analysis conducted in this study is split into three sections. Firstly, I present results
using pooled data on all five surveyed countries. Secondly, I run individual regressions
on each country to observe whether there is a consistent or differing picture. Finally,
briefly summarised here but presented fully in Appendix Tables C.5 - C.9 I expand
upon the findings of Shafiq and Sinno; replicating their model but adding 10 further
years of data.
Most regressions presented use an ordered probit specification. The ordered probit
model makes use of a natural ordering of states within a discrete random variable
(Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1992). This ensures that the analysis can take ad-
vantage of the full variation in the four levels of justification (Always/ Sometimes/
Often/ Never) for suicide attacks on civilians. It works by assuming that underlying
the observed ordinal response is a continuous normally distributed variable measuring
propensity to justify terrorism. The distribution of this underlying variable is estima-
ted using maximum likelihood (Daykin and Moffatt, 2002). The main advantage of
using the ordered probit model over an ordinary least squares regression is that OLS
implicitly assumes that the difference between each category of response is identical.
This is not the case for the ordered probit model. In the appendices for robustness I
repeat the analysis using alternative models and specifications including OLS and logit
models.
3.7.1 Combined Country Regressions
Figure 3.8 presents ordered probit regression model coefficients and their 95% confi-
dence intervals on the total combined sample of countries and years in my analysis.
Given the considerable variation in these measures, as shown in section 3.6 above, I
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control for both year and regional fixed effects. I also show the omitted category for
each categorical variable which will always be on the line where X = 0. In terms of
interpreting the results; a negative coefficient, such as that on income quartile four,
implies that an individual being in this category rather than the omitted category (in-
come quartile one) has a greater likelihood of providing a lower category of answer
to the bombing justification question (e.g. that suicide bombing is rarely rather than
sometimes justified).
Figure 3.8: Combined Country Regression: Justification for Suicide Bom-
bing
Below Primary
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Secondary Education
Higher Education
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Note: Confidence Intervals are calculated at the 95% level; Includes Regional and Year Controls; n=38409.
These results fail to reject the hypothesis (H1) that there is no relationship between
education and support for terrorism. While there is some evidence that those with
primary education have a significantly lower level of support than those with below
primary, this effect does not persist for the higher education groups where there is
no significant effect at all. There does, however, appear to be a monotonically and
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significantly decreasing relationship between income and support for suicide attacks
upon civilians. This seems to be relatively compelling evidence that the hypothesis
(H2) that there is no relationship can be rejected. The ‘importance of religion’ variable
also has a negative and significant coefficient. This indicates that as the importance
that individuals place upon religion increases, the likelihood that they support suicide
attacks on civilians decreases. The coefficients on other variables show that there is no
real pattern in relation to age or marital status. However, being male (positively) and
having more children (negatively) do affect an individual’s level of support. Clearly,
as the results here are pooling data from all countries they only indicate overall trends
and may be masking some country-specific effects. This possibility is tested for in the
next section.
The results reported in Figure 3.8 are coefficients. Appendix Figure C.3 repeats the
analysis in Figure 3.8 using a binary probit model on the dummy measure of support
which was introduced in section 3.6 above. In this graph the results are presented as
marginal effects at the means (MEM) instead of ordinary probit coefficients. Presenting
the results in this format makes them far easier to interpret. It involves holding all
other variables at their means and observing the change in probability as a result of
only changing the particular variable. For example, the coefficient of -0.046 on income
quartile four means that for the average person (as determined by the means of all other
variables) the impact of being in the highest income quartile compared to the lowest
quartile is a decrease of 4.6% in the probability of justification for suicide bombing.
Other significant results include a decrease in justification of 0.9% for every additional
level of importance an individual places on religion, an increase of 0.8% for being male,
and a decrease of 0.5% for every child that an individual has.
The results from Figure 3.8 and Appendix Figure C.3 are reproduced in tabular form in
Appendix Table C.2. For robustness I also present two alternative specifications using
OLS regression instead of the probit and ordered probit models used for the two figures.
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Table C.2 shows that the results discussed above are very robust to these alternative
specifications with no variables showing considerable change in sign, or significance.
Additionally, the magnitude of the coefficients is very similar in the directly comparable
marginal effects probit and OLS models.
3.7.2 Regression Results by Country
I now progress to setting out results by individual country. Table 3.2 includes specifi-
cations for each country both with and without the two religious variables (importance
of religion and frequency of prayer). This is because of the sample size penalty which
comes from including these. The other major change from Figure 3.8 is that the regres-
sions presented in Table 3.2 use a continuous measure of income. As explained above,
this is depreciated according to an equivalence scale to take into account heterogenous
household dynamics and then converted to 2005 USD in order to facilitate compari-
son between coefficients. This continuous measure allows the models to incorporate
significantly more variation than the quartile method used above and in other papers
(Krueger, 2007; Shafiq and Sinno, 2010). The square of this income measure is also
included to allow for any non-linear effects. These regressions include a full range of
covariates as well as controls for region, year and country dissatisfaction.
The results in Table 3.2 are presented as ordered probit regression coefficients. Ap-
pendix Table C.3 presents results for the binary probit model as marginal effects at
the mean (MEM). On first glance, the results in Table 3.2 add weight to the argument
made by Shafiq and Sinno about the difficulty of generalising over several Muslim
countries. Results observed on education, income and religion show that there are no
entirely consistent relationships across all five countries and therefore it seems that a
one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate.
There was no clear relationship between education and support for the suicide bombing
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of civilians in the combined country analysis above. The results in Table 3.2, however,
show that H1 cannot be entirely rejected once the countries are analysed as separate
entities. In Pakistan there is a non-monotonically negative relationship. Those indivi-
duals with primary or higher education are significantly less likely to justify bombings
than those with ‘below primary’ level education, although there is no significant dif-
ference for those with Secondary education. In contrast, the results in Jordan and
Turkey point in the opposite direction. Once income and the other covariates have
been controlled for, it appears that the level of education in these countries has a po-
sitive, monotonic and increasingly significant effect upon support for terrorism. This
gives weight to the claims of Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003) and others who do not
agree with the conventional wisdom that higher levels of education will lower support
for terrorism. In Indonesia and Lebanon, it does appear that H1 holds, there are no
obvious, significant patterns.
The income relationship portrayed in Table 3.2 confirms that H2 (no relationship
between income and support for terrorism) should be rejected. In all countries, aside
from Pakistan we observe negative coefficients on income variables, the majority of
which are significant. In Pakistan there is a positive effect which diminishes up until
the 95th percentile at which point it starts decreasing. In Jordan this transformation
occurs in reverse in the 99th percentile. There is no evidence of significant nonlinearities
in the other surveyed countries. Overall, these results provide backing to the popular
consensus that decreasing poverty should lead to a decrease in backing for violent
extremism.
Finally, the two religious variables imply that H3 (no relationship between religious
commitment and support for terrorism) should be rejected. The viewpoint professed by
many, that there is a positive relationship between commitment to Islam and support
for this type of terrorism, should also be rejected. All coefficients indicate that as
people claim that they believe religion to be more important and their prayer becomes
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more frequent, the likelihood that they justify suicide bombing will decrease. This is
with the exception of a positive relationship for the ‘Importance of Religion’ question in
Lebanon. Even here though, the frequency of prayer question is working in an opposing
direction. This means that only where individuals claim that religion is important to
them, but fail to pray regularly, will a strong positive effect be realised. As discussed
above, the suicide bombing question mentions justification in the defence of Islam. We
may expect that if this was not the case the negative coefficients on ‘Importance of
Religion’ would increase in magnitude. This is because some individuals who believe
that suicide bombings are justified generally but are not religious may claim they do
not believe they are justified in the defence of Islam.
The marginal effects results in Appendix Table C.3 complement the main results in
Table 3.2 by providing an indication of the practical significance of results. They
enable a direct comparison of the magnitude of coefficients between countries. For
example, holding other variables at their means, an individual who claims that they
pray daily is found to have a probability of support for terrorism which is 2.7% lower
in Indonesia compared to if they prayed less frequently or never. In comparison, the
probability fall in Pakistan is only 1.7%. One variable of interest where Table 3.2
indicated considerable ambiguity is the impacts of having studied higher education in
comparison with having no education. The marginal effects model shows that in Jordan
and Turkey the positive marginal impacts upon support for terrorism are 6% and 3.2%
respectively (using the 1st model). In contrast, the negative impact on support in
Pakistan is smaller in magnitude at 1.7%. This supports the earlier finding of a mixed
picture, albeit one which appears stronger in support of a positive relationship than
a negative one. Overall, the results in Table C.3 using a binary measure of support
strongly suggests the robustness of the findings in Table 3.2.
As a robustness check and to further investigate the opposing relationships between
education and income in Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan I split the country samples in
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two according to income and then re-estimate the results in Table 3.2. The results of
this are shown in Appendix Table C.4 where for each country the left column shows
results on individuals in the bottom two income quartiles and the right column shows
results on individuals in the top two quartiles. The results on income and religion
in this split sample regression hold up well. The religious effects are almost identical
between richer and poorer groups. In terms of income, even when restricting varia-
tion to half of the distribution, all countries aside from Pakistan exhibit a negative
relationship between income and support. The results on education are particularly
interesting; in Jordan and Turkey the positive and significant results on education from
Table 3.2 are only evident in the higher income quartiles. This exists despite an overall
decreasing relationship between income and support. This means that where income
is above average, and thus support is lower, higher levels of education can have an in-
creasing effect upon support for terrorism. In Pakistan the income relationship found
in Table 3.2 was positive. The split sample analysis shows that for lower income in-
dividuals increased education will increase support for suicide attacks. Conversely, for
higher income individuals the education relationship is negative. These relationships
hold when using other robustness checks including interactions between education and
income and when splitting the data by both education and income.
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3.7.3 Revisiting Shafiq and Sinno
In the final section of my analysis I revisit and expand upon the findings of Shafiq
and Sinno (2010) whose analysis was conducted using the PGAS data from 2005. This
is to verify whether any results which they found using their model specification on
one year’s survey data hold up with the addition of a further 10 years’ worth of data.
There are, however, a couple of caveats to this. Firstly, Shafiq and Sinno run separate
regressions on support for attacks on civilians and on coalition troops. In this chapter
I am only able to replicate those results on civilians as subsequent Pew surveys after
2005 did not ask about attacks on troops. Secondly, they use a slightly more complex
variable to model dissatisfaction than I can use here. My measure is only based on
whether a person is satisfied with the way their country is going. They use this question
but complement it with information on whether an individual believes that Islam is
under threat. This is not possible in the expanded sample replication because, again,
this question was not asked in future years.
It is also important to note that Shafiq and Sinno’s regression specification is different
to the one which I have used to generate the results elsewhere in this chapter (Ta-
ble 3.2). I believe that the changes that I have made improve the model. The main
differences are the use of a continuous measure of income depreciated according to the
OECD equivalence scale, compared to using quartiles of income per capita as well as
the addition of religious variables. There are also a couple of smaller changes such
as increasing the number of categories of age. Where results differ slightly between
the extension of Shafiq and Sinno and the results using my models presented in Ta-
ble 3.2 I believe that the results of the latter should provide a better indication of any
relationships.
Appendix Tables C.5 - C.9 compare the results found by Shafiq and Sinno, using 2005
data, with the results found using the same model (plus a year trend) for the full sample
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from 2005 through to 2015. The results in the right two columns, applying Shafiq and
Sinno’s methodology to the whole sample, show almost identical results to those found
in Table 2 using my alternative methodology and act as a useful robustness check.
The comparison tables show some consistency between the S&S results and those from
the full sample, particularly in Jordan where a negative result on income and a positive
one on education was identified. However, there are several points of divergence. One
is the negative and significant results on income in Lebanon and Turkey which were
not picked up in the 2005 survey. In contrast, Shafiq and Sinno find a negative result
on income in Pakistan while the full sample indicates that there is an overall positive
relationship. Overall, these results show the importance of replicating and expanding
the findings of studies such as this, especially where further data becomes available.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter has aimed to test the hypotheses that there is no consistent and signi-
ficant relationship between education, income, religious commitment and support for
terrorism using a series of surveys carried out in five Muslim countries between 2005
and 2015.
The results presented in this study have rejected the hypothesis (H2) that there is no
relationship between income and support for terrorism. In Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon
and Turkey an increase in household income implies a reduction in an individual’s
justification for suicide attacks upon civilians. Conversely, in Pakistan this relationship
appears to be positive although does diminish and then becomes negative for very high
earning households. These results contrast with much of the previous literature in the
area which has generally either concluded that there is no relationship between income
and support for terrorism or that there is a positive one.
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In terms of education, results are more uncertain with no overall pattern. Here, I fail
to reject the hypothesis (H1) that there is no consistent relationship. In Lebanon and
Indonesia I find no significant relationship, in Pakistan there is a non-monotonically
negative relationship while in Jordan and Turkey there is a positive, significant and
monotonic relationship. This positive relationship between education and support for
terrorism is compatible with much of the previous empirical literature that has been
carried out (e.g. Krueger (2007)). What is added to the literature here is the results
observed in Appendix Table C.4. These show that individuals who are poorer are
more likely to support terrorism regardless of their education. Those who are richer
are less likely to support terrorism but if they are also highly educated this acts in an
opposing, positive, direction compared to the income effect. One possible explanation
for this could be that it is a result of the social networks these groups mix within; poorer
people may often be exposed to likeminded people whose frustration with their place in
life incentivises them to rebel. Those who are financially better off may not mix in social
networks of discontent unless they are exposed to them within the confines of higher
education. There are suggestions that the nature of education in Jordan and Turkey
could lead to the formation of radicalised social networks. In Turkey, for example,
the percentage of children attending religious Imam Hatip Schools rose from 2% of
the secondary school age population in 2002 to 11% in 2017 (The Economist, 2017).
In Jordan, the national education curriculum was changed in 2016 as the government
believed that it could be driving young people towards radicalisation (Azzeh, 2016).
One caveat to the analysis in this chapter is the possibility of omitted variable bias.
The R2 values in Table 3.2 indicate that the variables included in the regression ex-
plain only some of the variation in the dependent variable, implying that there are
likely to be other variables which have explanatory power that have not been incor-
porated. Examples of possible omitted variables which are not covered by the Pew
surveys include an individual’s exposure to extremism within their community, their
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parental background, and their type of schooling (e.g. religious or secular). Where such
omitted variables are uncorrelated with incorporated independent variables, coefficients
obtained on these independent variables will remain unbiased. If this is the case for
all variables affecting an individual’s likelihood of supporting terrorism that were not
included in the model then the results in this chapter remain valid. However, where
an omitted variable is correlated with one of the independent variables, the regression
coefficient on this independent variable will be biased.
This analysis in this chapter incorporated as variables and controls as much individual
information as was consistently available within the confines of the Pew surveys. Howe-
ver, despite this, it seems plausible that omitted variable bias could be affecting some
coefficients in this chapter. For example, if secondary or higher education providers are
more likely to teach an Islamic curriculum than primary schools then the coefficients on
these education groups will be incorporating both the impact of an individual having
higher levels of schooling as well as that of the omitted variable (being more likely to
have received an Islamic education). In this case these two effects would be difficult to
disentangle. Future surveys undertaken with the goal of producing similar analysis to
the present study should ask a greater range of questions focussed upon the participants
background. This may, however, come with a cost as individual’s may be unwilling to
discuss such personal matters and there would also be a significant time cost to the
interviewer. An alternative to asking these additional questions is to collect panel data,
whereby individuals are asked the same questions over a number of years. The use of
repeated observations on individuals allows for time-invariant unobserved individual
characteristics to be controlled for by using fixed or random effects regression. Again,
however, there would be a substantial cost to implementing such a survey and, in ad-
dition, some individuals may opt out or become uncontactable part-way through the
study.
Another important caveat to the analysis here is that individual’s survey responses
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may be subject to a type of systematic measurement error, that is, they may misreport
their attitudes in a non-random way. An example of this is that respondents may sys-
tematically overstate the extent to which they are committed to their religion. In this
study I attempt to mitigate this risk by including a more objective proxy measure of
religious commitment which is how often the survey participant prays. There are, ho-
wever, further survey questions for which proxy questions are not available. The most
significant for the validity of this study is whether they believe suicide bombings to be
justified, the dependent variable in this analysis. It appears possible that individuals
may understate the extent of their support to avoid embarrassment or because they are
concerned that interviewers may pass details to law enforcement. This will be particu-
larly problematic if this measurement error is dispersed in a non-random way amongst
the sample population. For example, if older people are more likely to understate the
extent of their support than younger people then results on age will likely be biased.
While outside the domain of the current study, further work could mitigate this pro-
blem using alternative survey methods. Two such methods are list experiments and
endorsement experiments. Both methods employ indirect questioning techniques whe-
reby individuals are not required to explicitly respond to sensitive questions (Blair,
Imai, and Lyall, 2014). Both experimental methods randomly allocate interviewees
to either the treatment or control groups. For list experiments, the control group are
presented with a short list of individuals, political parties, or armed groups and asked
to give the number of these which they support (without being asked to name them).
The treatment group are asked to do the same with an identical list with the addition
of a sensitive individual or group (such as a terrorist organisation). Researchers then
analyse the difference in numerical responses between the treatment and control groups
to elicit likely support for the sensitive area of study. List experiments have been pre-
viously used to study a variety of topics including the level of anti-semitism affecting
support for Jewish election candidates in Florida (J. Kane, Craig, and Wald, 2004) and
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support for criminal organisations in Mexico (Dıaz-Cayeros et al., 2011). In endorse-
ment experiments, respondents in the treatment group are asked about the extent of
their support for a particular non-controversial policy. The control group are asked the
same question, however, with the additional information that the policy is endorsed by
an undesirable, or sensitive, group. The difference between the support for the policy
in the treatment and control groups is therefore an indicator of the underlying level of
support for the sensitive group. Endorsement experiments have previously been used
to measure support for militant organisations in Pakistan (Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro,
2012) and Afghanistan (Lyall, Blair, and Imai, 2013).
The findings outlined in this study should have policy relevance to those making de-
cisions on how to target resources with the goal of decreasing terrorism. Firstly, po-
licymakers should note that in neither income, education or religious commitment is
there an entirely consistent relationship with support for terrorism across all countries.
This should imply that one-size-fits-all policies targeted identically at all countries are
unlikely to be sufficient. For example, uniformly increasing funding for educational
providers is likely to have very different terrorism outcomes in some countries compa-
red to others. This means that in some countries (e.g. Jordan and Turkey), rather than
increasing funding for schools and universities policymakers should specifically target
the ideologies being taught. This could be done by, for example, including mandatory
peace education as part of the national curriculum. The income relationship found
here should reassure policymakers that targeting poverty reduction is a worthwhile
goal which should be expected to have a negative impact upon the level of support
for terrorism in most countries. Finally, in terms of religion, governments should act
to dampen any rhetoric linking commitment to Islam to support for terrorism. The
present analysis has shown no evidence to back up these claims. However, if this popu-
list rhetoric is allowed to shape policy it could exacerbate existing religious or political
tensions causing deeper grievances which eventually lead to more terrorism.
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There is a clear need for further research into several areas related to this chapter. Fir-
stly, researchers should study empirically the causal links between support for terrorism
and the level of terrorism that takes place. This should help us better understand the
consequences of public support for terrorist activities and therefore the motivations
for studies such as this one. Further research should also be undertaken on surveys
conducted in alternative countries, this should enable further testing of any consistent
patterns. In terms of education, where there is the most ambiguity, research should be
carried out on the types of school people went to as well as how the social networks
which they interact with affect their likelihood of radicalisation. The replication and
expansion of Shafiq and Sinno’s paper show that researchers should regularly revisit
existing findings when further data becomes available.
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Chapter 4
Thesis Conclusions
This thesis has explored three distinct research topics within the field of conflict stu-
dies. In particular, chapters have studied how conflict and terrorism may be observed
through the media, documented in media-based databases, and supported by local
populations. This concluding chapter draws out the main implications of these three
topics individually in addition to considering further implications which may be drawn
out through the synergies between them.
Chapter 1 studied the intensity with which heterogeneous conflict events are reported by
the news media. This was undertaken with the main aims of understanding the relative
newsworthiness of a range of conflict event characteristics, and how the importance
of these characteristics varies between differing groups of news outlets (e.g. between
domestic and international media). The study made use of a unique, innovative, dataset
which records direct linkages between 19,413 conflict events that occurred between 2006
and 2013 in Iraq, and the specific news media outlets that reported them. Several event
characteristics - such as the type of weapon employed by aggressors - were analysed for
the first time in the study. Other event characteristics - such as the number of fatalities
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- reported as significant by previous academic studies were reanalysed here with the
benefit of a larger and more robust dataset.
The analysis in Chapter 1 resulted in several key findings. Firstly, across all media
outlets, reporting intensity is found to significantly increase with event size. However,
growth in coverage is not proportional; a doubling in the number of fatalities does not
lead to a doubling in media coverage received by an event. Secondly, the weapon type
used in a conflict event significantly impacts upon the intensity of coverage an event
receives. Figure 1.6 presents the relative ordering in terms of newsworthiness of a range
of weapon types. These results show that events using small arms weaponry are the
least newsworthy while those utilising explosive weapons, particularly those involving
a suicide element, receive a significant reporting intensity premium. These effects are
not only restricted to the reporting of coalition news outlets. The relative ordering
of weapons is found to be persistent across both international news agencies as well
as Iraqi media outlets. Reporting is also found to be dependent upon event location.
Intensity of reporting decreases as distance from the capital, Baghdad, increases. While
this result is significant across domestic and international news outlets, the magnitude
of the coefficient is around 13 times larger for coalition-based media than for Iraqi
media.
Although Chapter 1 predominantly presented the empirical evidence for those phe-
nomena observed, it is important to note that the results also corroborate well with
the personal experiences of western journalists operating in Iraq since the outbreak
of war in 2003. For example, the consistent underreporting of “events occurring vir-
tually anywhere outside of Baghdad” was frequently cited by journalists interviewed
by Pew Research Center (2007). This is explained as being caused by a combination
of an increasingly dangerous security situation for journalists and the poor roads and
infrastructure outside the capital city. Freeman (2004), of The Telegraph, claimed that
“only the most important stories are now deemed worth leaving Baghdad for”. This
142
4. Thesis Conclusions
may offer some supporting evidence to the results in Appendix Figure A.5 which sho-
wed that the reporting gap between Baghdad and non-Baghdad events disappears for
incidents where more than 20 civilians were killed.
The majority of interviewed journalists (Pew Research Center, 2007) also noted the
decline in demand from editors for news stories on ‘day-to-day’ conflict events. This
appears to support the results in Figure 1.2 showing a substantial fall over time in
the average number of reports from coalition media outlets per event. This is ex-
plained as being a result of an oversaturation effect whereby “the media has in some
way bored its audience with the violence”. Iain Overton, a veteran reporter of more
than 16 conflicts including Iraq, explained in an interview conducted for the present
research (Appendix A.3) that “war reporting fatigue means that the longer a conflict
goes on, the more people have to die in a ‘spectacular way’ to merit meaningful co-
verage”. Additionally, anecdotal evidence from journalists corroborates those patterns
of heterogenous newsworthiness of weapon types found in the chapter. For example,
Overton describes how “hierarchies of reporting exist” for weaponry which determines
media coverage. Suicide bombings routinely obtain “the most attention” followed by
other explosive weapons which generally “trump small arms” weaponry. Although the
findings of Chapter 1 are frequently cited as significant factors influencing news repor-
ting by journalists, there are many other factors affecting the coverage that an event
receives. For example, Overton claims that “the quality of the footage emerging from
an event, the number of accredited journalists on the ground, the dominance of other
news stories on the day, and the wider context of interest” all may also contribute
in dictating the level of coverage that an event may be afforded. There is, therefore,
substantial future work analysing additional variables to be carried out in this field to
gain further understanding of event coverage variation.
There are several important implications of the analysis undertaken in Chapter 1.
For example, the results hold substantial consequences for those individuals wishing
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to obtain accurate knowledge of a conflict through their consumption of the news
media. Notably, relying upon a small number of relatively homogenous news outlets
to gain knowledge of a conflict is likely to result in a skewed understanding of the true
violence which is occurring. Such news consumers are encouraged to regularly access
the websites of data collators (such as IBC) that bring together data from a variety
of media (and often non-media) sources and are therefore less influenced by editors’
judgements of event newsworthiness. Furthermore, news editors wishing to accurately
cover the violence occurring within a conflict zone may wish to consider the significant
biases detected in this study to help shape their future editorial decisions.
In addition to these direct implications, further implications requiring future study
have become salient as a result of the analysis undertaken in the chapter. For example,
this study has been carried out with the implicit assumption that events and their cha-
racteristics are determined exogenously from patterns of media coverage that events
receive. This means, therefore, that the analysis assumes that the date, location, and
nature of conflict events are selected by conflict actors in a non-reactive manner and
subsequently media coverage is determined through the characteristics selected. Howe-
ver, previous research (e.g. Dowling, 1986) has suggested that terrorists and insurgents
will plan and carry out attacks with a variety of different goals: to cause maximum
fatalities and injuries, for the purpose of securing political or military advantage, for
disseminating fear, or - most importantly here - with the purpose of gaining media
attention for their cause. Given this, it could be considered plausible that insurgents
and terror organisations may be designing their attacks in order to extort maximum
media coverage. Media attention is desirable for armed groups, it gives them publi-
city, increases the feeling of public vulnerability, and it may offer insurgents and their
grievances a type of quasi-legitimacy (Savitch and Ardashev, 2001). While conclusive
evidence is weak there are several synergies between the findings of this thesis as well
as those of other studies which may offer support to this theory.
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One example of this can be found in the weapon type chosen by actors. Section 3.1
of this thesis set out how the use of suicide bombing has increased substantially over
the past 20 years. Suicide bombings have grown from being extremely rare events re-
sponsible for between 0 and 300 deaths worldwide each year between 1980 and 2000,
to averaging around 400 attacks and 4,000 deaths annually since 2005 (CPOST, 2016).
Given that results in Chapter 1 showed that suicide attacks accrue the most media
coverage of any weapon type, one could draw the conclusion that terror groups have
increasingly moved towards this type of attack in order to maximise their media atten-
tion. This desire for attention was described in interview by journalist Iain Overton
(Appendix A.3) as the ‘propaganda of the deed’ whereby an explosive charge is known
by revolutionaries to be far more newsworthy than a bullet and thus more likely to
ignite the desired social revolt.
A further example is the location of events. Chapter 1 indicated that violent events
occurring in urban areas, and particularly capital cities, will accrue more coverage
than otherwise equivalent events in rural areas. While conflict prevalence is declining
in most countries worldwide, violence and conflict within cities is increasing (Beall,
Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 2013). Savitch and Ardashev (2001) showed that terror
attacks are disproportionately common in major urban areas in comparison with rural
areas. They indicate several reasons for this including a higher concentration of assets,
the proximity of heterogeneous social groups, and cities’ role as ‘nodes’ in international
communication. However, one key reason is that events in cities are more likely to be
reported by the media; they claim that “if terrorists thrive on anything, it is media
attention and widespread recognition.”
There is a clear need for further research into this area, specifically studies that can
successfully establish causal channels that evaluate whether armed groups select the
weapons, targets, and dates of terrorism as a direct response to the reporting preferen-
ces of the media. However, should clear channels of causality be established, this should
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hold substantial moral implications for future reporting decisions of news editors. For
example, conflict actors may have switched to using suicide bombing as a tactic due
to the additional media attention, ceteris paribus, that such events accrue due to their
‘exotic’ nature. Given that suicide attacks are a particularly lethal type of attack (Ta-
ble 1.1) it could be shown that reporting decisions of the media have inadvertently
resulted in a higher number of conflict and terrorism deaths than would have otherwise
been the case. An argument could be made for some type of government intervention
or regulation in the media industry. This may be undertaken with the aim of pre-
venting excess media coverage of particular groups or events where such coverage may
lead to disproportionate panic amongst the general population or, indeed, encourage
further attacks. However, such an intervention should be carefully evaluated against
any diminishing in press freedom that it may cause. There are significant benefits to
a free press, for example, investigative journalism has routinely played a positive role
in exposing human rights violations by actors within conflict and has almost certainly
saved lives.
Chapter 2 of this thesis considered the validity of media-based conflict datasets. Such
datasets have been routinely used by NGOs to document conflict events and fatalities,
particularly where conflict actors have failed to record these themselves. The chapter
consisted of two main pieces of analysis. The first considered the source selection pro-
cess which those planning to implement such datasets will undergo. Results, drawn
from analysis using the IBC dataset, showed that source selection will hold significant
implications for the accuracy of datasets. It will impact upon both the completeness
of datasets (whether the total counts of events and/or fatalities are correct) and the
composition (whether datasets contain proportions of different types of events which
are as close as possible to the unobserved reality). There may also be trade-offs be-
tween selecting sources which provide higher completeness and those which reflect a
more accurate composition. Pseudo datasets, artificially created by drawing on the
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reporting of particular subsets of media sources, document the Iraq conflict in sys-
tematically different ways. Examples of these substantial differences between pseudo
datasets include variation in the timeline of the conflict, the event size distribution,
and the weapon type composition of the datasets. The main results of this analysis
should assist those embarking on the documentation of violence in selecting an optimal
composition of media sources. When targeting both data completeness as well as an
accurate event composition, datasets should draw predominantly upon international
news agencies, complemented with the reporting of local news sources. Adding further
news sources will particularly benefit datasets in correcting the imbalance of event-size
bias. While this study has provided an important indication of how to increase data-
set accuracy, formal models should be designed and implemented which fully evaluate
the marginal costs (e.g. personnel costs and computing power) against the marginal
benefits (in terms of dataset completeness and composition) of adding further sources.
The second section of analysis in Chapter 2 implemented a novel use of multiple sys-
tems estimation (MSE) techniques to the media-reported IBC dataset. The IBC da-
taset provided a unique opportunity to use media sources as ‘capture histories’ for the
MSE analysis. The analysis was also complemented by the existence of other types of
data - military records and household surveys - which were used as robustness checks
to the MSE estimation. Analysis was undertaken with the aims of establishing the
extent of completeness in IBC between July 2006 and December 2009 and gaining an
understanding of the likely characteristics of those conflict events which are missing.
Results found two distinct types of conflict events that are currently missing from the
IBC event data. Firstly, MSE estimated around 9,500 conflict events (responsible for
14,200 fatalities) which were missed because of imperfect media reporting. Secondly, a
further 6,000 to 8,000 deaths were estimated through comparing results with available
military and survey data. These deaths are those which were outside the ‘ecosystem’
of the news media (i.e. could not have feasibly been reported upon). After discounting
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around 9,800 fatalities which IBC includes as body count data, the estimated missing-
ness of IBC is estimated to be somewhere between 10,700 and 12,700 deaths. These
deaths are predicted as occurring almost exclusively in very small events killing one
or two people and mainly caused by gunshot wounds. The results in this section have
important implications for those involved in the contested debate over the true cost - in
terms of civilian lives - of the Iraq conflict. The results estimated that IBC incorporates
between 73% and 77% of civilian fatalities occurring between July 2006 and Decem-
ber 2009 (where deaths documented in IBC as events and those recorded as part of
body counts are combined). Although covering a different period, this implied rate of
missingness is significantly lower than that claimed by proponents of disputed surveys
(e.g. Roberts et al., 2004; Burnham et al., 2006) carried out in Iraq that estimated the
number of deaths to be several times higher than the number documented by IBC.
An overall implication of the analysis in Chapter 2 is that for a large, complex, and pro-
longed conflict, such as Iraq, it is unlikely that any conflict data gathering methodology
will be without error or bias. Although the analysis in this thesis has been particularly
focussed upon omissions present in media-based datasets, other academic research has
found inaccuracies in alternative data types such as military data (Berman, Shapiro,
and Felter, 2011) and survey data (Spagat, 2010). This thesis recommends that organi-
sations managing data collection projects should be open and clear about the potential
flaws within their data. For example, IBC states on its database website (Iraq Body
Count, n.d.(a)) that “gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest to-
tals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence”. There should also be
an onus upon journalists covering conflict to ensure that their reporting of death tolls
accurately reflects the level of uncertainty present in such measures. Finally, academic
researchers should acknowledge and explore where measurement error, introduced by
systematic inaccuracy in the recording of conflict events, may be affecting the results
of their studies.
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Chapter 3 studied the socio-economic and religious characteristics which determine an
individual’s likelihood of claiming that terrorism against civilians is a justified act. The
study analysed these topics using a larger, richer, dataset than those previously used
to study similar questions. The dataset was created through the amalgamation of 11
rounds of Pew’s Global Attitudes Survey, combining interviews with 44,393 individuals
across five Muslim countries. Analysis was particularly focussed upon the impact of
income, education, and religion on support for terrorism. Previous academic studies
have painted a weak, inconsistent, picture of the impact of these variables, which has
often contrasted with the conventional wisdom. In addition to a substantial increase
in the sample size relative to other studies, the chapter also implemented an impro-
ved model (e.g. by using a continuous measure of income) to analyse these topics.
The main chapter results indicated that there is a strong and consistently negative
relationship between income and support for terrorism in Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Turkey. In Pakistan, support for terrorism increases through the lower half of
the income distribution before declining for higher earners. Results on education were
found to be mixed; there was no significant relationship between education and support
in Indonesia and Lebanon. In Pakistan there was a negative relationship, albeit one
that was non-monotonic. However, in Jordan and Turkey results indicated a positive,
monotonically increasing, significant relationship between education level and support
for terrorism. Religious commitment was generally found to have a negative and sta-
tistically significant impact on the extent of justification for terrorism. However, in
Lebanon, the relationship is found to be positive where claims of religious commitment
are not put into practice in the form of regular prayer. Covariates incorporated within
the analysis indicated that unmarried men without children are the most likely group to
support terrorism overall. However, this result is far from consistent across countries.
There are several key implications stemming from the analysis in Chapter 3. One such
implication is that those individuals claiming that terrorism against civilians is a justi-
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fied act differ systematically across countries in several ways. These include educational
background, age, and gender. Policymakers should not expect that one-size-fits-all po-
licies targeted equally at individuals across a variety of countries will necessarily be
effective in suppressing support for extremism. In the present study this is particu-
larly evidenced by results on education where well-intentioned increased funding into
education might be expected to lead to a variety of different outcomes, including a
rise in support for terrorism in Turkey and Jordan. Overall, poverty reduction should
generally be expected to lead to a decrease in support for terrorism, however, the mag-
nitude of this effect varies significantly across countries. Finally, results in the chapter
implied that perceived positive links between commitment to Islam and support for
terrorism are baseless and, generally, the relationship works in an opposing direction.
Politicians and others holding influence should take note of these findings and avoid
unsubstantiated rhetoric linking commitment to Islam and terrorism, which is only
likely to exacerbate tensions.
The analysis in Chapter 3 also highlighted several areas where further academic re-
search should be carried out. One such area is the application of alternative survey
methods (such as list or endorsement experiments) in future analyses aiming to study
similar questions. These should be implemented with the purpose of testing whether
surveyed individuals answer questions honestly, especially where questions ask for vie-
wpoints on controversial issues such as support for terrorism. Further work should also
consider additional variables that may have a causal impact upon support for terrorism.
Examples of such variables include the type of schooling (e.g. religious or secular) an
individual has received, whether they were raised within a nuclear family unit, and
their employment status. Finally, given the discussion above on whether conflict can
plausibly be considered as exogenous to media coverage, synergies between chapters 1
and 3 of this thesis should be explored further. In particular, whether excess media
attention received by armed groups may elicit sympathy or support for such groups
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and the attacks they carry out. Chapter 3 has considered those personal characteristics
which increase an individual’s likelihood of supporting terrorism. A possible omitted
variable within this analysis may be the level of exposure that the individuals have
had to the media coverage of violent events, particularly ‘exotic’ events such as suicide
attacks known to receive excess coverage. Further work should consider whether the
intensity of media coverage of violence an individual is exposed to has a significant
causal effect on their likelihood of supporting violence.
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Appendix A
Framing of a War
A.1 Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Distribution of Coalition Media Group Variable
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Iraqi Media Group Variable
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Figure A.3: Distribution of News Agencies Media Group Variable
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Figure A.4: Reporting of Gunfire and Bombing Attacks by Event Size
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Figure A.5: Reporting Inside and Outside Baghdad by Event Size
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Figure A.6: Standardised OLS Coefficients by Weapon Type (Robust SEs)
Suicide Bomb (On Foot)
Suicide Bomb (Vehicle)
Air Attack
Non-Suicide Bombing
Drive-by Shooting
Missile Fire
Vehicle Accident
Other Weapon
Execution
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
Standardised OLS Regression Coefficients
Coalition Media
Iraqi Media
News Agencies
Note: CIs at the 95% level and calculated using robust SEs. Regression includes region, time and event size controls. Reference category is gunfire.
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Table A.3: Zero-Inflated Model Comparison
Coalition Media
NB ZINB
No. of Fatalities 1.038∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗
(17.67) (16.49)
No. of Injuries 1.012∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗
(13.08) (8.30)
Driving Time from Baghdada 0.871∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗
(-21.71) (-13.77)
Weekend 0.886∗∗∗ 0.939∗
(-4.51) (-2.18)
Aerial Attack 2.007∗∗∗ 2.563∗∗∗
(8.09) (10.61)
Non-Suicide Bomb 1.759∗∗∗ 1.813∗∗∗
(20.07) (19.36)
Drive-by Shooting 1.432∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗
(7.43) (5.95)
Execution 0.758∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗
(-3.33) (-3.52)
Missile 1.307∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗
(5.39) (5.82)
Other Weapon 1.023 1.373∗
(0.20) (2.46)
Suicide Bomb (On Foot) 3.576∗∗∗ 3.482∗∗∗
(19.32) (21.40)
Suicide Bomb (Vehicle) 2.887∗∗∗ 2.824∗∗∗
(18.68) (19.97)
Vehicle Accident 0.889 0.820
(-0.37) (-0.71)
Constant 0.489∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(-20.46) (-9.03)
Alpha 0.635∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(-13.40) (-20.38)
Observations 19413 19413
Pseudo R2 0.148
Standard errors in parentheses; NB coefficients are given as
incidence rate ratios; Weapon reference category is gunfire;
aMeasured in hours; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.4: NB Regressions: Coalition Media by Locational Specification
(Robust SE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Driving Time from Baghdada 0.871∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗
(0.00594) (0.00800)
Within Baghdad City 1.797∗∗∗
(0.0561)
Driving Time from Nearest Citya 0.825∗∗∗ 1.003
(0.0137) (0.0273)
Within Any City 1.445∗∗∗
(0.0576)
Constant 0.489∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0155)
Alpha 0.635∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0358) (0.0376) (0.0373)
Event Size Controlsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weapon Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19413 19413 19413 19413
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.155 0.141 0.143
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Coefficients are given as incidence rate ratios
a Measured in hours; b No. of fatalities and injuries; cYear and weekend controls;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.5: NB Regression: Restricting Sample by Location
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Minus Baghdada Full Sample Minus Citiesb
Driving Time (Baghdad)c 0.871∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗
(0.00554) (0.00842)
Driving Time (Any City)c 0.825∗∗∗ 0.993
(0.0125) (0.0262)
Constant 0.489∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0171)
Alpha 0.635∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0324) (0.0223) (0.0365)
Event Size Controlsd Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controlse Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weapon Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19413 14867 19413 10580
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.141 0.141 0.146
Standard errors in parentheses; Coefficients given as incidence rate ratios; aEvents in Baghdad
dropped from sample; bEvents in Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Kirkuk and Erbil dropped; cMeasured
in hours; d No. of fatalities and injuries; eYear and weekend controls; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.6: NB Regression: Locational Specifications ’As-the-Crow-Flies’
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance from Baghdada 0.841∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗
(0.00742) (0.0102)
Within Baghdad City 1.852∗∗∗
(0.0559)
Distance from Nearest Citya 0.750∗∗∗ 0.985
(0.0179) (0.0347)
Within Any City 1.423∗∗∗
(0.0496)
Constant 0.469∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0130) (0.0146) (0.0141)
Alpha 0.645∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0206) (0.0224) (0.0221)
Event Size Controlsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weapon Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19413 19413 19413 19413
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.155 0.141 0.143
Standard errors in parentheses; Coefficients are given as incidence rate ratios;
a Measured per 100km ’as the crow flies’; b No. of fatalities and injuries;
cYear and weekend controls; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.7: Full Results by Weapon Type
Coalition Media Iraqi Media News Agencies
OLS NB OLS NB OLS NB
Air Attack 0.541∗∗∗ 2.237∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗
(0.0593) (0.197) (0.0677) (0.0975) (0.0659) (0.100)
Non-Suicide Bombing 0.273∗∗∗ 1.797∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 1.610∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0513) (0.0159) (0.0217) (0.0154) (0.0308)
Drive-by Shooting 0.127∗∗∗ 1.417∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 1.432∗∗∗
(0.0237) (0.0696) (0.0270) (0.0324) (0.0263) (0.0458)
Execution -0.124∗∗∗ 0.838∗ -0.183∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗
(0.0371) (0.0701) (0.0423) (0.0419) (0.0412) (0.0510)
Missile Fire 0.0712∗ 1.257∗∗∗ 0.0235 1.068 0.0700∗ 1.180∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0634) (0.0320) (0.0370) (0.0312) (0.0441)
Suicide Bomb (On Foot) 1.694∗∗∗ 4.563∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 2.626∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗ 3.496∗∗∗
(0.0476) (0.304) (0.0543) (0.101) (0.0529) (0.142)
Suicide Bomb (Vehicle) 1.005∗∗∗ 3.232∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 2.096∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 2.754∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.187) (0.0436) (0.0712) (0.0424) (0.102)
Vehicle Accident -0.000307 0.954 0.131 1.258 -0.0125 1.114
(0.160) (0.310) (0.182) (0.227) (0.177) (0.256)
Other Weapon 0.0853 1.187 -0.0323 0.980 -0.0520 0.894
(0.0172) (0.0405) (0.0197) (0.0174) (0.0191) (0.0242)
Constant 0.881∗∗∗ 1.277∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0405) (0.0197) (0.0174) (0.0191) (0.0242)
Alpha 0.680∗∗∗ 0.00174 3.29e-11
(0.0227) (0.0123) (.)
Event Size Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controlsb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19413 19413 19413 19413 19413 19413
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.174 0.218
Standard errors in parentheses; Dependent variables standardised in OLS models; NB coefficients
given as incidence rate ratios; Reference category is gunfire; aNo. of fatalities & injuries; bDummy
variables for regions cYear trends and weekend controls; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.2 Technical Appendix (Excluded Observations)
The analysis in this chapter has been focused upon the intensity of reporting received
by specific conflict events recorded with a wide range of event details. This has involved
attempting to remove those events included in the dataset as aggregations of several
incidents and therefore with varying amounts of missing information. An example of an
aggregation here may be a police report documenting that 30 bodies have been found
across Baghdad over a period of time. IBC will also record which (if any) media outlets
reported on this police report. Despite not being covered in the same detail as other
events, these deaths are still being covered by the media in some way. Also removed
from the data were events recorded as lasting more than 2 days due to these events
tending to have looser linkages between specific event details. It is important however
to acknowledge that the exclusion of long duration events and aggregated reports may
have affected results obtained. This Technical Appendix will assess whether overall
results are robust to reintroducing such events into the main dataset. The intensity of
coverage in the coalition media group is used as the chosen variable for analysis. One
point to note again here is that the paper analyses differences in the intensity of media
coverage of conflict, rather than whether events were covered at all. This implies that
in order to see large changes in the observed coefficients the added events would need
to be receiving a substantially different intensity of coverage compared to events with
similar compositions already in the dataset.
Technical Appendix Table A.8 presents a series of robustness checks relating to rein-
tegrating the removed aggregations back into the dataset. As there is no information
within these aggregations with which to deconstruct them into individual events, they
are included as single large entries. To analyse these aggregations required some gene-
ralisations over event characteristics. These include, for example, using the mid point
of a region where bodies have been found and classing all deaths as gunfire where media
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Table A.8: Robustness Checks using NB Model and Coalition Media Group
Original Data Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Driving Time to Baghdada 0.871∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗
(0.00554) (0.00527) (0.00551) (0.00528)
No. of Fatalities 1.038∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.00219) (0.00176) (0.00216) (0.00170)
No. of Injuries 1.012∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(0.000944) (0.000837) (0.000942) (0.000920)
Weekend 0.886∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0232)
Aerial Attack 2.007∗∗∗ 1.889∗∗∗ 1.975∗∗∗ 1.828∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.157) (0.169) (0.156)
Non-Suicide Bombing 1.759∗∗∗ 1.701∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗ 1.528∗∗∗
(0.0495) (0.0455) (0.0491) (0.0419)
Drive-by Shooting 1.432∗∗∗ 1.379∗∗∗ 1.433∗∗∗ 1.284∗∗∗
(0.0693) (0.0652) (0.0692) (0.0620)
Execution 0.758∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗
(0.0631) (0.0586) (0.0599) (0.0581)
Missile Fire 1.307∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.092
(0.0649) (0.0597) (0.0645) (0.0540)
Suicide Bomb (Foot) 3.576∗∗∗ 3.442∗∗∗ 3.563∗∗∗ 3.510∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.218) (0.235) (0.231)
Suicide Bomb (Vehicle) 2.887∗∗∗ 2.800∗∗∗ 2.870∗∗∗ 2.558∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.153) (0.163) (0.146)
Vehicle Accident 0.889 0.873 0.883 0.785
(0.283) (0.271) (0.282) (0.258)
Other Weapon 1.023 0.990 0.961 0.883
(0.115) (0.109) (0.105) (0.0960)
Constant 0.489∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0206)
Alpha 0.635∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0191) (0.0215) (0.0212)
Observations 19413 20026 19654 20272
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.152 0.148 0.141
Standard errors in parentheses; Coefficients given as incidence rate ratios; aMeasured in hours
Weapons reference category is gunfire; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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reports say that ‘most show signs of gunshot wounds’. Column (1) presents the same
negative binomial results using the original data as those presented in Table 1.4 and
therefore should be used as a comparison for the other coefficients. Column (2) removes
the restriction on events found to have been reported upon as aggregations. As can
be observed, there is very little movement in the obtained coefficients. This can be
explained by the composition of the observations added here. They are predominantly
gunfire and they receive a slightly higher than average intensity of coverage within the
coalition media group. However, they are also significantly larger in magnitude than
the average event within the data. Therefore, the observed intensity of reporting -
taking into account the number of fatalities incurred by these events and that they are
mainly caused by gunfire - is roughly at the level predicted by the existing data.
Column (3) tests a second restriction made on the data analysed in the paper by
reintroducing previously removed events that have at least some information on location
and weapon type with a duration of longer than 2 days. Again, the inclusion of these
events is not found to have any significant effect on the coefficients reported in the
main paper.
Column (4) tests the effect of simultaneously removing the restrictions on both re-
porting aggregations and duration. The main consequence of this is the addition of
monthly body count figures from the Baghdad morgue from July – October 2006. These
enter the database as very large events (300-1000 deaths) denoted as all being caused
by gunfire and that received little coverage among western media sources. As expected,
adding events of this magnitude which receive a low intensity of coverage diminishes
the coefficient on the effect of the number of fatalities on media intensity, though it
maintains significance. Coefficients are otherwise very similar to column (1), aside from
missile fire no longer holding a significant coverage premium over gunfire events.
Secondly, as an additional robustness check, Technical Appendix Table A.9 compares
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the coalition media results in Table 1.4 with those of a date restricted sample. This
sample includes only events occurring after December 2008. This date was chosen
because it roughly splits the sample in half but also because events reported as aggre-
gations within the dataset occur almost exclusively before December 2008. Rerunning
these results with the restricted time frame may provide an indication as to whether
results are being driven by their inclusion/non-inclusion. It also provides another useful
robustness check in ensuring that the results obtained were not being led generally by
events at the start of the period. The table shows that restricting the data in this way
has little impact upon the regression coefficients. In terms of weapon bias, coefficients
are mostly very similar in direction and size with notable differences being that the
effect of missiles, aerial attack or execution upon reporting intensity is no longer sig-
nificantly distinguishable from that of gunfire. The insignificant coefficient on ‘aerial
attack’ is due to only a handful of events of this type occurring after November 2008.
One other noticeable change is a strengthening of the coefficients indicating an event
size effect within the intensity of coalition media reporting.
Overall, results obtained within the paper have been shown to be very robust to the
treatment of removed observations. The inclusion or exclusion of these events may be
considered conceptually important in terms of defining what constitutes coverage of an
event. However, empirically, their inclusion would have little effect on the impact that
event characteristics have upon the intensity of media coverage that events receive.
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Table A.9: Impact of Restricting Analysis Time Frame
Full Date Restricted
Sample Sample
Driving Time to Baghdada 0.871∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗
(0.00554) (0.00973)
No. of Fatalities 1.038∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗
(0.00219) (0.00636)
No. of Injuries 1.012∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗
(0.000944) (0.00216)
Weekend 0.886∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0399)
Aerial Attack 2.007∗∗∗ 3.66e-19
(0.173) (9.94e-10)
Non-Suicide Bombing 1.759∗∗∗ 1.705∗∗∗
(0.0495) (0.0871)
Drive-by Shooting 1.432∗∗∗ 1.351∗∗∗
(0.0693) (0.117)
Execution 0.758∗∗∗ 0.835
(0.0631) (0.185)
Missile Fire 1.307∗∗∗ 1.085
(0.0649) (0.179)
Suicide Bomb (Foot) 3.576∗∗∗ 3.455∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.468)
Suicide Bomb (Vehicle) 2.887∗∗∗ 3.095∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.377)
Vehicle Accident 0.889 0.711
(0.283) (0.419)
Other Weapon 1.023 0.746
(0.115) (0.138)
Constant 0.489∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.00891)
Alpha 0.635∗∗∗ 0.985
(0.0215) (0.0533)
Observations 19413 9635
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.162
Standard errors in parentheses; Coefficients given as incidence rate ratios;
Weapons reference category is gunfire; Date restricted sample covers events
after Nov 2008; aMeasured in hours; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.3 Interview Transcript
Electronic Communication with Iain Overton (1st February 2019)
Nathan Woolley: Iain, as a journalist who has previously reported on various con-
flicts worldwide, what patterns have you observed in the newsworthiness of particular
conflict events? Why do you believe that certain types of events receive disproportionate
levels of media attention?
Iain Overton: When innovations in explosive materials emerged in the late 19th
century, revolutionaries from New York to Paris to St Petersburg were enthralled by
the notion that societal change could be achieved through a carefully placed bomb.
Inherent in this was the belief that the ‘propaganda of the deed’ - where an explosive
charge was far more ‘newsworthy’ than an assassin’s bullet - would ignite social revolt.
The first suicide bomber targeted the Tsar of Russia in 1871, and since that time
explosive weapons have garnered great media attention.
Today, hierarchies of reporting exist within explosive violence use. Suicide bombs get
the most attention, followed by ‘prohibited’ weapons such as cluster munitions and
landmines. Certain explosive weapons - such as hand grenades - barely register in
conflict zones, although they would gain huge attention if used in a European city. The
location and type of weapon, alongside who is targeted and the number of victims, all
play a part. A mortar that kills ten schoolgirls in Afghanistan will get more traction
than the same weapon if it killed ten adult, male agricultural labourers. A suicide
bomber in a Western city will get as much coverage as a school mass shooter in the
United States. The degree to which a story gets coverage is also influenced by other
factors. War reporting fatigue means that the longer a conflict goes on, the more people
have to die in a ‘spectacular way’ to merit meaningful coverage. The quality of the
footage emerging from an event, the number of accredited journalists on the ground, the
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dominance of other news stories on the day, and the wider context of interest (i.e. Syria
is more covered than Nigeria, for example), all dictate how many inches or minutes a
report might be given. Explosive weapons in a conflict zone trump small arms, but
small arms in a developed nation trump explosive weapons in a conflict zone. Within
explosive weapons, the hierarchy of reporting appears to be: nuclear weapons, suicide
attacks, air-strikes (with cluster munitions leading that sub-type), ground-to-ground
weapons, landmines, ground-to-airs, hand-held.
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Appendix B
Assessing the Completeness of
Media Based Datasets
B.1 Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: Relative Fatality Completeness over Time
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Figure B.2: Weapon Deaths Composition by Pseudo Dataset
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Figure B.3: No. of Events by Event Size
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Table B.2: LCM MSE Estimation Stratified by Event Size
Event Size
IBC MSE Estimate
Events Deaths Events Deaths
1 6,129 6,129 8,724 8,724
[7,966, 10,330] [7,966, 10,330]
2-3 3,264 7,579 4,162 9,664
[3,745, 5,170] [8,696, 12,005]
4-9 1,536 8,255 1,907 10,249
[1,709, 2,334] [9,185, 12,544]
10-19 347 4,558 328 4,308
[320, 345] [4,203, 4,532]
20+ 258 10,872 256 10,788
[251, 270] [10,577, 11,378]
Total 11,534 37,393 15,377 43,733
[13,991, 18,449] [40,627, 50,789]
Note: 95% Confidence Intervals in parentheses.
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Table B.3: Event Size and Weapon Stratification Breakdown
Gunfire Bombing
Suicide
Bombing
Driveby
Shooting
Air/
Missile
Other
1 IBC 3291 1534 126 505 394 279
% IBC 53.70% 25.03% 2.06% 8.24% 6.43% 4.55%
MSE 5193.39 1681.90 114.04 658.68 486.57 346.81
% MSE 61.23% 19.83% 1.34% 7.77% 5.74% 4.09%
2-3 IBC 1557 911 138 158 339 161
% IBC 47.70% 27.91% 4.23% 4.84% 10.39% 4.93%
MSE 2088.70 937.08 143.62 176.49 349.12 228.99
% MSE 53.23% 23.88% 3.66% 4.50% 8.90% 5.84%
4-9 IBC 672 391 156 34 185 98
% IBC 43.75% 25.46% 10.16% 2.21% 12.04% 6.38%
MSE 846.69 363.26 162.90 41.68 191.30 184.15
% MSE 47.30% 20.29% 9.10% 2.33% 10.69% 10.29%
10-19 IBC 122 92 65 5 44 19
% IBC 35.16% 26.51% 18.73% 1.44% 12.68% 5.48%
MSE 115.12 91.52 64.10 4.00 41.20 15.00
% MSE 34.79% 27.65% 19.37% 1.21% 12.45% 4.53%
20+ IBC 103 46 80 0 13 16
% IBC 39.92% 17.83% 31.01% 0.00% 5.04% 6.20%
MSE 104.61 46.00 80.02 0.00 13.00 13.00
% MSE 40.76% 17.92% 31.18% 0.00% 5.07% 5.07%
Overall IBC 5745 2974 565 702 975 573
% IBC 49.81% 25.78% 4.90% 6.09% 8.45% 4.97%
MSE 8348.50 3119.75 564.68 880.85 1081.19 787.95
% MSE 56.47% 21.10% 3.82% 5.96% 7.31% 5.33%
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Table B.4: Full IBC+SIGACTS Matching Comparison
Event Size LB Estimate UB
1 IBC+SIGACTS 14534 16233 17932
Model Based MSE 10980 12807 14634
LCM Estimation 7966 8724 10330
2-3 IBC+SIGACTS 4703 5049 5394
Model Based MSE 4835 5772 6709
LCM Estimation 3745 4162 5170
4-9 IBC+SIGACTS 1715 1848 1990
Model Based MSE 1745 1878 2011
LCM Estimation 1709 1907 2334
10-19 IBC+SIGACTS 350 366 382
Model Based MSE 320 332 344
LCM Estimation 320 328 345
20+ IBC+SIGACTS 260 260 260
Model Based MSE 251 259 267
LCM Estimation 251 256 270
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Appendix C
Who Supports Terrorism?
C.1 Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: Support for Suicide Bombing over Time by Gender
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Figure C.2: Support for Suicide Bombing over Time by Age
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Table C.1: Comparing Dropped Observations
Did Not Answer Question
Full Sample Terrorism Support Dissatisfaction
Below Primary 0.240 0.340† 0.345
Primary Education 0.326 0.333 0.328
Secondary Education 0.295 0.232† 0.221
Higher Education 0.140 0.095† 0.106
Income Levela 2.627 2.393† 2.524
Male 0.506 0.438† 0.426
Married 0.707 0.707 0.713
Age 36.246 36.463 36.588
No. of Children 2.188 2.276† 2.436*
N 44,393 2,439 1,061
aIncome measured in 100’s 2005 USD deflated by OECD measure; † Significant
(p < 0.05) difference with full sample; * Significant (p < 0.05) difference with those
who did not answer terrorism question
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Table C.2: Full Results and Alternative Specifications of Figure 3.8
Ordinal Dependent Variable Binary Dependent Variable
OProbit OLS Probit (MEM) OLS
Primary Education -0.0585*** -0.0344*** -0.00794 -0.00685
(0.0187) (0.0125) (0.00536) (0.00538)
Secondary Education -0.0198 -0.00595 0.00507 0.00608
(0.0200) (0.0134) (0.00586) (0.00576)
Higher Education -0.0260 -0.0113 0.00629 0.00641
(0.0240) (0.0164) (0.00705) (0.00706)
Income Q2 -0.0229 -0.0234* -0.0158*** -0.0159***
(0.0188) (0.0126) (0.00578) (0.00543)
Income Q3 -0.0587*** -0.0507*** -0.0324*** -0.0316***
(0.0195) (0.0131) (0.00586) (0.00563)
Income Q4 -0.0970*** -0.0820*** -0.0459*** -0.0478***
(0.0215) (0.0144) (0.00625) (0.00620)
Importance of Religion -0.0522*** -0.0304*** -0.00851** -0.00800**
(0.0128) (0.00899) (0.00365) (0.00387)
Gender 0.0436*** 0.0262*** 0.00765** 0.00676*
(0.0129) (0.00866) (0.00374) (0.00373)
Married 0.00198 0.00125 -0.000803 -0.000586
(0.0169) (0.0113) (0.00487) (0.00487)
No. of Children -0.00764* -0.00782*** -0.00476*** -0.00500***
(0.00396) (0.00258) (0.00115) (0.00111)
Constant 0.725*** 0.238***
(0.0411) (0.0177)
Cut 1 0.168***
Cut 2 0.736***
Cut 3 1.464***
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Group Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.045 0.080 0.047
N 38409 38409 38409 38409
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure C.3: Probit Marginal Effects Regression: Justification for Suicide
Bombing
Below Primary
Primary Education
Secondary Education
Higher Education
One
Two
Three
Four
18-29
Age 30-49
50-64
65+
Importance of Religion
Gender
Married
No. of Children
Education Level
Income Quartile
Age Group
Other Variables
-.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
Marginal Effects at the Means
Note: Confidence Intervals are calculated at the 95% level; Includes Regional and Year Controls; n=38409.
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Table C.5: Indonesia Ordered Probit Replication/Expansion Regressions
2005 Replication 2005-2015 Data
Primary Education -0.004 -0.007 -0.0650 -0.0612
(0.149) (0.148) (0.0542) (0.0542)
Secondary Education -0.199 -0.204 -0.103* -0.0963*
(0.153) (0.152) (0.0559) (0.0560)
Higher Education -0.717*** -0.726*** -0.0972 -0.0843
(0.292) (0.291) (0.0836) (0.0838)
Income Quartile 2 0.064 0.063 0.0472 0.0441
(0.138) (0.138) (0.0421) (0.0421)
Income Quartile 3 -0.086 -0.087 0.0168 0.0116
(0.135) (0.135) (0.0422) (0.0422)
Income Quartile 4 0.134 0.132 0.0185 0.0126
(0.142) (0.143) (0.0460) (0.0461)
Dissatisfaction 0.019 -0.105***
(0.064) (0.0295)
Male 0.094 0.093 0.0688** 0.0700**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.0286) (0.0286)
Age 18 to 29 0.608*** 0.609*** 0.216*** 0.217***
(0.164) (0.163) (0.0479) (0.0480)
Age 30 to 49 0.553*** 0.553*** 0.180*** 0.182***
(0.150) (0.150) (0.0443) (0.0444)
Married -0.039 -0.036 -0.0385 -0.0417
(0.137) (0.136) (0.0370) (0.0371)
No. of Children 0.064** 0.062** -0.00488 -0.00503
(0.042) (0.042) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Cut1 0.998 *** 1.016*** 0.643*** 0.572***
(0.237) (0.241) (0.114) (0.116)
Cut2 1.554*** 1.573*** 1.196*** 1.125***
(0.238) (0.242) (0.114) (0.116)
Cut3 2.569*** 2.587*** 1.964*** 1.895***
(0.252) (0.263) (0.117) (0.119)
Year Trend N/A N/A Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 767 767 8447 8447
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.031 0.004 0.005
Omitted categories: Below Primary Education, Income Quartile 1 and
Age 50+; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.6: Jordan Ordered Probit Replication/Expansion Regressions
2005 Replication 2005-2015 Data
Primary Education 0.198* 0.206 0.0298 0.0291
(0.111) (0.110) (0.0355) (0.0355)
Secondary Education 0.359*** 0.366*** 0.0723** 0.0705**
(0.116) (0.116) (0.0354) (0.0356)
Higher Education 0.293* 0.327* 0.127*** 0.124***
(0.176) (0.173) (0.0385) (0.0387)
Income Quartile 2 -0.156 -0.183 -0.0638* -0.0638*
(0.114) (0.114) (0.0361) (0.0361)
Income Quartile 3 -0.290** -0.285** -0.0862** -0.0869**
(0.128) (0.127) (0.0376) (0.0377)
Income Quartile 4 -0.562*** -0.535*** -0.238*** -0.239***
(0.144) (0.150) (0.0413) (0.0413)
Dissatisfaction 0.251*** -0.0170
(0.063) (0.0252)
Male 0.040 0.036 0.0307 0.0303
(0.072) (0.073) (0.0246) (0.0246)
Age 18 to 29 -0.429*** -0.440*** -0.0753* -0.0752*
(0.147) (0.146) (0.0411) (0.0411)
Age 30 to 49 -0.166 -0.172 -0.0670* -0.0674*
(0.103) (0.104) (0.0344) (0.0344)
Married -0.219** -0.215** 0.110*** 0.109***
(0.109) (0.107) (0.0338) (0.0338)
No. of Children -0.115*** -0.111*** -0.0121 -0.0121
(0.028) (0.028) (0.00827) (0.00827)
Cut1 -1.133*** -0.825 *** -0.501*** -0.509***
(0.158) (0.173) (0.0661) (0.0671)
Cut2 -0.409*** -0.097 0.348*** 0.340***
(0.154) (0.169) (0.0663) (0.0671)
Cut3 0.658*** 0.988*** 1.173*** 1.165***
(0.149) (0.165) (0.0664) (0.0671)
Year Trend N/A N/A Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 887 887 8504 8504
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.022 0.019 0.019
Omitted categories: Below Primary Education, Income Quartile 1 and Age 50+;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Lebanon Ordered Probit Replication/Expansion Regressions
2005 Replication 2005-2015 Data
Primary Education -0.145 -0.177 -0.0363 -0.0362
(0.195) (0.197) (0.0577) (0.0578)
Secondary Education -0.139 -0.189 0.0410 0.0414
(0.213) (0.212) (0.0612) (0.0612)
Higher Education -0.271 -0.343 -0.0866 -0.0832
(0.260) (0.260) (0.0607) (0.0608)
Income Quartile 2 -0.028 0.028 -0.000408 -0.00392
(0.168) (0.169) (0.0484) (0.0484)
Income Quartile 3 0.104 0.125 -0.0881* -0.0900*
(0.176) (0.174) (0.0475) (0.0476)
Income Quartile 4 -0.052 -0.038 -0.114** -0.119**
(0.221) (0.219) (0.0508) (0.0508)
Dissatisfaction 0.299*** -0.118**
(0.072) (0.0497)
Male -0.111 -0.136 -0.0284 -0.0299
(0.114) (0.115) (0.0324) (0.0324)
Age 18 to 29 0.185 0.192 -0.107** -0.108**
(0.178) (0.181) (0.0533) (0.0533)
Age 30 to 49 0.239 0.218 -0.0900** -0.0875*
(0.160) (0.159) (0.0449) (0.0449)
Married -0.141 -0.128 0.0172 0.0158
(0.143) (0.145) (0.0400) (0.0400)
No. of Children -0.106* -0.098* -0.0129 -0.0136
(0.057) (0.055) (0.0164) (0.0164)
Cut1 -0.635*** -0.302 -0.504*** -0.587***
(0.212) (0.225) (0.0976) (0.104)
Cut2 0.112 0.457** 0.101 0.0187
(0.210) (0.223) (0.0976) (0.104)
Cut3 0.692*** 1.056*** 0.943*** 0.861***
(0.213) (0.224) (0.0990) (0.105)
Year Trend N/A N/A Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 384 384 4745 4745
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.036 0.008 0.009
Omitted categories: Below Primary Education, Income Quartile 1 and
Age 50+; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Pakistan Ordered Probit Replication/Expansion Regressions
2005 Replication 2005-2015 Data
Primary Education -0.108 -0.144 -0.109*** -0.0890**
(0.110) (0.110) (0.0412) (0.0415)
Secondary Education -0.154 -0.194 -0.0563 -0.0339
(0.166) (0.168) (0.0412) (0.0414)
Higher Education -0.436** -0.488*** -0.180*** -0.140**
(0.179) (0.183) (0.0617) (0.0623)
Income Quartile 2 -0.040 -0.040 0.0782* 0.0814*
(0.139) (0.138) (0.0445) (0.0447)
Income Quartile 3 -0.179 -0.181 0.0752 0.0890*
(0.139) (0.139) (0.0468) (0.0470)
Income Quartile 4 -0.316** -0.332** 0.124** 0.142***
(0.154) (0.155) (0.0511) (0.0513)
Dissatisfaction 0.113*** -0.305***
(0.069) (0.0325)
Gender 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.0194 0.00873
(0.099) (0.099) (0.0316) (0.0318)
Age 18 to 29 -0.096 -0.099 -0.0157 -0.0195
(0.151) (0.150) (0.0488) (0.0489)
Age 30 to 49 0.085 0.079 -0.0244 -0.0230
(0.139) (0.139) (0.0465) (0.0466)
Married 0.104 0.112 0.00905 0.0120
(0.123) (0.122) (0.0400) (0.0400)
No. of Children -0.017 -0.018 -0.00103 -0.00122
(0.022) (0.022) (0.00663) (0.00660)
Cut1 0.003 0.093 0.463*** 0.321***
(0.220) (0.225) (0.0923) (0.0936)
Cut2 0.595*** 0.686*** 0.830*** 0.691***
(0.219) (0.224) (0.0927) (0.0939)
Cut3 1.097*** 1.190*** 1.249*** 1.114***
(0.218) (0.224) (0.0935) (0.0944)
Year Trend N/A N/A Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 670 9208 9208
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.038 0.014 0.022
Omitted categories: Below Primary Education, Income Quartile 1 and
Age 50+; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.9: Turkey Ordered Probit Replication/Expansion Regressions
2005 Replication 2005-2015 Data
Primary Education -0.268 -0.269 0.0977 0.101
(0.229) (0.230) (0.0639) (0.0642)
Secondary Education -0.285 -0.285 0.157** 0.169**
(0.245) (0.245) (0.0709) (0.0714)
Higher Education -0.320 -0.321 0.155* 0.169**
(0.295) (0.296) (0.0809) (0.0814)
Income Quartile 2 0.220 0.220 -0.0657 -0.0651
(0.174) (0.174) (0.0502) (0.0504)
Income Quartile 3 -0.167 -0.167 -0.166*** -0.171***
(0.180) (0.180) (0.0538) (0.0539)
Income Quartile 4 -0.308 -0.309 -0.188*** -0.187***
(0.222) (0.223) (0.0576) (0.0578)
Dissatisfaction -0.006 -0.297***
(0.077) (0.0333)
Gender 0.170 0.169 0.145*** 0.138***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.0338) (0.0340)
Age 18 to 29 0.318 0.319 0.226*** 0.243***
(0.202) (0.203) (0.0535) (0.0539)
Age 30 to 49 0.198 0.198 0.0696 0.0790
(0.185) (0.185) (0.0493) (0.0495)
Married 0.093 0.092 -0.0211 -0.0385
(0.154) (0.154) (0.0413) (0.0415)
No. of Children -0.023 -0.023 -0.0678*** -0.0644***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.0175) (0.0175)
Cut1 0.628* 0.621* 0.953*** 0.762***
(0.328) (0.349) (0.1000) (0.102)
Cut2 1.020 *** 1.012 *** 1.346*** 1.159***
(0.327) (0.349) (0.101) (0.102)
Cut3 1.874*** 1.866*** 2.130*** 1.951***
(0.319) (0.343) (0.105) (0.106)
Year Trend N/A N/A Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 590 590 6547 6547
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.061 0.019 0.027
Omitted categories: Below Primary Education, Income Quartile 1 and
Age 50+; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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